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Abstract
The effect of aging on nuclear power plant performance has come under increased scrutiny in
recent years. The approaches used to make an assessment of this effect strongly influence the eco-
nomics of nuclear power plant operation. This work aims (a) to determine how the risk-informed
approach to performance assessment can be specifically improved, (b) to formulate and demon-
strate a method for risk-informed nuclear power plant component reliability analysis, and (c) to as-
sess the applicability of these improvements to the nuclear regulatory environments of the United
States and France, the countries having the largest national nuclear power programs.
In order to address the first objective, a case study of the U.S. and French regulatory treatment of the
pressurized thermal shock phenomenon was performed. A new methodology that can be applied
to the construction of risk-informed analyses was developed in response to the findings of the case
study. The methodology specifically aims to improve upon current risk-informed methods, which
implement a hybrid of best-estimate and conservative modeling, by increasing the use of risk-
based modeling justification in order to allow for the development of a more logically consistent
analysis. The second objective is addressed through the development of a new reliability model
describing the effects of transient-induced degradation. The reliability model is applied through
the demonstration of a risk-informed method for the calculation of fatigue degradation. The data
requirements for the future successful implementation of this risk-informed method are presented.
Examining the applicability of the risk-informed approach to U.S. and French nuclear power plant
regulation showed that currently the U.S. is a more progressive implementer of risk-informed prac-
tices. This examination revealed, however, than an alternative approach known as the best-estimate
plus uncertainty (BEPU) method could be considered for application in regulatory environments,
such as in France, that are less accepting of the risk-informed approach. In order to understand
how the BEPU method could be improved, the U.S. approach to BEPU was analyzed and recom-
mendations for its future application are presented.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael W. Golay
Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The effect of aging on nuclear power plant performance has come under increased scrutiny
in recent years. Many operating nuclear power plants are now reaching the ends of their planned
lifetimes. In order for the plants to be operated beyond the original license duration, analyses must
be performed in order to understand the safety of future operation. The approaches used to make
this assessment can strongly affect the economics of nuclear power plant operation. Ultimately,
the analytical approaches used to make these assessments will be reflected in the formation of the
nuclear regulation.
Two approaches are used to make assessments of plant performance and reliability: the de-
terministic approach and the risk-informed approach. The deterministic approach relies upon en-
gineering judgment to determine the acceptable range of plant performance, while a risk-informed
assessment implements an explicit treatment of parameter uncertainty, relying less on traditional
conservative engineering judgment. In France and in the U.S. the deterministic approach is imple-
mented in the majority of the nuclear regulatory requirements.
Risk-informed based performance assessments have gradually become more popular in the
U.S. This has been largely driven by the market structure of the U.S. electric industry, as the
competitive markets encourage the desire for the economic efficiencies that can result from the use
of risk-based methodologies. The use of risk-informed practices has been particularly successful
in the implementation of the Reactor Oversight Process and the Maintenance Rule. Deterministic
approaches, however, still remain in use, with the option to use the risk-informed or deterministic
rule when both are available.
In contrast to the U.S., France has remained grounded in its use of deterministic approaches.
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Recent improvements in performance assessment methods, however, have indicated that excessive
margin may exist in the deterministic treatment. The resulting economic consequences have led to
a curiosity concerning the benefits of implementing risk-based methodologies in some performance
analyses related to plant aging.
Understanding the fundamental nature of the U.S. and French analytical treatment of perfor-
mance assessments could reveal opportunities for both countries to enjoy a higher level of safety
in plant operation, in addition to increased economies. The basic differences between the risk-
informed and deterministic approaches used in the U.S. and France leave much to be understood.
1.2 Thesis Objectives
The focus of this thesis work is on the construction of risk-informed nuclear power plant
safety analyses. The following two questions are addressed through this work:
1. What new methodology (or method) could be implemented in the improvement of risk-
informed analyses?
2. How applicable are the alternative methods to U.S. and French regulatory practices?
1.3 Introduction to Thesis Sections
In order to be able to understand how to improve upon the construction of a risk-informed
analysis, an example was selected in order to serve as a case study from which conclusions can
be drawn. The case study that is used in this work is the technical basis of the risk-informed
pressurized thermal shock (PTS) rule (10 CFR 50.61a)(CFR, 2010), which is an assessment of the
integrity of the reactor pressure vessel. This case is relevant to the motivation of this work for
three main reasons. First, it is a risk-informed treatment of a reactor component that is central
to the safety justification of the long-life performance of nuclear power plants. Secondly, it has
parallel international treatments that are heavily based in deterministic practices. Therefore, it
provides a point of comparison between these two different practices. In our work, the French PTS
analysis is used for these comparative purposes. Finally, the risk-informed PTS rule is a newly
developed treatment, gaining U.S. regulatory approval in January of 2010. Therefore, it provides
a characterization of the latest risk-informed practices that are being implemented in the U.S.
In order to be able to draw useful conclusions regarding the construction of the risk-informed
PTS analysis, the technical basis of the U.S. risk-informed PTS treatment is studied in detail. The
16
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areas that were selected for focus are the transient selection (PRA) and fracture mechanics analy-
sis. These two areas were selected because they provide the most useful material to use in com-
parison to the French PTS treatment. Chapter two is a description of the technical basis of the
U.S. risk-informed analysis. Because the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis reflects an evolution
of a deterministic analysis, the chapter begins by discussing the original, deterministic U.S. PTS
treatment. The material selected for presentation in chapter two regarding the U.S. risk-informed
treatment was chosen as it provides the foundation from which conclusions were later drawn in
this thesis work.
Similar to chapter two, chapter three is a description of the French PTS analysis. Because
the availability of information regarding the French analysis is much more limited in comparison to
the U.S., as there is little public dissemination of regulatory analysis and practices, the description
is far less detailed. It still, however, presents a description of the transient selection and fracture
mechanics analyses, parallel to the presentation of the U.S. practices.
In chapter four, a comparison of the U.S and French reactor vessel integrity assessments
is presented. This comparison focuses on the transient selection and fracture mechanics analyses,
as these are the technical areas which constitute the main differences in the analytical approach.
Although the French treatment has been selected for comparison, its highly deterministic nature
allows for it to serve as a general characterization of the fundamental differences between a risk-
informed and deterministic treatment.
In order to be able to determine how the construction of risk-informed analyses may be
improved, the case study example of the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis was critiqued. The
critique presented in chapter five has two objectives: to identify and describe the techniques that
are implemented in order to construct a risk-informed analysis and to analyze how effectively these
techniques were implemented. The critique of the risk-informed analysis serves as the basis from
which conclusions can be drawn regarding how the construction of risk-informed analyses can be
improved generally.
Based upon the conclusions of the critique presented in chapter five, chapter six presents
a new methodology that can be used in the construction of future risk-informed analyses. The
methodology is generally applicable, in that it is not specific to the analysis of reactor pressure
vessel integrity. The methodology is presented through both a description and an example of it as
applied to the analysis of reactor vessel integrity.
In chapter seven, a risk-informed reliability model that characterizes the effects of transient-
induced degradation and the important considerations for its future implementation are presented.
The model was developed in response to considering how the reliability of a reactor pressure
vessel would be determined if it were to experience a pressurized thermal shock event, but not
17
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experience failure. At the beginning of the chapter, the basics of reliability theory are summarized
in order to provide a foundation for the model. After the model is presented, its future appli-
cability is addressed by examining how the current deterministic treatment of a component that
experiences transient-induced degradation could be improved upon through implementation of the
risk-informed reliability model. The deterministic analysis pertaining to nuclear power plant com-
ponent fatigue was selected for this illustration. The important considerations for the successful
application of the risk-informed reliability model to component fatigue are discussed. Finally, an
example of how a risk-informed treatment of component fatigue could be constructed is presented.
In order to address the second main objective of the thesis, the next three chapters are
devoted to evaluating the applicability of the developed methods to the nuclear regulatory systems
in the U.S. and France. Chapter eight presents a history of the use of risk information in U.S.
nuclear regulation. This historical presentation provides the justification for the conclusions that
it is likely that the U.S. will continue to both increase and improve upon the implementation of
risk-informed practices in nuclear regulation. A history of the use of risk-information in French
nuclear regulation is presented in chapter nine. As the French nuclear regulator has not until this
time embraced the use of risk acceptance criteria in the same way that has been done by the U.S.
regulator, the probable justification for this perception is presented as the reason for why it would
be difficult to implement the new developed risk-informed methods in France.
Although there currently exists intolerance towards the use of risk acceptance criteria in the
French nuclear safety justification analyses, other techniques may be used in the French context in
order to improve upon deterministic analyses by implementing best-estimate modeling. Chapter
ten focuses on one potentially implementable method, the Best-Estimate Plus-Uncertainty (BEPU)
method. The U.S. BEPU methodology developed for application to the large-break loss-of-cooling
accident (LBLOCA) is studied in order to determine how its application could be improved upon
in the future. Chapter ten provides a description of the U.S. BEPU methodology and its application
to the LBLOCA. In order to address its potentially applicability to French regulation, recommen-
dations are offered regarding what should be considered in applying BEPU to French PTS analy-
sis. The recommendations focus on the selection of uncertainty parameters and the strategies that
should be used in order to develop the uncertainty distributions.
In chapter eleven, the main conclusions from this work and the potential areas available for
future study are presented.
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Chapter 2
U.S. Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity
Assessment
2.1 Introduction to the U.S. Methods: Deterministic & Risk-
Informed
2.1.1 U.S. Deterministic Rule Background
In the U.S., during the early 1980's, pressurized thermal shock (PTS) transients were iden-
tified as a class of potential major threats to the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV).
Overcooling events had occurred at various U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) signaling that the
likelihood of such an event was not insignificant. It was realized that an overcooling event com-
bined with the loss of toughness of the RPV from irradiation could result in the occurrence of a
damaging PTS event. This introductory discussion is based upon the material presented in (Erick-
sonKirk, 2007).
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decided to seek the development of an
operational limit that would be applicable to all U.S. pressurized water reactors (PWRs). The pur-
pose of the operational limit is to restrict the likelihood of a PTS event to an acceptable frequency.
Currently, there are two accepted nuclear regulations which contain different operational limits.
The deterministic rule (lOCFR 50.61) was adopted on July 23, 1985 and the risk-informed rule
(1OCFR 50.61a) was adopted on January 4, 2010.
The technical basis of the U.S. deterministic rule consists of a series of coupled probabilistic
calculations integrating the risk assessment, thermal-hydraulic and fracture mechanics components
19
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of PTS-induced RPV failure analysis. This coupled analysis derives a relationship between annual
through-wall crack frequency (TWCF) and the reference temperature for fracture toughness tran-
sition (RTNDT). From this relationship, an operational limit was derived by accepting that the
TWCF not exceed 5 x 10-6 events per reactor year. The resultant derived screening limits for
the RTNDT at the projected end of life are 132C (2700 F) for axial weld plates and forgings and
149'C (300'F) for circumferential welds. The geometric specific screening limits are a result of
the differing likelihoods of through-wall crack propagation for each orientation. The principles of
fracture mechanics dictate that circumferential cracks are less likely to propagate through the RPV;
therefore, the corresponding screening limit is more permissive.
The coupled probabilistic analyses providing the technical basis of the deterministic rule
reflect the NRC's transition to the use of probabilistically based analysis practices during the time
period of the early 1980's. Fundamentally, however, the analysis supporting the technical basis
remains firmly grounded in the use of deterministic practices, as it uses very conservative input
parameters in the models. Therefore, although the approach reflects a somewhat hybrid analysis,
the inputs to the models justify the rule's classification as deterministic.
The implementation of the U.S. deterministic rule by licensees consists of a prescriptive
method for making a comparison of a NPP's predicted end-of-life RTNDT with the RTNDT set by
the screening limits. First the licensees must predict their NPP's end-of-life RTNDT by using the
equations provided in the rule. Second, licensees must use plant-specific data to verify that the
value calculated using the equations from the rule is a bounding value. Criteria are given regarding
the acceptability of the plant-specific surveillance data that can be used in this comparison. If the
predictions satisfy the screening limits, then the licensee satisfies the rule. If not, the licensee has
three options: implement a flux reduction program, anneal the RPV, or perform a plant specific
analysis to demonstrate that operating above the screening limits does not impose undue risk to the
public. Currently, all operating PWRs in the U.S. meet the deterministic rule requirements.
2.1.2 Motivation for Rule Revision
With the granting of many twenty-year NPP license extensions, it became clear that many of
the older, most brittle RPVs would likely not meet the deterministic rule screening criteria at their
projected end-of-life. Also, there had been a recognition of the many conservative models used in
the development of the technical basis of the deterministic rule. The dominating conservatisms are
as follows:
1. Highly simplified treatment of NPP transients: tens of thousands of overcooling transients
were approximated by ten different thermal-hydraulic sequences.
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2. Flaw specification model: the flaw specification model assumes conservatively that all flaws
are located on the interior surface diameter of the RPV. It also assumes the presence of 6
interior surface breaking axial cracks.
3. Material: the RPV is assumed to be entirely of its most brittle constituent components.
4. Fluence: the highest level of fluence for each region of the vessel is assumed for that entire
region.
5. Operator action: limited credit was given for an operator's response to an overcooling event
sequence.
6. RTNDT characterization: the use of RTNDT to characterize the fracture toughness is inher-
ently conservative, averaging 170C (60 0F) in its overestimation of the true fracture toughness
transition temperature.
A schematic diagram used in the analysis performed in the development of the risk-informed rule's
technical basis is shown in Figure 2.1.1. When comparing the steps of the analysis in the risk-
informed technical basis to those in the deterministic rule's basis, we see that the structures of the
analyses are the same. Both analyses use coupled probabilistic risk assessment, thermal-hydraulic
and probabilistic fracture mechanics analyses. The risk-informed rule is different, however, in that
it exercises an explicit treatment of uncertainty and makes use of the improvements in modeling
that have occurred since the formulation of the deterministic rule, allowing for the increased use
of best-estimate modeling.
Uncertainties remain regarding the implementation of the risk-informed rule due to the
detailed vessel inspections required by the regulation. The NRC is currently working to address
the difficulties in implementing the new rule. The details of these problems surrounding the rule's
implementation will be discussed in Section 2.5.
2.2 U.S. Risk-Informed PTS RPV Integrity Assessment
Method
The U.S. risk-informed methodology for PTS RPV integrity assessment consists of a cou-
pled probabilistic risk assessment, thermal-hydraulic and probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis
whose purpose is to calculate the conditional probability of through-wall crack propagation. This
value is compared to the accepted level of risk as stated by the NRC in order to determine whether
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Vesse dnge, age,
or operational nthic
Figure 2.1.1. Schematic of the technical basis analysis for risk-informed PTS rule, Extracted from
(EricksonKirk, 2007)
the RPV has a satisfactory level of safety. The following discussion focuses upon the details of
the construction of the probabilistic risk assessment that supports transient selection, in addition to
the structure of the probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis. In the discussion of this analysis, the
first U.S. RPV integrity assessment method is referred to as the deterministic rule, as it is predom-
inantly based upon the use of conservative engineering judgment. It is relevant in this discussion
as the risk-informed method reflects an evolution of the RPV integrity assessment from its origi-
nal, deterministic form. The majority of the material presented in this chapter is based upon the
description of the technical basis of the U.S. risk-informed PTS rule in (EricksonKirk, 2007).
2.2.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Transient Selection)
There are three main purposes of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analysis portion
of the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis:
1. To define the transients (overcooling event sequences) that could cause a PTS threat
2. To determine the transients to be modeled in the thermal-hydraulic (TH) analysis
22
2.2. U.S. RISK-INFORMED PTS RPV INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT METHOD
3. To estimate the frequencies (and uncertainties) associated with the pertinent transients to be
used in the probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analysis
The transients were defined by developing event trees. Transients were defined for each of the
three commercially operating NPPs selected for analysis (Oconee Unit 1, Beaver Valley Unit 1,
and Palisades Unit 1) (Kolaczkowski, 2005; Whitehead, 2005a,b). These transients were reflective
of both operator responses to NPP operation, and initiating events, with consequent equipment
response.
Once the transients were defined, the PRA analysts selected those to be modeled by the TH
analysts. Transients that were similar in terms of their TH response were grouped together. The
determination of this grouping was performed in an iterative manner.
Finally, the associated frequencies of each group of thermal-hydraulically similar transients
were determined. These frequencies are representative of the summation of all of the event fre-
quencies associated with each bin of thermal-hydraulically similar transients.
2.2.1.1 PRA Information Collection
The three NPPs chosen for analysis were chosen for both convenience and relevance. First,
the management at all three NPPs were very supportive of the NRC's effort to revise the PTS rule,
and thus were agreeable in providing the NRC access to plant personnel, plant simulators, records
of construction and other pertinent plant-specific information. Second, the Oconee Unit was also
used for the development of the deterministic rule, and therefore it seemed sensible to study it
while developing the risk-informed rule, providing a link to the earlier work. Finally, the Palisades
and Beaver Valley NPPs are among those NPPs closest to the deterministic rule's screening limit.
Since these NPPs are considered to have a greater risk of PTS, it was logical for these to be included
in the new analysis.
In order to orient the definition of the transients of interest, a review was conducted of
the analyses supporting the deterministic rule. This included reviewing the deterministic rule's
technical basis, including the plant-specific analyses conducted in support of this rule. The main
objective of this review was to determine what classes of initiating events were to be included in
this PTS study. The following classes of initiating events were identified from this review:
1. General category consisting of reactor/turbine trips, loss of service feedwater, core power
increase, loss of offsite power, closure of main steam isolation valve etc.
2. Events specific to the status of main feedwater (MFW), such as loss of MFW or excessive
MFW
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3. Steam line breaks of all sizes and similar events such as stuck-open turbine bypass valves
4. Primary system loss of cooling accidents (LOCAs) of all sizes
5. Inadvertent safety injection
6. Steam generator tube rupture.
Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed in order to gain insight from the overcooling events
that had occurred since the formulation of the deterministic rule. The LER review resulted in the
identification of 128 overcooling events that had occurred since the formulation of the determin-
istic rule; however, none of these overcooling events were serious events, resulting in only minor
overcooling. Each of these events was reviewed in detail. The events demonstrated the different
ways that primary system overcooling could occur, in addition to providing data useful for the
estimation of the frequencies of the events. The LER review showed that the operating experience
exemplified the classes of initiating events postulated in the development of the deterministic rule.
A comparison of each initiating event's thermal-hydraulic, event frequency and human per-
formance characteristics was performed by the analysts in order to determine what initiating events
should be included in the study. Human performance considerations strongly affected whether spe-
cific initiating events would be considered within their own individual classes, as opposed to being
considered in groups consisting of other event sequences. Table 2.2.1 provides an example of the
information used in the process of deciding which initiating events should be included in the study
of the Oconee plant.
Data concerning initiating event frequencies and equipment failure probabilities had to be
collected for insertion into the PRA. Industry-wide PWR data were used although the PRA analysis
was performed only for the three selected plants. The data was taken mainly from two sources:
NUREG/CR-5750 and NUREG/CR-5500 (Poloski, 1999; Chapman and Simonen, 1998).
Lastly, plant specific data were collected from the three NPPs analyzed. This included the
relevant plant design, procedure, training and operational procedures pertinent to a PTS analysis.
2.2.1.2 Identification of Scope & Features of PRA Model
The three primary goals of the development of the PRA were to increase its refinement and
detail, treat operator actions more realistically, and to use recent data on initiating event frequencies
and equipment failure rates as compared to those of the PRA used in the development of the
deterministic rule.
The types of sequences selected for inclusion in the PRA model were:
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Initiator Thermal-Hydraulic Frequency Human Reliability Comments
Considerations Considerations Analysis
Considerations
Loss of cooling/ The effects of loss of flow do not In the 10-3/yr to This is a more This is a low frequency initiator,
service water encourage the initiation of PTS. 104/yr range for the complex event than a yet it could increase workload
However, the likely need to turn initiator. Therefore reactor trip. Operators and add to operator confusion. It
off the reactor coolant pumps to it's not a significant have other diversions will likely cause a need to
protect them from overheating initiator from a or concerns for shutdown reactor coolant pumps
could add to the potential for frequency perspective. overheating and due to overheating, which
coolant flow stagnation. failing of equipment. enhances stagnation potential.
This could delay any Loss of component cooling could
overcooling cause the failure of the reactor
responses. coolant pump seal, but this is a
small PTS challenge for any
reasonable size LOCA. Since loss
of air has a similar initiating
frequency, and it can cause a
multiple set of direct effects
important to PTS, including the
potential loss of component
cooling water, it is felt that this
initiator can be bounded by
modeling the loss of air initiator.
Loss of Electri- The tendency for equipment to In the 10- 2/yr to the This is a more Loss of power and its subsequent
calBus(es)/ fail more likely causes 10- 3/yr range for the complex event than a effects could be unique
Power underfeed/no flow; therefore it initiator (bus loss), reactor trip. Operators depending on the specific loss.
does not tend towards possible which tends to make have other diversions Frequency, especially for loss of
PTS. this type of initiator or concerns about offsite power is not low, therefore
less important, though getting power its modeling seems worthwhile.
they are included in restored, which could A plant-wide loss of 120VAC and
the PRA. Loss of delay any overcooling 4KV buses that induce trips will
offsite power (LOOP) responses. also be modeled.
is in the 0.01/yr -
0.1/yrrange.
Table 2.2.1. Considerations for including or excluding initiating events in the Oconee PTS-PRA
(adapted from (EricksonKirk, 2007))
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1. Overcooling scenarios: at full/nominal power operation and under hot-shutdown conditions
2. Reactor coolant system (RCS) loss of pressure scenarios
3. Virtually sustained RCS pressure scenarios: RCS initially loses pressure, but pressure is
maintained by the addition of water from the high pressure injection
4. Late repressurization scenarios
5. Immediate overcooling scenarios and scenarios that start as undercooling loss-of-cooling
scenarios and consequently become overcooling scenarios.
The scenarios of anticipated transient without scram and interfacing systems small break loss-of-
cooling accident were not included in the scope of the PRA model. This decision was based on
the fact that these scenarios require the consequent failure of other systems in order to initiate
an overcooling event. This, coupled with their much lower expected frequency (~103 times less
frequent) compared to the other scenarios modeled, showed that their contribution to PTS risk was
minimal.
The initiating events chosen to be included in the PRA model were:
1. Small, medium, and large-break LOCAs
2. Reactor turbine trip
3. Loss of main feedwater
4. Loss of main condenser
5. Loss of offsite power (including station blackout)
6. Loss of supports systems (such as AC or DC buses)
7. Loss of instrument air
8. Loss of various cooling water systems
9. Steam generator tube rupture
10. Small and large steam line breaks with and without subsequent isolation.
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Plant records of overcooling events had shown the significance of operator action on the outcome
of the event. The human reliability analysis methodology chosen for implementation was that of
NUREG-1624: "Technical Basis and Implementation Guidelines for a Technique for Human Event
Analysis (ATHEANA)" (Commission, 2000). This method relies largely on expert elicitation, in
this case, making use of both NRC contractors and the licensees participating in the study. The
modeling considers both errors of omission and acts of commission. Table 2.2.2 shows the classes
of human failures considered in the model.
The goal of the human reliability analysis was to improve upon the methodology used in
the development of the deterministic rule. To accomplish this goal, more realistic models were
pursued, taking into account detailed considerations of sequential and contextual factors, multiple
simulator observations, latest procedures and training, and discussions with licensee operating
and training staff. A greater number of specific operator actions were modeled. For example,
the number of discrete operator action times (such as action 10, 20 or 30 minutes after an event
occurs) was increased to gain a greater understanding of the effects over a greater range of operator
response or inaction.
2.2.1.3 Construction of PRA Models
The construction of the PRAs for all three plants differed from traditional PRA analyses in
that the goal of the PRA was to identify those circumstances that lead to overcooling conditions that
result in PTS, as opposed to core damage. The event trees reflect the status and interactions of four
NPP functions and their associated systems: primary integrity, secondary pressure, secondary feed
and primary pressure and flow. In the development of this PRA model, the assumption was made
that the NPP components and human actions were binary, meaning that a component either worked
or not, or an action was performed or not: there were not partial operations. The logic associated
with the developed event trees was generated by the SAPHIRE (Engineering and Laboratory, n
70) code. The event tree logic was determined through the use of event trees rules that dictated
the combination of events that an initiating event may cause. The same set of rules was used for
the development of all event trees. Once all of the sequences had been determined, SAPHIRE was
used to solve for the minimal cut sets for each sequence.
The process of constructing the three plant specific PRA models differed slightly among
the three NPPs examined. This was due to the order in which the analyses were performed, as
information learned from one analysis influenced the construction of the models of the other plants.
The Oconee NPP was the first to be modeled, and therefore its PRA included the most event
sequences as there had been no information feedback from the thermal-hydraulic or probabilistic
fracture mechanics analyses to provide instruction concerning sequence selection.
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Primary Integrity Secondary Pressure Secondary Feed Primary
Control Control Control Pressure/Flow Control
I. Operator fails to I. Operator fails to I. Operator fails I. Operator does not
isolate an isolable loss isolate a to stop/throttle or properly control
of cooling accident in depressurization properly align cooling and
a timely manner condition in a timely feed in a timely throttle/terminate
II. Operator induces a manner manner injection to control
loss of cooling II. Operator isolates II. Operator feeds reactor coolant system
accident that when not needed wrong, affected, pressure
induces/enhances III. Operator isolates steam generator II. Operator trips
cooldown wrong path III. Operator reactor coolant pumps
IV. Operator creates stops/throttles when not appropriate,
an excess steam feed when or fails to restore them
demand such as inappropriate when desirable
opening turbine III. Operator does not
bypass/atmospheric provide sufficient
dump valves injection or fails to
trip reactor coolant
pumps appropriately
Table 2.2.2. General classes of human failures considered in the analysis (adapted from
(EricksonKirk, 2007)
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The second NPP modeled, Beaver Valley, was able to take advantage of information learned
from the results of the Oconee study. This resulted in the elimination of a variety of transients that
were determined not to be major contributors to the through-wall cracking frequency (TWCF).
The transients that were not included were those that were conservatively estimated as having fre-
quencies less than 10~ 8 /yr. This frequency was chosen because when coupled with the maximum
determined conditional probability of through-wall cracking, 10 3 /yr, the corresponding TWCF
would be on the order of 10- 1 1 /yr, which is considered to be insignificant compared to other
known PTS sequences having frequencies on the order of 10-8.
The PRA model of the Palisades NPP was the most detailed given that it was derived from
the licensee's component-level PRA model. It incorporated the information learned from the con-
struction of the other two NPP models.
2.2.1.4 Quantification and Binning the PTS-PRA Sequences
The two plant conditions that were modeled in the PRAs were: full operating power and hot
zero power (HZP). The large number of event sequences considered in the Oconee PRA (181,258)
required the grouping of sequences with similar TH characteristics into bins for TH analysis using
the RELAP5/MOD3.2.2y code. The first set of bins constructed were done so by implementing
event tree partitioning rules based upon information learned from preliminary TH analyses.
Although the implementation of binning provided for a reduction in the computational re-
quirements of the thermal-hydraulic analysis, this was not the only reason that binning was used.
For many of the bins created, it would have been inappropriate for them to be subdivided because
information regarding the probabilities of the modeled events was limited. Each time a bin was
subdivided, the probability associated with that bin is smaller, and the uncertainty of frequency
of the events it contains becomes larger. Therefore, the binning process reflected a compromise
between thermal-hydraulic accuracy and the level of uncertainty associated with the frequencies
of the events.
The decisions made throughout the binning process relied heavily on the judgment of the
analysts performing the work. In determining bin partitioning, the analysts decided whether previ-
ously defined TH characteristics were representative of the transient in examination. The transient
would be defined by existing TH characteristics if it matched the TH characteristic exactly, or if
the TH characteristics were considered to be similar, but not worse than those represented already.
When the TH characteristics of a given transient did not match those defined already, a new TH
characteristic was defined. The formation of these new characteristics were discussed with the TH
analysts. It would be formally defined if the TH analysts agreed on two conditions: the TH con-
ditions of the considered transient were sufficiently different from all others and the frequency of
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occurrence of the given condition was such that it could not be included in another group without
using a large degree of conservatism. This process resulted in the formation of approximately 100
bins.
Once all of the transients were characterized by a TH characteristic, the PRA analysis was
re-quantified and the transients having an associated frequency of 10- 10/yr or less were truncated.
The same process was applied to Beaver Valley, the only difference being that the lower number
of transients modeled due to the knowledge gained during the construction of the Oconee PRA did
not necessitate the truncation of any transients based on a minimum frequency.
The Palisades PRA model construction was different in that it defined each transient end
state to a specific TH bin, and all cut sets associated with that transient were defined by the same
chosen bin. This led to a less refined model for Palisades, however, based on the results from
the Oconee and Beaver Valley studies, it was determined that the less refined bins were low con-
tributors to the overall PTS risk and therefore this discrepancy would not significantly affect the
model's results. A truncation limit of 10- 9/yr was used for the Palisades model.
2.2.1.5 Revision of PTS-PRA Models and Quantification
Once the initial PRA models had been constructed for all three NPPs, a review of the anal-
yses was performed by the licensees and the internal project staff. The purpose of this review was
to identify whether the models reflected any inaccuracies and whether additional PTS sequences
should be included in the model. Also, a decision had to be made regarding whether additional
TH bins should be created based on the results of conditional probability of through wall cracking
calculations. This was done by examining the contribution of each TH bin to the total TWCF. If
the contribution of a bin was large compared to that of others, it was subdivided.
2.2.2 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Uncertainty
There are two main outputs of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) analysis: the def-
inition of the bin sequences, and of the associated bin frequencies. Both of these outputs have
uncertainty associated with them. They reflect, however, two different kinds of uncertainty treat-
ment.
2.2.2.1 Bin Definitions
The PRA models all PTS challenging event sequences as a set number of event bins repre-
senting thermal-hydraulically similar events. The uncertainty associated with bin definition arises
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from the approximation of the spectrum of challenging events as a set number of sequences.
The construction of the bins requires approximations to be made, which consequently intro-
duces uncertainties into the modeling. The binning process exemplifies the treatment of uncertainty
through the structure of the model itself. The assumption used in the PRA that equipment failures
and operator actions are binary (i.e. a valve is closed or open, an action is taken or not taken)
leads to each event sequence being representative of a spectrum of thermal-hydraulic behavior,
since each intermediate stage is not explicitly modeled. Similarly, the approximation of a group of
thermal-hydraulically similar events as an individual bin introduces this same type of uncertainty,
because each bin is actually representative of a spectrum of thermal-hydraulic behavior.
The only timing considerations in the model concerned operator action. For example, an
action being taken in 10 minutes or 20 minutes, etc. The uncertainties associated with the structure
of the PRA model, such as completeness or the occurrence of intermediate states between the
binary states and specific time states, were not quantified. In some cases, changes to the model were
made to account for variations in equipment states that were deemed significant to the response of
the NPP. The factors considered included:
- size of loss-of-cooling accident (LOCA)
- initial injection water temperature
- size of opening of single/multiple stuck open safety relief valves
- time at which safety relief valve closes
- time at which operators take action.
In these cases, new bins were formulated to account for these events. These bins were constructed
by analyzing the spectrum of thermal-hydraulic responses arising from variations in the above pa-
rameters. The bins were defined so as to characterize the total spectrum of these thermal-hydraulic
responses.
Only a portion of the uncertainties associated with the definition of the bin sequences is
significant to the calculated TWCF. Those bins that are dominant in their contribution to the TWCF
are considered to be significant contributors to the uncertainty and thus were subdivided in an
iterative manner until further subdivision no longer affected the calculated TWCF. This process
is illustrated in Figure 2.2.1. The final portion of bins that dominate in their contribution to the
TWCF are used as a measure of the uncertainty associated with how a PTS challenge may occur.
The uncertainty regarding the completeness of the PRA model, that all important sequences
potentially causing PTS have been identified, was not quantitatively addressed. The large amount
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TWCFbi
TF TWCF =
Figure 2.2.1. Binning iteration process
of peer reviews of the analysis involving NRC staff, contractors and licensees, however, provided
the analysts with enough confidence to believe any remaining degree of incompleteness would have
negligible effect on the final result, mainly by reaching the point in the event sequence modeling
process that risk-important sequences were no longer being found.
2.2.2.2 Bin Frequencies
Each bin is characterized by frequencies with which its constituent events are expected to
occur. The uncertainties associated with these frequencies come from three sources: the initiating
event frequency, the equipment response to the initiating event (i.e. series of equipment successes
and failures), and operator actions. The frequency that characterizes each bin is a function of all
of these factors. These individual frequencies and probabilities are, in turn, characterized by their
respective uncertainty distributions.
Each event within each initiating event tree is treated as occurring randomly. Therefore, the
occurrence of each sequence is random, with its overall frequency governed by Eq.(2.2. 1), where
f is frequency and Py is probability,
fscenario ~ finitiating -event 'PYequipment -response ' .O perator-Action(s). (2.2.1)
The uncertainty distributions of the frequencies and probabilities were propagated through
the rest of the analysis, ultimately combining with the complementary uncertainty distributions
from the probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis in order to determine the total uncertainty asso-
ciated with the calculated TWCF.
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2.2.2.3 Thermal-Hydraulic Uncertainty
In order to assess the uncertainties associated with the thermal-hydraulic (TH) calculations,
sensitivity studies were primarily used in order to quantify the effects of phenomenological and
boundary condition uncertainties on the severity of PTS-inducing characteristics of a given TH
sequence. The results of these studies were used to update the bin frequencies used in the PRA, in
addition to being used as justification for further subdivision of PRA bins.
The use of TH sensitivity analysis allowed for a realization of how specific factors that
were not explicitly modeled in the PRA (such as seasonal temperature variations) would affect the
TH response of the plant. The insights gained from these analyses allowed for a more informed
selection of the transient used to characterize each PRA bin.
The implementation of the sensitivity studies required the identification of the event cate-
gories that are considered to pose significant challenge to vessel integrity. These categories were
defined so that one category does not characterize too broad of a range of TH conditions. For
example, this resulted in a breakdown of the LOCA event category by break size, and, according
to whether repressurization was reached following a safety relief valve failure.
In order to ensure a thorough characterization of uncertainties, specific parameters were
identified that were considered to contribute to variation between different event sequences of the
same event category.
Sensitivity studies were performed on the following parameters:
- Break flow rate of coolant
- Break location
- High-pressure coolant injection flow rates
- Accumulator coolant injection temperature
- Accumulator coolant injection rate
- High-pressure and low-pressure injection temperature
- Decay heat load
- High-pressure coolant injection flow control
- Feedwater flow control
- Secondary pressure control.
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In order to compare the sensitivities of the results to variations in the above parameters, a sensitivity
indicator was defined. Because the reactor vessel downcomer temperature is the TH parameter that
most strongly influences the fracture mechanics analysis, the sensitivity indicator was chosen to be
reflective of this significance. The sensitivity indicator is defined in Eq.(2.2.2):
AT = Tsen - Tnom, (2.2.2)
where Tsen is the sensitivity case downcomer temperature averaged over a 3 hour interval and
Tnom is the base case downcomer temperature averaged over a hour interval. The 3 hour interval
was chosen because it is representative of long-term transient behavior. This sensitivity indicator
is determined for each parameter studied by varying one parameter at a time to an upper and
lower bound (i.e.±30% variation in break diameter) in order to determine the average temperature
difference.
The use of sensitivity studies to evaluate TH uncertainties did not result in a true quantifica-
tion of the associated uncertainties, but instead helped in characterizing the degree of uncertainty.
This approach was deemed to be justifiable, given that the TH parameter and modeling uncer-
tainties were always much less than those arising from the formulation of PRA bins. This is true
because the uncertainties in the bin frequencies and the variability in severity between the differ-
ent sequences in each bin were always greater than the TH modeling and parameter uncertainties.
The differences in the magnitudes of uncertainties associated with the TH analysis and those from
the PRA modeling were reinforced by the iterative process used to define the PRA bins, such that
further bin subdivision was shown to affect negligibly the calculated TWCF.
The results of the sensitivity studies showed that variations in the following parameters
were dominant in their contribution to the overall PTS risk:
1. Break coolant flow (or valve capacity)
2. Break location
3. Accumulator coolant injection temperature
4. High-pressure/low-pressure coolant injection temperature
5. High pressure coolant injection flow control
6. Secondary pressure control
The results of the sensitivity studies were used to refine both the selection of the representative
transient of each bin and the bin frequencies. Understanding the effects of various parameters on
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the severity of TH sequences allowed for a more informed selection of the transient characterizing
each bin, as the sensitivity studies provided insight on the range of thermal-hydraulic characteris-
tics that can occur as a result of an initiating event.
The determined sensitivity indicators were assumed to be linearly additive, meaning that
the effect of any sensitivity parameter is independent from the effects of other sensitivity param-
eters. This assumption was validated for the case of a surge line break transient. This validation
was performed by varying multiple sensitivity parameters in a single RELAP run for this transient.
The results of this were compared to RELAP runs for this transient that vary only one parameter at
a time, and then linearly added. The linearly additive assumption was considered to be valid as the
results of these two approaches were in good agreement. In order to make use of the results, statisti-
cal analyses were performed using the sensitivity indicators. First, a new downcomer temperature
was determined by adjusting the nominal downcomer temperature of each transient category by
the sum of the sensitivity indicators. Then, the probabilities of the combinations of the sensitiv-
ity parameters were determined. The representative TH scenario was selected by identifying the
scenario corresponding to the median of the downcomer temperature distributions produced by the
sensitivity study for a given transient category. By using this technique, results from the thermal-
hydraulic uncertainty analysis contributed to the numerical quantification of uncertainties, albeit
in an indirect manner.
2.2.2.4 Dominant Contributors to TWCF
Once the PRA was coupled to the TH and PFM analysis, the TWCF results were examined
in order to determine which event sequences (and associated PRA bins) were the dominant con-
tributors to the TWCF. The result of this analysis was that the primary side pipe breaks (loss of
cooling accidents and primary stuck open valves, LOCA & SO-1) contributed most greatly to the
TWCF, roughly 70%. Stuck-open valves on the secondary side (SO-2) and main steam line breaks
(MSLB) account for the nearly all remaining risk, with insignificant risk contribution from steam
generator tube rupture (SGTR) and feed and bleed (F&B).
Primary Side Pipe Breaks (LOCA) The two most important mechanisms of a primary side pipe
break that pose threat to the induction of a PTS scenario are depressurization and the injection of
make-up water. Depressurization is the dominant effect in large-diameter break scenarios, while
the importance of the temperature and volume of the injection water increases with reducing break
size. Because the high-pressure and low-pressure injection systems draw water from the reactor
water storage tank (RWST), the temperature of the RWST is often strongly affected by the ambient
temperature, and thus seasonal changes. In responding to primary side breaks, operators actions
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were not shown to play a major role. This is because the predicted time to vessel failure given a
primary side break is short, approximately 15-30 minutes depending on the break size in question.
This short period gives the operators little time to respond. In addition, the operators would not
have much choice in how to respond to this class of accidents, as the emergency core cooling
system must continue to operate. These considerations were taken into account in the modeling of
this class of sequences.
Stuck-Open Valves on the Primary Side (SO-1) Primary system stuck-open valves occur when
there is a real, or false, demand for a pressurizer safety relief valve and it does not close appropri-
ately. An open safety relief valve results in the depressurization and rapid cooldown of the primary
system. Safety injection is used to makeup the lost inventory of water. Once the safety relief valve
is able to be shut, the primary system may repressurize while the safety injection systems are still
in operation. In the model, the valve reclosure time was considered to be 3,000 or 6,000 seconds
after the initiating event. Once the pressurizer is adequately refilled, the operators can carefully
control the pressure of the primary system. The control of the repressurization is very dependent
upon operator action, and thus it is reflected in the modeling. The operators were modeled as con-
trolling repressurization of the plant in either 1 minute, 10 minutes or never after the point in time
in which the plant can rapidly repressurize due to the closed valve. The results of this analysis
showed that if the operators were able to respond within the 1 minute time period (in a hot zero-
power plant configuration), the conditional probability of through-wall cracking could be reduced
by a factor of -10,000 compared to the risk of through wall cracking given full repressurization.
This dramatic effect highlights the significance of operator action on the outcome of the sequence.
Main Steam Line Breaks (MSLB) A break in the main steam line results in a rapid depressur-
ization of the affected steam generator and consequent cooling of the primary system. Breaks both
outside and within the containment were considered since the break placement has a strong effect
on the amount of cooling the primary system experiences. The main role of the operators consid-
ered in this type of event was their ability to isolate the break and the throttling of the high pressure
injection system into the primary system. The delayed actions of the operators in break isolation
and high pressure injection were modeled as not isolating for 30 minutes and indefinitely, and not
throttling until 30 and 60 minutes after the appropriate time to begin throttling has occurred. The
analysis showed that for this class of transients, if the vessel were to fail, it is predicted to occur
within ten to fifteen minutes. Therefore, the delayed actions of the operator do not have an affect
on the probability of vessel failure. The most significant transient parameter affecting the risk of
vessel failure is the location of the break, as a break occurring outside containment allows for the
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secondary side to come to equilibrium with the ambient pressure, thus providing for more heat
transfer from the primary side.
Stuck-Open Valves on the Secondary Side (SO-2) Secondary side stuck-open valve transients
are very similar to the MSLB from above, except that the opening created is much smaller than
that of a MSLB, and, they are all located outside the containment. The small size of their opening
does not allow for as rapid of a depressurziation as seen in the MSLB. Therefore, they do not pose
as great of a risk. Because the SO-2 transient class was considered to be less of a contributor to
the overall PTS risk than the MSLB, a bounding analysis was performed. This assumed that all
main steam safety valves or turbine bypass valves were stuck open. The results of this analysis
showed that this transient class was a very low contributor to the overall PTS risk, having frequen-
cies of 10-10 to 10- 13/yr versus the 10~4 to 10-5/yr frequencies seen in the dominant transient
class. Also, similarly to the MSLB, operator actions were not a significant contributor to the risk
associated with this class of events.
2.2.3 Fracture Mechanics Analysis
The probabilistic fracture mechanics (PFM) analysis calculates the conditional probability
of a through wall crack given the occurrence of a PTS overcooling event. The two main com-
ponents of this model are the Crack Initiation Model and the Through Wall Cracking Model. A
flowchart showing the steps from the input to the output of the analysis is show in in Figure 2.2.2.
Figure 2.2.2. Probabilistic fracture mechanics flowchart
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2.2.3.1 Flaw Distribution
The flaw distributions developed are representative of flaws in the RPV that were formed
during fabrication. The RPV flaw distributions are used as input for the PFM code (FAVOR)
(Williams and Dickinson, 2004). FAVOR was used to calculate the conditional probability of
through-wall cracking. The distributions describe: the location of the flaws relative to the inner
surface of the vessel, the size of flaws in terms of the through-wall dimension, and the length
and orientation (axial or circumferential). The flaw distributions developed in support of the risk-
informed PTS rule represent a significant improvement upon the flaw distributions used for the
U.S. deterministic PTS rule. Advanced non-destructive evaluation (NDE) methods were imple-
mented on nuclear vessels available due to plant construction cancellations. The use of these
vessels allowed for ultrasonic scans to access regions of the vessel that would not be feasible if
only operating RPVs had been analyzed. Where data was lacking in this analysis, expert opinions
were formally elicited.
The research performed to develop the flaw distributions was performed by Pacific North-
west National Laboratory in conjunction with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NDE
center at the Electric Power Research Institute assisted with flaw characterization. The following
discussion on the development of the the flaw distributions is mainly based on the material pre-
sented in (Simonen, 2004).
Vessel Examinations Examinations of vessel material were performed using high-resolution
NDE techniques having resolutions of a few millimeters. The vessel material used for exami-
nation was sourced from vessels belonging to plants whose construction had been canceled. This
allowed for the use of destructive examination, as well as examination of areas that are hard to
access in operating vessels. The two vessels that were predominantly used in the examinations
were from the Shoreham plant and from the Pressure Vessel Research User Facility (PVRUF).
Flaw Detection, Sizing, and Characterization A four stage process of increasing refine-
ment was used to detect and size flaws. This process is shown in Figure 2.2.3. The first detection
measurements were made using SAFT-UT (synthetic aperture focusing technique for ultrasonic
testing) from the inner surface of the clad. The second measurements taken were of weld bearing
specimens removed from the vessel using SAFT-UT. The third measurements were performed by
radiographing thin, weld-bearing plates. The fourth, and final measurements, made use of a variety
of detection techniques including: ultrasonic, radiographic, computer-assisted tomographic scans
and metallography. This final stage of measurements was performed on small cubes (25 mm3 ). The
multiple techniques utilized in the fourth stage were used to validate each other and conservatisms
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adopted in the earlier stages of the process were consequently removed. The flaws were character-
ized by combining multiple techniques: metallography was used to determine flaw composition,
electron microscopy aided in the determination of composition and provided for increased mag-
nification, and finally, x-ray computed tomography provided shape information on repair flaws,
which are a flaw type characterized by more complex shapes.
The results of this procedure showed that the majority of flaws were located in the welds,
particularly due to a lack of fusion in the fusion zone adjacent to the base metal. The largest
flaws were found to be a result of repair flaws. The sizing of the repair flaws was performed
conservatively because of the complex geometry associated with this flaw type. For example,
in cases where flaws in close proximity could potentially be classified as separate flaws, their
dimensions were combined. This was a conservative treatment because the larger flaw would pose
a greater threat to structural integrity in a PTS scenario. Conservatisms were reduced in other
flaw characterizations when flaw rotation was considered, as flaws perpendicular to the through-
wall direction pose less threat to structural integrity. Finally, although the shapes of the detected
flaws were not truly elliptical, the assumption of elliptical flaws remained in use in the fracture
mechanics code since it was considered to be a reasonable by the analysts.
Expert Elicitation
Expert Judgment Process A formal approach to the elicitation of expert judgment was
used in order to both supplement and validate the data accrued from the vessel examinations.
First, the experts and the issues to be examined had to be selected. The experts selected were
chosen from a wide variety of backgrounds (e.g. academic, consulting, vessel fabricators, forging
manufacturers). The selection of the experts was strongly based upon the areas of needed expertise.
Many of the experts selected had been involved in the fabrication of the vessels used in the NPPs
that are currently operating, and are of interest to the results of the PTS rule formulation.
Once the issues had been presented to the experts, the experts categorized the issues into
more specific categories, so that the areas examined would be as unique as possible. This feedback
was provided to the NRC and PNNL staff who would later conduct the elicitation sessions. In order
to conduct these elicitation sessions, formal training had to be given to the experts so that they
would be able to deliver their knowledge and beliefs into a quantitative form. During the formal
training process the definition of an RPV flaw was established as "an unintentional discontinuity
that has the potential to compromise vessel integrity and is present in the vessel after pre-service
inspection."
39
CHAPTER 2. U.S. REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT
Stage 4 Small Cube FormVai tetage 4Validated
Dimensions
Stage 3 Thin Plate Form
Stage 2 Welnormal inspections
Conservative
Sizing
Stage 1 SdzIeg
Figure 2.2.3. Sequence of the techniques used to detect and size flaws, Extracted from (Simonen,
2004)
Prior to the elicitation sessions, the experts were given time to individually analyze the
specific issues to be discussed during the sessions. Each expert was given a particular set of
documents to analyze.
The elicitation sessions were conducted individually with each expert in order to minimize
pressures from group dynamics. The experts made comparisons of the contributions of different
phenomena to the development of flaws. They were also asked to assess the relative likelihood of
different types of flaws. For each likelihood, the experts provided low, high and median values.
Some topics did not lend themselves easily to quantitative feedback, so qualitative feedback was
received as well. Table 2.2.3 provides examples of the kind of quantitative and qualitative infor-
mation gathered in this process. After all of the elicitation sessions had been held and the data
was compiled, the experts reconvened as necessary in order to add more detail to areas that were
lacking in information.
PRODIGAL Weld Simulation Model The PRODIGAL (Chapman and Simonen, 1998) weld
simulation model developed by Rolls-Royce and Associates in the 1980's was used to support the
development of the weld flaw distribution. Using PRODIGAL assisted the development of the
weld flaw distribution in a few different ways: it provided for greater understanding of the physical
nature of weld defects, a basis for developing weld flaw distributions in cases where empirical data
was lacking, a basis for extrapolating empirical weld flaw data, and a basis for extrapolating the
empirical data from the Shoreham and PVRUF vessels to other vessels.
Using PRODIGAL to validate the data derived empirically from the Shoreham and PVRUF
vessels showed good agreement between the two methods. Although the empirical data collected
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Quantitative Characteristics
- flaw size
Qualitative Characteristics
- field versus shop fabrication
- product form - base metal ring forg-
ings, base metal plate, cladding, weld
metal
- repairs to base metal, weld metal,
cladding
- weld process - SMAW, SAW, ESW,
cladding
- flaw location
- weld procedure
- weld materials
- welder skill
- inspection procedure
- inspector skill
- base metal properties
- surface preparation and parameters
Table 2.2.3. Characteristics examined by experts, Extracted from (Simonen, 2004)
was decidedly sufficient for the development of flaw distributions, the features of PRODIGAL pro-
vided useful insights concerning the sensitivity of the flaw distribution to welding process condi-
tions. PRODIGAL also provided validation for many of the assumptions made in the development
of the weld and clad distributions, which are illustrated in the following sections.
Weld Flaw Distribution The weld flaw distribution was developed in such a way that attributes
of other vessels could be incorporated into the distribution, should they not be reflected by the
vessels examined in this study. Specifically, the aspects of the flaw distribution that can be varied
are:
1. Selection of the data trends from either the Shoreham or PVRUF vessel data
2. Volume fractions of welding type
3. Dimensions of the weld-bead for each weld-type
4. Truncation limits for maximum flaw depths for each weld type.
Important Assumptions Many assumptions were made in constructing the weld flaw
distribution. Those assumptions significantly affecting the distribution are discussed:
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- Use of Data Versus Models and Experts: In developing the flaw distribution, empirical
data was used to the greatest extent possible. Expert judgment and model simulations were
used only when data proved to be insufficient. The model simulations and expert opinions
did, however, provide insight on the development of the distribution, in addition to support-
ing the justification of the applicability of the distributions to the entire U.S. plate-type RPV
population.
- Rule of Mixtures: The flaw density in each type of weld (submerged arc welding (SAW),
shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) and repair welds) was taken to be proportional to the
total volume of each type of weld. The location of the flaws relative to the inner surface
of the vessel was modeled as random, along with the location of the flaw within the weld.
The level of knowledge available concerning the locational dependency of flaw formation
justified this random treatment. The distribution, however, does allow for the designation of
a flaw distribution of a particular weld if data is available to justify such specific treatment.
- Decomposition of Flaw Data/Uncertainties: The empirical flaw data was decomposed into
three different subsets: PVRUF versus Shoreham vessel, small flaws versus large flaws based
on through-wall dimensions relative to the estimated sizes of the weld passes, and flaws in
SAW, SMAW and repair-welded material. This decomposition of the data into smaller sub-
groups allowed for each subset to be characterized by a simple statistical function. The
Poisson distribution was used to characterize the flaw density and exponential distributions
were used for the distributions of flaw length and depth. A multi-nomial distribution was
used for the small distribution composed of flaws smaller than one weld bead. The total
flaw distribution is the addition of the subset distributions. The uncertainties of each sub-
distribution were quantified using a Bayesian approach.
- Vessel to Vessel Variability: Because the data from which the distributions were constructed
is largely sourced from only two vessels, the applicability of the developed distributions to
other vessels in the operating reactor fleet was in question. As a result, separate distributions
for the two vessels were created. The Shoreham vessel's distribution was selected to be used
in the PTS calculations since it was the more conservative choice. This was done given
that as a general principle in the risk-informed PTS approach, conservative treatments were
chosen when information was lacking.
- Flaw Orientation: The orientation of the flaws in welds were assumed to exist in the same
orientation as the weld itself, either axial or circumferential. This was supported by the
empirical data gathered from the vessel examinations.
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- Crack Shape: All of the flaws are assumed to be crack-like flaws, with no detailed consid-
eration being given to the truly sharp nature of the flaw tips. This characterization of flaws as
crack-like is supported by the planar nature of the flaws observed in the vessel examinations.
- Flaw Proximity: Multiple flaws were modeled as one flaw if dictated by the ASME Code of
flaw proximity rules. This treatment does not require the modeling of multiple flaws in close
proximity beyond the scale dictated by the ASME code. Therefore, the fracture mechanics
modeling does not simulate occurrences of adjacent flaws.
- Flaw Distribution Truncation: The distributions were truncated in order to avoid exces-
sive extrapolation of the data. The truncation limit was set at two times the maximum depth
dimension of the observed flaws constituting the statistical correlations. This treatment al-
lowed for the inclusion of the larger flaws detected in the vessel examinations, while avoiding
excessive extrapolation which could introduce the presence of flaws that would otherwise not
exist, given the cracking mechanisms considered.
- Service-Related Flaws: No service-related flaws were considered as inservice inspections
have shown that the growth of cracks due to operation is unlikely. Therefore, all flaws
considered exist from fabrication.
Base Metal Flaw Distribution The base metal flaw distribution applies to the outer 1 inch re-
gions of the base metal, as this region presents the most significant risk in a PTS scenario. Im-
portantly, this base metal distribution does not address the formation of under-cladding (i.e. sub-
cladding) crack that may originate during the cladding process (see Figure 2.2.4).
Important Assumptions Many of the assumptions governing the development of the
base metal flaw distributions are the same as those governing the weld flaw distribution. Those
that are particular to the base metal flaw distribution are described below:
- Use of Data Versus Models and Experts: Similar to the weld flaw distribution, data on
base metal flaws was used to the maximum extent possible in the development of the base
Sub-cladding Crack
Base Metal
Cladding Metal
Figure 2.2.4. Sub-cladding crack
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metal flaw distribution. The amount of data available, however, was very small given that
the examined base metal material comprised only a small fraction of the total volume of base
metal material in existence. Therefore, this formulation of this distribution relied heavily on
the elicitation of expert judgment, using the data as a means to validate the expert opinions.
- Vessel-to-Vessel Variability: The base metal flaws of the four vessels examined showed
marked differences in their respective flaw densities, while their flaw depth distributions
were very similar. In order to make a distribution applicable to all plate vessels, the objective
in developing the base metal flaw distribution was to make an average distribution reflective
of the average vessel.
- Locations of Flaws Relative to Vessel Inner Surface: The results of the expert elicitation
showed that the highest density of flaws occurred in the midsection of the rolled plate vessel.
This region, however, was not considered in the construction of the flaw distribution since it
was decided that only the flaws on the near-surface regions of the base metals were important
in terms of their contribution to PTS. Therefore, it was assumed that the flaws in the vessel
mid-section were unimportant to vessel integrity.
- Flaw Orientation: The base metal flaw distribution addressed only those flaws with sig-
nificant through-wall dimensions. Therefore, flaws that were parallel to the vessel surface
were not considered, even if they were larger than some through-wall flaws. For the flaws
having significant through-wall dimensions, 50% were considered to have axial orientation
and 50% were considered to have circumferential orientations.
Cladding Flaw Distribution In developing the cladding flaw distribution, it was assumed that
cladding flaws formed entirely within the cladding would not be included in the distribution since
the cladding material has a sufficient toughness to prevent this type of flaw from causing material
fracture. Therefore, the distribution reflects two types of cladding flaws: (1) cladding flaws that
are surface breaking and extend entirely through the cladding to the base or weld metal and (2)
buried cladding flaws that extend to the cladding/base metal interface, but do not entirely penetrate
the cladding. These are illustrated in figures 2.2.5 and 2.2.6.
Base Metal
Clad Metal
Figure 2.2.5. Surface breaking cladding flaw
44
2.2. U.S. RISK-INFORMED PTS RPV INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT METHOD
Base Metal
Cladding Metal
Figure 2.2.6. Buried cladding flaw
The vessel examination process did not reveal the existence of any surface-breaking cladding
flaws, but because only a small amount of material was examined during this process, the potential
for their existence could not be entirely ignored. It was consequently assumed that the cladding
surface breaking flaws would compose 1/1000 of the total cladding flaws. All of the cladding flaws
are assumed to have circumferential orientation because that is the direction of the deposition of
the cladding.
All of the buried flaws in the cladding are assumed to have one crack tip at the location of
the cladding/base metal interface. This type of flaw will initiate vessel fracture if the toughness of
the base metal at the crack tip is low enough. It was assumed that no flaws in the base metal were
linked to these cladding flaws at the interface because the inspections of the inner surface of the
base metal are assumed sufficient to preclude the existence of surface-breaking base metal flaws.
2.2.3.2 Crack Initiation Model
The purpose of the crack initiation model is to determine whether a flaw within the RPV will
initiate growth during a PTS overcooling event. The fracture driving force (Kapplied) is compared
to the fracture toughness, or crack initiation resistance, (Kre) in order to determine the likelihood
of crack initiation. This conditional probability of crack initiation for a given set of transient
conditions will be greater than zero in those cases where Kapplied exceeds the minimum value of
the K1 e distribution, otherwise, the probability will be zero.
The effects of the warm pre-stress effects are taken into account in the crack initiation
model. The warm pre-stress effect elevates the fracture toughness of a material if the material is
pre-stressed at an elevated temperature, even though the reduction in temperature may cause the
Kmc to be lower than the Kapplied. This occurs due to the formation of a region of compressive
residual stresses around the crack tip. Thus, this has the overall effect of reducing the likelihood of
crack initiation. The consideration of the warm pre-stress effect forces the requirements of both:
Kapplied ;> Kjc-minimum
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d Kapplied/dt > 0 (2.2.4)
to be true for crack initiation, as instances where dKapplied/dt first increases, but later decreases
can occur without causing crack initiation when warm pre-stress effects are taken into account.
Therefore, crack initiation will only occur if dKapplied/dt is always greater than 0.
The modeling of the fracture toughness (Kc) was performed empirically, however, the un-
derstanding of the physical processes important to fracture toughness are shown through the func-
tional fits used in relating the data. The fracture toughness model takes into account an athermal
irradiation induced temperature dependency, a scattering of the fracture toughness values which
have a finite lower bound under which a the fracture driving force cannot induce cleavage fracture.
In the modeling of the material properties used in the crack initiation model, the known
fluence and material composition variations found in the RPV beltline region were taken into
account. The inherent overestimation of the true fracture toughness transition temperature through
the use of RTNDT, as it is not a direct measure of the fracture toughness transition temperature, is
also modeled so as to remove this conservative bias, which on average over predicts the value of
this transition temperature by 180 C.
The probability of crack initiation is calculated as the maximum of the individual failure
probabilities of each flaw within the vessel given the occurrence of a PTS transient:
n
PFAIL(VESSEL) = MAX(PFAIL(j)) (2.2.5)j=1
Regarding the treatment of uncertainty, the uncertainties associated with the variations in
material properties and fluence in the RPV beltline and the cleavage crack initiation toughness
(KIc) were propagated throughout the analysis.
2.2.3.3 Through-Wall Cracking Model
If the crack initiation model yields a conditional probability of crack initiation greater than
zero, the through-wall cracking model is used to calculate the conditional probability of through-
wall cracking by determining how far the crack will propagate into the wall by determining if
the crack will arrest before the vessel ruptures. Through-wall cracking is defined as a crack that
penetrates through 90% of the wall thickness. The through-wall cracking probability is calculated
by comparing the Kapplied to the cleavage crack arrest toughness (Kla). Should the crack arrest,
the Kapplied is compared for the duration of the transient to the material's resistance to crack ini-
tiation by either cleavage or ductile tearing (Kre & Kjc). When it is necessary to implement the
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through-wall cracking model (CPI>0), 100 deterministic trials are performed in order to determine
a percentage of those 100 trials in which the crack propagates through the entire wall. To determine
the conditional probability of through-wall cracking (CPTWC) this percentage is multiplied by the
conditional probability of crack initiation (CPI).
2.2.4 Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Uncertainty
In developing uncertainty estimates of parameters in the probabilistic fracture mechanics
(PFM) models, whenever possible, quantifications of uncertainties of best-estimate models were
performed. When uncertainty quantifications were not possible, conservative models and parame-
ters were used.
2.2.4.1 Uncertainty Identification
In order to determine how to characterize the uncertainties of the PFM analysis, first, the
relationships between the parameters of the models had to be identified. In order to make this
determination, a root-cause diagram was constructed for the fracture toughness and embrittlement
models. The root-cause diagram illustrated how uncertainties in input variables propagated through
the model to the final result of the analysis.
2.2.4.2 Uncertainty Classification
For those uncertainties that were numerically propagated, the classification of the uncer-
tainty of the model components as either being aleatory or epistemic was important to the PFM
analysis because it influenced the structure of the mathematical models within the PFM analysis.
This distinction was achieved by developing an understanding of the basic physical mechanisms
involved in the fracture mechanics modeling.
Aleatory uncertainty is used to characterize uncertainties that exist due to inherent random-
ness. This kind of uncertainty is irreducible and defined by a probability distribution. Repeated
observations of a variable with aleatory uncertainty will result in an empirical distribution of val-
ues.
Epistemic uncertainty is used to characterize uncertainties that exist due to a lack of knowl-
edge of a variable, meaning that a true underlying value exists, although it is not known. Repeated
observations of a variable with epistemic uncertainty will yield a single outcome of the variable,
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the true value. This means that increased observations will result in a more accurate distribution of
the variable, meaning that epistemic uncertainty is reducible uncertainty.
Making the distinction between these two types of uncertainty is important because it can
have a direct effect on how the results of the analysis are interpreted. Understanding the type of
uncertainty governing a particular parameter can influence the decision-making that occurs as a
result of the analysis.
2.2.4.3 Crack Initiation Model
The characterization of the type of uncertainty associated with fracture toughness is depen-
dent upon the physical understanding of cleavage fracture. Fracture toughness properties have an
associated size scale. This size scale is that of the volume experiencing plastic deformation. When
stress elevation occurs in a material having a crack, the stress moves along the entire length of the
crack to the crack tip. The crack will propagate if the dislocations present at the crack tip are suffi-
ciently accumulated such that they allow for the local stress at the crack tip to exceed the fracture
toughness. Therefore, it can be said that the fracture toughness property is not controlled by the
presence of a dislocation at a single point, but by the accumulation of these dislocations, or rather
the distribution of these dislocations throughout the material. Because this dislocation distribution
can be considered to be random, as it occurs at a scale smaller than that considered in the crack
initiation model, the uncertainty associated with the fracture toughness is considered to be aleatory
by nature, because it is irreducible in this situation.
The method used to calculate the crack initiation probability based upon the characterization
of the fracture toughness uncertainty as being aleatory is illustrative of how the characterization of
uncertainty affects the structure of the computational model. In the analysis performed in support
of the development of the U.S. deterministic PTS rule, the fracture toughness uncertainty was
considered to be epistemic. This meant that for each simulation, there was one value for the fracture
toughness. This resulted in the calculation of vessel failure probability being either equal to 1 or 0,
depending upon whether the applied force exceeded the simulated value of fracture toughness. The
way in which this calculation is performed changes when the uncertainty is modeled as aleatory.
In this case, the vessel failure probability lies between 0 and 1. Specifically, the method used to
calculate the vessel failure probability is shown in Eq. (2.2.6). The equation for vessel failure
probability states that the failure probability of the vessel is the maximum of the individual failure
probabilities associated with the cracks in the vessel,
(2.2.6)PFAIL(VESSEL) = MAX (PFAIL(j))-j=1
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Although the computation associated with the two uncertainty treatments for fracture tough-
ness are distinctly different, it is important to note that the differences in the mean TWCF estimates
produced by the two forms of analysis were very small.
The other major sources of uncertainty in the crack initiation model are characterized as
being epistemic. These include the uncertainties associated with the model input data concerning
material content, such as copper, nickel and phosphorus concentration, the initial material RTNDT
value and the unirradiated CVN upper-shelf energy. The mean values of the parameters used were
those specific to the plant being analyzed, while the distributions characterizing these properties
were derived from all of the data available for reactor pressure vessels. Because the results of the
analysis were to be used to develop fleet-wide screening limits, the use of these distributions is
considered to be appropriate.
2.2.4.4 Through-Wall Cracking Model
The uncertainty classification used in the through-wall cracking model is parallel to that
used in the crack initiation model. The toughness associated with ductile tearing was also modeled
as being aleatory, making use of the same reasoning as that for the cleavage crack initiation tough-
ness in the crack initiation model. The non-toughness material properties were similarly modeled
as having epistemic uncertainty.
2.2.4.5 Adoption of Conservative Models
The adoption of conservative models and parameters such as RTNDT, fluence attenuation,
flaw distribution etc., also reflects a treatment of uncertainty. Because these parameters do not
easily lend themselves to uncertainty quantification due to lack of knowledge and/or data, a con-
servative modeling approach was implemented. This conservative approach did not neglect, how-
ever, the use of realistic models. Conservatisms in the deterministic formulation of the U.S. PTS
rule which had been identified as excessive were systematically reduced, guided by the use of new
modeling techniques and expert judgment. The conservatisms that remained reflected the bounds
of the current state of knowledge.
2.3 Acceptance Criterion
The acceptance criterion for the risk-informed rule's technical basis is defined as the ac-
ceptable frequency for the annual TWCF. The specific value chosen for the acceptance criterion
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was informed by the policies set fort in the Regulatory Guide 1.174: Regulatory Policy Guidance
on Risk-Informed Regulation (Commission, 1998). Regulatory Guide 1.174 presents the general
principles to be followed in formulating risk-informed regulation and provides probabilistic guide-
lines for changes in core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) for
proposed reductions in regulatory requirements. The probabilistic guidelines are shown in Table
2.3.1.
Mean A Mean
Core Damage Frequency (CDF) 10-4/ reactor year 10-5/ reactor year
Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) 10-5/ reactor year 10-6/ reactor year
Table 2.3.1. Regulatory guide 1.174 probabilistic guidelines (Commission, 1998)
In order to select the appropriate value for the acceptance criterion, a post RPV failure
scenarios scoping study was performed in order to identify what events may occur in the event of
a PTS induced RPV failure. RPV failure was defined as the propagation of a through-wall crack
and thus, it is correlated directly to the annual TWCF. The scoping study showed that a large early
release given a PTS event would be very unlikely given that it would be very difficult to disable the
multiple safety systems that would be prerequisite to a large early release. This fact combined with
the recognition that this PTS evaluation did not account for external events resulted in a decision to
use 1 x 10-6 as the accepted annual TWCF to be used in the derivation of the screening limits. This
value was informed by the ALERF value given in Reg Guide 1.174. The selection of this value was
considered to be highly conservative given that the TWCF is correlated to the LERF, although the
results of the scoping study indicate that the likelihood of a large-early release is minimal given a
through-wall cracking event.
2.4 Applicability to Forged Vessels
All three of the plants that were analyzed in the development of the technical basis for the
U.S. risk-informed PTS rule use plate-type reactor pressure vessels. The U.S. pressurized water
reactor nuclear power plant fleet includes, however, 21 forged vessels.
Plate vessels are fabricated by welding rolled plates together. This is done by forming rings
from the rolled plates by welding one end of the plate to the other end. These rings are then welded
together in order to form the vessel. This fabrication process therefore results in the use of both
axial and circumferential welds.
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Forged vessels are fabricated by welding forged rings together. Forged vessels are markedly
different because they do not contain the axial welds found in plate vessels, and are consequently
less susceptible to the presence of axial flaws. Since axial flaws have been shown to be the domi-
nant contributors to the through-wall cracking frequency (TWCF), it is consequently believed that
a forged vessel would consistently have a lower TWCF than a plate vessel (Ballesteros, 2009).
The method used to manufacture forged vessels, however, does allow for the development
of embedded flaws. Sub-cladding cracking can occur too, when the stainless steel weld layer is
deposited on the interior of the vessel during manufacturing. Sub-cladding cracks are defined as
cracks existing in the interface between the base metal. A schematic of a sub-cladding crack is
shown in Figure 2.4.1.
In order to ensure that the results of the analyses performed on the plate vessels would
be applicable to forged vessels, various material parameters specific to forged vessels such as
the unirradiated RTNDT, and the copper, nickel and phosphorous contents were used in the PTS
analyses specific to forged vessels. Flaw distributions specific to forged vessels were also used in
these analyses (Schuster, 2002; Dhooge, 1978).
A sensitivity study was performed in order to evaluate the effects of embedded flaws in
forged vessels upon the TWCF. This sensitivity study used the material properties of the most
irradiation-sensitive vessels in the fleet. Because destructive analyses had shown that the density
of embedded forged flaws was similar to that of plate vessels, the flaw distribution used in the
analysis was based upon the embedded flaw distribution of the Beaver Valley and Palisades NPPs,
which are two of the three NPPs used for analysis in the development of the technical basis of
the risk-informed rule. This sensitivity study showed that in comparison to plate vessels, the
TWCF of forged vessels was on average 3% of that of plate vessels. This highlights the significant
contribution of the axial welds present in plate vessels to the TWCF, which are absent in forged
vessels.
Another sensitivity study, making use of the same assumptions from the previously men-
tioned study, was performed in order to evaluate the effect of sub-cladding cracking on the TWCF.
The results of this study indicated that the TWCF would be less than 20% than that of the plate
vessels'. This is a result of the sub-cladding cracks' axial orientation. Therefore, because forged
Sub-cladding Crack
Base Metal
Cladding Metal
Figure 2.4.1. Schematic of a sub-cladding crack
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vessels do not feature axial welds, the risk contribution of sub-cladding cracks is reduced. It should
be noted, however, that if a high embrittlement level of the forged vessel is reached, the TWCF
could be up to 10 times that of a similarly embrittled plate welded vessel. Although the embrit-
tlement level associated with this dramatic increase in TWCF in forged vessels is not realistic for
current projected plant lifetimes, if this level were to be reached in the future, a more detailed
analysis of this phenomenon would be needed.
The results of the analysis performed on the forged vessels showed that the screening limits
developed based upon the three plants using plate vessels would be applicable to forged vessel
NPPs as well, but they would be very conservative because the TWCF of the forged vessels is
much lower than that of the plate vessels. Therefore, the difference between forged and plate
vessels is a source of large margin for the former. If, however, very high embrittlement levels were
to be reach in the forged vessels, a plant-specific analysis would be warranted so that the effect of
sub-clad cracks on the TWCF could be further understood.
2.5 Implementation
In order to implement the risk-informed rule, a licensee must satisfy two requirements.
First, similar to the deterministic rule, it must use the equations provided in the rule to calculate
the predicted RTNDT at the plant's projected end-of-life. The equations in the risk-informed rule
make use of an updated embrittlement correlation to determine this transition temperature value.
This calculation must be validated by the plant's own surveillance data. On average, the screening
limits in the risk-informed rule are 16C (600 F) more permissive. Secondly, the licensee must use
non-destructive examinations to verify that the RPV flaw distribution does not exceed that stated
in the rule. If this cannot be satisfactorily completed, the licensee must perform a secondary safety
analysis to show that the RPV's annual TWCF will not exceed 1 x 10-6.
Currently, the risk-informed rule has not been implemented by utilities, but it is expected
that some of the older plants will need to implement the risk-informed rule within the next three to
five years in order to remain in operation. The requirements of the rule regarding the verification
of the flaw distribution have been a cause for concern. It has been determined that it is either
extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the currently available non-destructive evaluation
techniques to provide a resolution which can be used to compare plant data to the rule's flaw
distribution. This is due to the fact that the size ranges of the allowed number of small flaws
fall below the limit of detectability. Furthermore, non-destructive evaluation procedures call for a
rounding up of the flaw sizes when clear sizing conclusions cannot be made. Since there are fewer
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larger sized flaws permitted by the distribution, this could prevent the licensee from falling within
the distribution's bounds.
In order to remedy this problem, the NRC is currently working on drafting a regulatory
guide that can guide licensees in how to satisfy the rule's requirements if they are not able to verify
their flaw distributions according to the given distribution. There is a sense of optimism about
the content of the regulatory guide since those involved in its drafting were highly involved in the
development of the technical basis itself.
It is important to note that those that worked on the development of the technical basis
supporting the risk-informed rule strongly believed that the flaw distribution used to develop the
screening limits was so conservative that verification of each RPV's flaw distribution would not be
necessary in order to satisfy the rule. This viewpoint, however, was not shared by all and thus a
flaw distribution verification became a requirement.
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Chapter 3
French Reactor Pressure Vessel Integrity
Assessment
3.1 Introduction to French Method
The French method used to assess the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in re-
sponse to pressurized thermal shock (PTS) is fundamentally a deterministic engineering analysis.
The French RPV integrity assessment consists of a coupled thermal-mechanical analysis that deter-
mines whether vessel flaws will initiate crack growth, should a particular PTS-inducing transient
occur from within the set of concern. In order for the RPV to be considered safe for operation,
the integrity assessment must demonstrate that sufficient margin to failure, defined as vessel crack-
initiation, exists for the operable period of the nuclear power plant (NPP), while considering all
relevant safety factors imposed by the French nuclear safety authority (ASN). The following de-
scription of the French methodology is a summary of the material presented in (Churier, 2011;
Fontes, 2011; Monin, 2011).
The French approach to ensuring reactor vessel integrity during PTS transients is based
upon the use of deterministic methods. A coupled thermal-hydraulic and fracture mechanics anal-
ysis is performed in order to confirm that the margin to crack initiation is sufficient for both those
flaws detected and speculated. Transients are ranked by severity based upon the margin to crack-
initiation that exists when they occur. In order to satisfy regulatory requirements, all types of flaws
must show sufficient margin to failure, given the occurrence of the most severe transient within
each transient class.
Interest in revisions to the French methodology concern the development of a more ad-
vanced safety justification analysis, which are provided to the regulator. The safety justification
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analyses have the purpose of illustrating that the method used continues to provide an adequate
level of safety given the evolution of knowledge between review periods. Therefore, the method
used to demonstrate the safety margin will remain the same, but the analytical means to demon-
strate its adequacy are undergoing revision.
The French approach to the reevaluation of the RPV integrity assessment differs markedly
from that of the U.S. in that it does not attempt to revise the analysis explicitly used to assess
whether the vessel will fail given the occurrence of a PTS transient; however, this strategy does not
preclude the French from implementing sophisticated analytical techniques in this demonstration
of the adequacy of their method.
3.2 Transient Selection
The French evaluation of reactor vessel integrity requires the determination of the transient
that would be the most penalizing to the condition of the reactor vessel. Those transients of interest
are those with a low final temperature, having either high or low pressure. The safety of the vessel
is considered sufficient if it can be shown that the occurrence of the most penalizing transient does
not induce crack initiation.
The transients that are considered to be the most severe are selected from each category
of operation (normal, upset, emergency, faulted). The transient categorization is performed by
considering the predicted frequency with which the transient occurs. Specific frequency ranges
are imposed upon the transients of interest in order to formulate the four categories. It is in this
manner that the transient probability is considered in the analysis.
The subset of transients examined in this process originated from those proposed for con-
sideration during the plant design process, in addition to those discovered to exist based upon
operating experience. The selection of the transients that pose the greatest threat to RPV integrity
reflects an implicit uncertainty treatment in which it is assumed that if the vessel will not degrade
under the most severe circumstances, it will survive a less severe transient. Recently, efforts have
been made to provide additional analyses supporting the selection of the most severe transients in
the form of safety justification arguments to the ASN. In these analyses sensitivity studies were uti-
lized in order to distinguish the most penalizing transient from other transients. For those transients
considered to have a higher probability of occurrence, such as the small break loss-of-cooling ac-
cident (i.e. a "3rd category break" which consist of breaks having a diameter of approximately 2
to 10 cm) a greater range of transients are considered in the analysis even though they may not ex-
emplify the most penalizing transient of the particular category. The range of transients considered
3.3. MECHANICAL ANALYSIS
in the 3rd category include both cases of low and high dewatering of the cold leg, even though in
the latter case the safety injection water is able to be warmed by steam and consequently is less
penalizing. In the entire RPV integrity analysis, 30 transients are selected for analysis.
The new methods of safety justification currently being implemented aim to provide greater
evidence that the identification of the most penalizing transients indeed are those that most signif-
icantly affect the integrity of the vessel. This new approach involves identifying the phenomena
that contribute most significantly to minimal safety margins for the vessel by using the the PIRT
(Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table) method. This method was used with a simplified
version of the calculation of the coupled thermal-hydraulic and mechanical analysis in order to
determine which system parameters most negatively affect the safety margins at the location of
the generic defect (see Section 3.3.1 for definitions) in terms of their contributions to the pressure,
velocity and temperature at that specific location in the vessel. Once these parameters were identi-
fied, sensitivity calculations were performed in order to verify their influence on the safety margin,
and consequent classification. The parameters identified as ultimately having significant effects
upon safety margins are: break size, safety injection flow, safety injection temperature, and loss of
natural circulation in the vessel. These results are then used to provide further confirmation of the
selection of the most penalizing transient.
3.3 Mechanical Analysis
3.3.1 Types of RPV Defects
Two categories of RPV defects (i.e. flaws) are analyzed. The two categories are detected
defects and generic defects, which are both exclusively subcladding-type defects, which are present
at the cladding/base metal interface. The detected defects reflect those defects which have been
found during RPV examinations. As a result, the detected defects have a record of their specific
locations in the vessel. The generic defect reflects the limits in the resolution of the non-destructive
examination (NDE) techniques, and consequently has the dimensions of the largest defect unable
to be detected using NDE.
Because exact locational information is available for the detected defects, this information is
used in the mechanical analysis of the defect. The location is used to determine the flux experienced
at the defect, as the flux varies azimuthally in the RPV. The detected size of the defect is also used
in the analysis.
In the mechanical analysis of the generic defect, which is characterized as an ellipse with a
width of 5mm and length of 25 mm, the flux is assumed to be that of the location of maximum flux
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in the RPV. It is considered to be axially oriented in the base metal and circumferentially oriented
in the weld metal, as these are the most compromising orientations for each region. The generic
defect in the weld metal is placed at its most stressed and irradiated point.
3.3.2 Mechanical Margin Calculation
The aim of the mechanical analysis is to verify the existence of a margin to failure, defined
as crack initiation, given the safety coefficients specified by the ASN. Failure is defined as the
initiation of defect propagation (i.e. crack initiation). The ratio used to assess defect propagation is
the fracture toughness of the material to the stress intensity factor of the crack, which is a function
the safety coefficient. This ratio is shown in Eq. 3.3.1,
R = KcorKjc (3.3.1)
KCp(M)
where KIc (or Kjc) are the fracture toughnesses in the brittle and ductile domains, respectively,
Kcp is the stress intensity factor, and M is the applicable safety coefficient, given by the regulator.
The value of this ratio must be verified to be greater than 1 for the entire duration of all transients
selected for analysis. The relevant safety coefficients and their associated transient categories are
shown in Table 3.3.1. Apart from being used to determine safety margin, the mechanical margin
ratio is also used as a means to compare the severity of a transient, as more severe transients will
have a ratio closer to one. Therefore, the calculation of the mechanical margin is essential to the
ranking of the severity of the PTS transients and implicit in the selection of the transient considered
to be most severe.
The elastic stress intensity factors used in this analysis are calculated by using simplified
Transient Category Safety Coefficients for Safety Coefficients for
Ductile Fracture Brittle Fracture &
Domain Transition Domain
2 nd: Normal 1.3/1.5 2
Situations and
Incidents
3': Exceptional 1.1/1.3 1.6
Situations
4': Highly -/1.1 1.2
Improbable Accidents
Table 3.3.1. Safety coefficients used for mechanical loadings in different situations, Extracted
from (Monin, 2011)
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methods such as that of influence functions. In the time period during the transient in which the
stress on the crack tip is increasing, a plasticity correction is used, while during unloading, elastic
discharging is assumed.
In the mechanical calculations, the input parameters have the most conservative values.
For example, the minimum allowed value of safety injection temperature given by the technical
specifications is used, reflecting the conservatism associated with a deterministic approach.
Also, a correction to the margin value is used in the brittle domain to account for the effects
of the crack front length, as it is surmised that an increase of the volume of material displaced by
the crack front subsequently increases the probability of crack initiation at that site.
3.3.3 Material Properties
In order to determine whether appropriate margin exists at the end of operation, a formula
that predicts the shift in the RTNDT due to embrittlement over the operating period was developed.
This formula was developed to account for the fluence imparted upon the vessel, in addition to
these concentrations of elements (such as phosphorus and copper) which are known to have em-
brittling effects. This formula reflects the knowledge gained from both commercially operating
and experimental nuclear reactors.
The RTNDT formula computes an average embrittlement level. In order to determine the
shift in RTNDT that is caused as a result of irradiation embrittlement evident at the end of op-
eration, two standard deviations of this value are added to the average. A chemistry penalty is
also implemented to account for zones in which the material may segregate by element. The final
RTNDT shift relationship is as follows,
ATT = A[1 + 35.7(P - 0.008) + 6.6(Cu - 0.08) + 5.8Ni2Cu]CD0 .59, (3.3.2)
where A = 15.6 and a = 12.7 0C for base metal, and A = 15.8 and a = 13.3'C for welds. ATT
is in degrees Celsius, chemical contents in weight percent and neutron fluence is in 1019 n/cm 2
(for neutrons of energies greater than 1 MeV). For the 900 MW reactors, the RTNDT value at 40
years ranges between 404C and 74'C for the base metal and 304C and 85'C for the weld metal,
reflecting a confidence level of 97.5%.
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Chapter 4
Comparison of French and U.S. Reactor
Pressure Vessel Integrity Assessment
In the following section, the transient selection and fracture mechanics methodologies of
the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) integrity assessments of the U.S. and France are compared.
In comparing the methods, it is important to note the difference between the objectives of their
analyses. Although both aim to address the question of reactor vessel integrity, the French method
reflects the integrity of the particular vessel in question, while the U.S. method is structured to
address the integrity of all of the vessels in the fleet through the development of a screening limit.
The most significant difference between the two methods is demonstrated in how the suc-
cessful performance of the RPV is defined. The U.S. treatment derives its criterion for successful
performance based upon the direct statement of an acceptable level of risk, through the definition
of an acceptable frequency of annual through-wall cracking. The French treatment defines accept-
able performance through the evaluation of margin to crack initiation, which is not based upon the
use of any stated acceptable level of risk. This discrepancy highlights the fundamental difference
between the risk-informed and deterministic approaches to this integrity assessment.
4.1 Transient Selection Comparison
The overall approach to the transient selection process by both countries is fundamentally
different, in that the U.S method is structured to account for the range of thermal-hydraulic condi-
tions that could result in pressurized thermal shock (PTS), while the French method considers only
those which are understood to result in the most severe PTS conditions. The major differences of
the two methods are summarized in Table 4.1.1.
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U.S. France
Transients Modeled All PTS transients discretized Only most severe transients
into groups of TH similar considered
sequences
Use of Frequencies Frequencies of transients Frequencies considered in
directly modeled in analysis categorization of transients,
with a greater number of
transients modeled for higher
frequency categories
Uncertainty Treatment Mixture of explicit treatment Use of conservative modeling
with conservative modeling
Table 4.1.1. Summary of transient selection comparison
Initially, both methods rely upon the consideration of the entire range of transients that
have the potential of inducing PTS and both perform this examination by using data from the
nuclear power plant (NPP) design and operation so that all potential transients are considered. The
methods diverge, however, in their treatment of how to account for the range of thermal-hydraulic
conditions and the frequencies associated with the occurrence of the range of transients. These
differences are ultimately reflected in how the uncertainty is treated in the two methods.
In assessing the severity of a transient, the U.S. and France implement different approaches.
The U.S. method only considers the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the transient, while the
French assume a coupling of the thermal-hydraulic behavior to that of fracture mechanics in order
to make the assessment. The French coupling of the two analyses yields a more succinct result, as
it directly answers the question of which transients most severely impact the state of the vessel. It
would not be sensible, however, for the U.S. approach to pursue a similar strategy, as its method
is based upon accounting for the entire range of PTS-inducing conditions. Therefore, it would not
be sensible to exclude any transient from the analysis except for those clearly uninvolved in the
PTS phenomenon. Furthermore, because the U.S. method's fundamental purpose is to calculate
the risk associated with PTS, the exclusion of some transients would bias the final outcome of the
analysis. Therefore, the fundamental goals of the U.S. and French approaches to transient selection
are in agreement, however, each country's methods are particularly structured to suit the analytical
objectives of each approach.
By accounting for the spectrum of transients by approximating the thousands of distinct
transients into groups of thermal-hydraulically similar transients, the computational burden of the
U.S. method is reduced, while a level of realism in the analysis is maintained as the spectrum of
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conditions is represented. The representation of such a spectrum requires the use of probabilities
(frequencies) in order to maintain the level of realism, as not all transients are equally as probable
and consequently contribute to the overall risk in varying levels.
Because the French method relies upon the analysis of only the most severe transient, it does
not require the significant use of probabilities in the analysis. Instead, probability is considered
only in the breakdown of transient categories, which are formally defined by probabilities. Only the
most penalizing transient, however, is considered in the calculation of the reactor vessel integrity.
The differences in the applications of probability in the analysis directly translate into how
the uncertainty treatment is performed. In the U.S. method, the uncertainties associated with tran-
sient frequencies were directly propagated throughout the analysis so that the calculated through-
wall cracking frequency had an associated level of uncertainty. Conservatisms, however, still ex-
ist due to the nature of the transient binning process (i.e. approximation of a group of thermal-
hydraulic scenarios as one scenario), as the transients considered being within one bin were de-
fined as being no worse than the one thermal-hydraulic sequence chosen to represent the entire
bin. This approach used in the binning process exemplifies the use of a conservatism when there
exists a lack of knowledge. This treatment is witnessed throughout the risk-informed approach, as
there remains in many areas the inability to provide the engineering resolution required for a more
detailed output.
The French treatment of uncertainty associated with the transient selection process differs in
that there is no explicit uncertainty treatment, but instead it is implicitly accounted for by selecting
the most severe transient for analysis. Although this is an effective way of defining the margin,
it does not necessarily provide for the most realistic analysis, as the transient selected may be
extremely unlikely to occur, thereby unnecessarily constraining the operation of the plant. This
treatment, however, clearly exemplifies the nature of a deterministic analysis.
Although the transient selection processes implemented in the two methods are fundamen-
tally different, the ultimate results that they yield are in agreement, in that they both demonstrate
that loss-of-cooling accidents and main steam line breaks are the transients that have the great-
est ability to damage the RPV. The U.S. does additionally identify primary and secondary side
stuck-open valve transients as major risk contributors. The SEBIM valve technology that is used
in France severely limits the possibility of such transients occurring, as the SEBIM valves perform
much more reliably in terms of maintaining primary loop closure. They are very reliable because
they are composed of two independent valves, allowing for the integrity of the primary system to
be maintained with only one functional valve. This difference in technology results in a very low
probability of valve-failure induced transients; therefore, this discrepancy does not indicate any
fundamental disagreement between the output of the two different transient selection methods.
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4.2 Fracture Mechanics Comparison
The purpose of the fracture mechanics analysis in both analyses is the same: to determine
whether the vessel will fail given the occurrence of a PTS transient. The methods implemented
and, the criteria by which vessel failure is defined, differ in significant ways between the two
treatments. These differences are highlighted in Table 4.2.1.
The definition of vessel failure is distinctly different for each method. In France, vessel
failure is defined as the initiation of crack growth in the vessel wall, while in the U.S., vessel failure
is defined by the propagation of a crack through the entire vessel wall. The two approaches to the
definition of vessel failure provide an explanation for the differences present between the fracture
mechanics analyses of both countries. The French fracture mechanics analysis is performed only
to analyze whether crack initiation will occur by using the mechanical margin ratio, while the
U.S. analysis takes into account the possibility for crack arrest during the time that the crack is
propagating through the vessel wall. This necessitates the U.S. having both crack initiation and
through-wall crack propagation models in order to factor in these multiple phenomena. Because
the U.S. method gives attention to the mechanics of the crack as it propagates through the wall, the
U.S. approach has to ensure that all possible mechanical behaviors were modeled so that a realistic
result could be achieved. Behaviors such as the warm pre-stress effect and prior conservative
biases in the construction of the temperature-dependent behavior of RTNDT were addressed in the
modeling. Neglecting these effects would have introduced unnecessary conservatisms. Therefore,
the U.S. risk-informed approach to the fracture mechanics calculation contrasts the conservative
characteristics of the French deterministic method.
Because the results of the fracture mechanics analyses are used in a different manner for
each approach, the RPV flaw input data in the fracture mechanics model vary accordingly. The
French RPV integrity analysis is performed in order to assess the integrity of a specific NPP, and
U.S. France
Failure Criterion Through-wall crack Crack Initiation
propagation
Flaw Distribution Generalized distribution used Both plant specific flaws and
to develop screening limits one generic flaw considered
Uncertainty Treatment Combination of explicit Use of conservative modeling
treatment with conservative
modeling
Table 4.2.1. Comparison of fracture mechanics characteristics
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therefore, the flaw data input into the analysis is specific to the NPP in question. The same generic
flaw is, of course, evaluated for all NPPs. The U.S. approach is different in that the RPV integrity
analysis is performed for a generalized flaw distribution whose purpose is to reflect the range of
flaws perceived to exist in the whole fleet, as the results of the U.S. analysis are used to support
the development of a screening criterion applicable to all NPPs in the fleet. Therefore, much effort
had to be directed into the development of this flaw distribution, as it would strongly affect the
outcome of all RPV integrity evaluations. Slight differences exist between the French and U.S.
considerations of flaws. The French take a slightly more conservative approach when considering
flaw geometry, position and orientation. The U.S. approach has some conservatisms, but aims to be
a best-estimate model. The generalized approach taken by the U.S. in flaw characterization can be
considered to be beneficial in that it removes the need for costly NDE vessel analysis as is required
in France, however, the regulatory requirements for implementation of the risk-informed method
did indeed evolve to keep the requirement of NDE, so it could be suggested that the investment in
the accuracy of the flaw distribution was conceivably unnecessary.
The uncertainty treatment implemented in the fracture mechanics modeling again reflects
the inherent differences between the risk-informed and deterministic approach. The U.S. fracture
mechanics analysis treats uncertainty explicitly when enough information is present to grant such
a treatment. Therefore, model elements such as fracture toughness and material properties had
their associated uncertainties propagated throughout the analysis. The U.S. method implemented
conservatisms only in areas where knowledge was lacking, such as in the development of the flaw
distribution and fluence attenuation models. The French deterministic approach conversely directly
makes use of conservatisms in its uncertainty treatment. The major conservatisms in the fracture
mechanics analysis are the analysis of the generic flaw and the use of the safety coefficients in the
margin calculation. Because the generic flaw represents the largest flaw undetectable by NDE, it
serves as the uncertainty treatment for the NDE. The safety coefficients are provided by the ASN
and correspond to the transient category (i.e. transient frequency). They were presumably derived
using a traditional approach of engineering margin. The advantage of the use of the U.S. approach
to the uncertainty treatment is that it results in a better understanding of the level of confidence
associated with the results of the integrity assessment, which are used in the derivation of the gen-
eral screening limits. Alternatively, the French use of deterministic conservatism indeed may yield
a very safe result, however, the lack of understanding of what comprises the engineering margin
may allow for excessive conservatism to exist that could ultimately affect the future operable life
of the plant in question.
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Chapter 5
Critique of the U.S. Risk-Informed Reactor
Pressure Vessel Integrity Assessment
5.1 Introduction to Critique
The following assesses the use of best-estimate modeling and risk analysis in order to make
nuclear power plant safety analysis more accurate. The problems encountered in the particular
example of the U.S. risk-informed pressurized thermal shock (PTS) analysis can be expected in
other such attempts. Therefore, it is important to determine what can be learned from this example.
A risk-informed analysis is broadly defined as one that incorporates the assessment of safety
significance, or relative risk. The method that should be used to implement this type of analysis
for nuclear power plant (NPP) performance applications is not explicitly defined. Greater opera-
tional efficiencies could be achieved at NPPs by developing a systematic approach to risk-informed
analysis. Here, the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis serves to illustrate the techniques of a risk-
informed analysis of NPP performance. The elements that exemplify the use of risk-informed
practices are identified and critiqued. This critique will serve as the basis for the development of a
generalized risk-informed methodology applicable to NPP components.
5.1.1 Risk-Informed Analysis: A New Way to Treat Uncertainty
The fundamental difference between a risk-informed and deterministic analysis is revealed
through the discrepancy between the uncertainty treatments used in the two approaches. The ideal
analysis would not require uncertainty treatment, as a perfect state of knowledge would exist. Natu-
rally, this is unrealistic. The risk-informed approach aims to bridge the existing gaps in knowledge
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by employing risk arguments and explicit statements of belief concerning uncertainties in order to
achieve increased implementation of best-estimate modeling. The deterministic treatment, alterna-
tively, employs conservative models and data. Because the structure of the risk-informed analysis
has a significant effect on the analytical output, it is important to examine how these arguments are
formulated.
The methods that are used to increase the amount of best-estimate modeling in the risk-
informed PTS analysis provide an example of the variety of available techniques that can be used
to accomplish the goals of a risk-informed analysis. The ultimate result of the risk-informed PTS
analysis proved to be successful, in that it can be used to alleviate constraints on future plant
operation; however, this does not mean it is an ideal evaluation. The critique of the risk-informed
techniques presented here highlights the areas in the analysis that could benefit from improvement.
5.1.1.1 General Description of the Risk-Informed PTS Uncertainty Treatment
This description of the uncertainty treatment is based upon the discussion by (EricksonKirk,
2007). The approach to the uncertainty treatment in the risk-informed PTS analysis is character-
ized by both explicit and implicit treatments of different aspects. Thus, it is a hybrid approach,
representing a bridge between traditional deterministic engineering assessment and a fully risk-
informed treatment. The explicit treatment of uncertainty employs the direct use of risk argu-
ments. It allowed for the quantitative propagation of uncertainties throughout the entire analysis to
yield results corresponding to stated confidence intervals, as the uncertainties were systematically
propagated through the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), thermal-hydraulic and fracture me-
chanics analysis in order to yield through-wall cracking frequencies with quantified uncertainties.
The implicit treatment differs, in that it more strongly resembles the traditional deterministic ap-
proach by using conservative engineering models to treat uncertainties. This blend of approaches
demonstrates a move towards the greater use of risk-arguments and consequent uncertainty quan-
tification; however, the uncertainty treatment still lacks complete uniformity in its characterization
of all quantities in the assessment due to the presence of remaining deterministic conservatisms.
These conservatisms remain in the analysis, however, due to the practical limitations derived from
both a lack of resources and knowledge.
During the formulation of the technical basis for the risk-informed PTS analysis, signifi-
cant effort was expended in order to characterize correctly the type of uncertainty for each vari-
able. These characterizations are shown in Table 5.1.1, which is an adaptation from (EricksonKirk,
2007). The characterization of the uncertainties as being either aleatory or epistemic directly af-
fects how the calculations were performed in some cases, such as in the definition of the vessel fail-
ure probability in the fracture mechanics model. These characterizations were made by considering
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the knowledge available concerning the physical mechanisms governing the various properties in
question. In the case of the definition of the vessel failure probability, the change in the characteri-
zation of the crack initiation fracture toughness from epistemic to aleatory necessitated a change of
the definition. This change in characterization did not result in a significant discrepancy from the
earlier PTS assessment methodology, bringing into question the necessity of implementing such
techniques in this assessment.
The risk-informed PTS analysis implements several strategies that enable an increased use
of both best-estimate modeling and explicit uncertainty treatment. The use of the following tech-
niques is illustrated and critiqued in the sections that follow: currently used models and data,
frequency arguments, expert judgment, and sensitivity studies. This discussion is based upon the
work from (EricksonKirk, 2007; Simonen, 2004; Chang, 2004; Bessette, 2005).
5.2 Risk-Informed Analysis Strategies
5.2.1 Currently Used Models and Data
5.2.1.1 Illustration
The use of current models and data is an important characteristic of the risk-informed PTS
analysis. Their use allows for the creation of best-estimate models, which are essential to the
development of a risk-informed analysis. Current models and data enable the number of implicit
conservatisms to be reduced, resulting in an analysis that treats uncertainties more explicitly.
There are many examples of the implementation of current models and data into the risk-
informed PTS analysis. Many directly reflect the effort to eliminate the recognized deterministic
conservatisms that were used in previous analyses. A significant example of the use of current
models and data in the risk-informed PTS analysis is the development of a new vessel flaw distri-
bution. A vessel flaw is defined in (Simonen, 2004) as "an unintentional discontinuity that has the
potential to compromise vessel integrity and is present in the vessel after pre-service inspection."
All vessel flaws are assumed to be sharp-tip. A crack is defined as a vessel flaw that has initiated
growth through the vessel wall. Therefore, a through-wall crack is a crack that has propagated
entirely through the vessel wall.
Because the flaw distribution previously used in the deterministic formulation of the PTS
rule is not based upon any nuclear vessel data and incorporated various highly conservative as-
sumptions, much effort was directed to developing a flaw distribution that more accurately de-
scribes the generic reactor vessel. Advanced non-destructive examination methods were used on
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Type of Analysis Aleatory Uncertainties Epistemic Uncertainties
Probabilistic Risk Discretization of all PTS Frequencies of grouped PRA
Assessment scenarios into a finite number scenarios (bin frequencies)
of groups of
thermal-hydraulically similar
scenarios (PRA bins)
Thermal-Hydraulic Thermal-hydraulic boundary Model uncertainties
condition uncertainties, which
are sometimes reflected in the
associated grouped PTS
scenario frequencies
Probabilistic Fracture Uncertainties in fracture Uncertainties in
Mechanics toughness values non-toughness material
properties, Adoption of
conservative models
Table 5.1.1. Summary of uncertainty characterization in different portions of risk-informed PTS
analysis, Adapted from (EricksonKirk, 2007)
nuclear vessels that were available due to plant construction cancellations. The results of these
efforts yielded a distribution that, to the fullest extent possible, relies on empirical data. The use
of this new distribution resulted in a reduction of the TWCF by a factor varying between 20 and
70, depending upon the value of the limiting RTprs as shown in Figure 5.2.1, from (EricksonKirk,
2007). Here, Marshall refers to the old flaw distribution and PNNL (Pacific Northwest National
Lab) refers to the new distribution.
An important feature of the vessel flaw distribution model is that it allows for flexible model
inputs. This is significant because it enabled the tailoring of the analysis to a specific vessel in ques-
tion, ultimately producing a result reflecting increased realism. Of course, the analysis performed
in support of the development of the risk-informed PTS rule was performed to reflect a generic
PWR vessel in the operating reactor fleet, so that general screening criteria could be developed;
however, the flexible input parameters remain a unique feature of this model.
Although the flaw distribution developed for the risk-informed rule benefited greatly from
the addition of new empirical data, it was not constructed without the use of deterministic con-
servatisms. For example, inner-surface breaking cladding flaws were rarely ever discovered in a
nuclear vessel, but because they are potentially such strong contributors to the risk of vessel failure,
a small percentage of all flaws were considered to have this penalizing configuration. This mod-
eling choice reflects a reduction in the level of conservatism from the deterministic PTS analysis,
as all flaws were considered to be inner-surface breaking, but its inclusion in the risk-informed
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Figure 5.2.1. Comparison of the effect on the TWCF due to the use of a new flaw distribution
(PNNL) versus the old flaw distribution (Marshall), Extracted from (EricksonKirk, 2007)
analysis reflects the continued use of conservative engineering models.
The use of current data is also reflected in the selection of the scope of the transients con-
sidered in the analysis. The operating history of the plants, recorded in Licensee Event Reports
(LER), was used to provide validation of the transient selection. For those transients selected, the
information included in the LER was also used to provide evidence for the quantification of PRA
bin frequency distributions. The use of the LER in this way is significant because it results in
the selected transients and associated frequencies being directly reflective of objectively observed
data, instead of reflecting only the beliefs of the analysts involved. In addition, the LER could
also be used as a point of comparison, so that the PRA analysts could more clearly understand the
accuracy of their modeling assumptions.
Current models of human performance were used to evaluate the effects of human inter-
vention in PTS transients. This enabled a better understanding of the range of plant conditions
that could result from human involvement in the course of a transient. In the risk-informed PTS
analysis, the most currently available human performance models were used. The human perfor-
mance models explicitly considered the timing of operator actions for those actions considered
most influencing to the PTS phenomenon. Although human performance modeling is not a perfect
ratio: fequency of RPV failure(Marshall I improved PNNL)
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science, its inclusion demonstrates an important step in the evolution of risk-informed analysis as
it provided an additional means to advance the use of best-estimate modeling.
The modeling of equipment state variations that were considered to be specifically relevant
to PTS scenarios provides an additional example of the incorporation of model flexibility. The
modeling of conditions that are uniquely important to PTS provide for increasingly realistic results,
when compared to using the model parameters found in a general plant safety analysis, which
focuses on the end state of core damage.
The modeling of aging effects serves as the final, and most significant, example of the
importance of using current models and data in a risk-informed analysis. Because the PTS phe-
nomenon inherently arises from the effects of plant aging, the inclusion of aging effects is essential
to supporting the realism of the model. The modeling of the effects of embrittlement on material
toughness dominates this treatment of aging. A better understanding of the embrittlement effects
on the fracture toughness and crack arrest toughness properties that had been realized since the
formulation of the original PTS rule allowed for increased realism to be incorporated into the
modeling. This is demonstrated in the comparison of temperature separation between crack initia-
tion and crack arrest toughness transitions curves that had been used in the old and new formulation
of the PTS analyses, as shown in Figure 5.2.2 from (EricksonKirk, 2007). This graph shows that
for increased embrittlement (i.e. higher value of crack initiation transition temperature, designated
by To), there is less of a temperature difference between the crack arrest (TKia) and crack initiation
curves. This difference is represented by ARTARREST. This results in more embrittled materials
being characterized by a greater capacity for crack arrest. Therefore, the use of the new model
accounts for an increased number of states in which crack arrest will occur in the high irradiation
range.
5.2.1.2 Critique
The positive effects of the use of current models and data in the risk-informed PTS analysis
are undeniable, as evidenced by the significant effects that their use had on the calculated through-
wall cracking frequency. While it is undoubtedly necessary that best-estimate modeling must be
used in a risk-informed analysis, the level of realism associated with this modeling that needs to be
achieved remains a relevant question. Presumably, it would be sensible to implement a consistent
degree of best-estimate modeling throughout the analysis. The question that begs, however, is that
of "What is the appropriate measure of this realism?"
Quantifying the level of realism that characterizes the analysis is not straightforward. There
exists an ultimate limit to the extent of human knowledge concerning the relevant phenomena. Per-
haps the goal of a risk-informed analysis could be to perform the analysis to the point of reaching
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Figure 5.2.2. Separation between crack initiation and crack arrest toughness in old formulation
(red) vs. new formulation (blue), Extracted from (EricksonKirk, 2007)
this limit. This approach, however, would likely be too costly to implement practically. As a result,
there exists a need for the development of a metric that could be used to characterize the realistic
quality of the models and data used in the analysis. This metric needs to be consistently applica-
ble to all model parameters so that a stated level of confidence can be expressed concerning the
realism of the modeling. The use of such a metric would be valuable in providing justification for
the development of more detailed models for some parameters, so that a consistent level of realism
could be achieved. Currently, there exists no defined way to discriminate clearly between models
that could benefit from improvement. Having the means to accomplish this goal would increase
the efficiency of the development of risk-informed analyses.
The generality of the models and data that are implemented in the risk-informed PTS anal-
ysis is an important characteristic because it directly affects the degree of realism in the modeling.
Ideally, a truly risk-informed analysis would utilize all available plant specific information to the
fullest extent. The current risk-informed PTS analysis, however, does not provide a means for this
to occur. The risk-informed PTS analysis is concentrated on the operating and vessel conditions at
three plants. The analysis was structured in a way so that a regulatory screening limit applicable
to the entire operating fleet could be derived.
The risk-informed PTS analysis demonstrates the effect that the use of current models and
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data can have on the output of the analysis. The development of an increasingly logical approach to
their implementation could allow for a reduction in the amount of conservative engineering models
included in the analysis, ultimately increasing the use of both best-estimate modeling and explicit
uncertainty treatment.
5.2.2 Frequency Arguments
5.2.2.1 Illustration
The use of event frequency arguments is inherent to the implementation of a risk-informed
analysis, as they are used as a means to identify the risk contribution of various elements in the
analysis. Because uncertainties in the models and data can be correlated to event frequencies, the
use of event frequency arguments allows for the explicit propagation of uncertainties throughout
the analysis. In the risk-informed PTS analysis, this is demonstrated through the development of
confidence intervals for the through-wall cracking frequency (TWCF). The knowledge of the dis-
tribution of the TWCF was used directly to provide justification for the derivation of the regulatory
screening limit that would be generally applicable to all plants.
The use of event frequency arguments in order to identify risk-significance and inform
consequent steps in the modeling process directly supported the uncertainty quantification in the
risk-informed PTS analysis. The identification of risk-significant transients was an important step
in the development of the PRA scenario bins. The PRA bins were formed iteratively based upon
their relative risk-contribution to the total TWCF. Those bins that demonstrated greater fractional
risk-
contribution to the total TWCF were subdivided, until no single bin dominated in its risk-contribution.
In this way, frequency arguments were used as a means to identify which parts of the analysis re-
quired further development. Ultimately, the bin compositions reflected a compromise between
thermal-hydraulic accuracy and modeling uncertainty. This is because as the bins were subdi-
vided, the probability of the events that it contains becomes smaller, increasing the overall relative
uncertainty of the bin frequency. In this way, event frequency arguments are used to manage the
underlying uncertainty.
Event frequency arguments were also used to provide guidance in deriving the TWCF ac-
ceptance criterion by defining "RPV failure". In defining "RPV failure," it was debated whether
the failure should be defined in terms of crack initiation or through-wall crack propagation. The
decision to define failure in terms of through-wall crack propagation was made by comparing the
distributions produced by both failure definitions. Because the distributions exhibited similar be-
havior, it was concluded that the inclusion of the crack arrest phenomena in the result did not
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introduce an unacceptable degree of uncertainty. In this way, event frequencies were used as a
convenient means to compare the effects of different assumptions.
Using event frequency arguments in order to justify the truncation of analysis allows avoid-
ance of analyses that would insignificantly affect the risk. This approach is used, for example,
in the selection of transients to be modeled in the PRA, where below a set frequency limit the
transient scenario is not included in the analysis. This strategy is more significantly used to justify
ignoring the propagation of the thermal-hydraulic uncertainties throughout the entire analysis, as
the effects of thermal-hydraulic uncertainties on the result were far outweighed by the uncertainty
surrounding the frequencies associated with the PRA bins.
5.2.2.2 Critique
The use of frequency arguments is necessary in order to achieve the goals of a risk-informed
analysis, as their use is integral to the definition of risk. The identification of risk-significant
quantities in the risk-informed PTS analysis brought focus to parts of the model that strongly
influence the result, and thus deserve more attention with respect to their refinement. This is the
most important way in which frequency arguments can be used in a risk-informed analysis. In
order to achieve a result that exhibits more analytical consistency, frequency arguments should be
implemented in a consistent fashion throughout the entirety of the analysis. This would ensure that
elements of the analysis would neither be under- or over-emphasized. A consistent implementation
would prevent the creation of unjustified conservatisms, which should be highly limited in a risk-
informed analysis, as they are not supported by the logical arguments that characterize a risk-
informed analysis.
Risk arguments could aid in determining which parts of the analysis would be most bene-
ficial to invest in further fundamental research, thereby serving as a possible metric to determine
which models would benefit from increased realism. Because the quality of a risk-informed anal-
ysis strongly hinges on the quality of the input data, using frequency arguments to provide this
justification could prove to be very effective.
Implementing risk arguments in a consistent manner throughout an entire risk-informed
analysis would require the formulation of fundamental definition of a risk-significant quantity. A
good starting point for the determination of this value could be the risk acceptance criterion. Of
course, this implies some iteration in the analysis, as in the case of the risk-informed PTS analysis
the risk acceptance criterion was defined after the analysis had been performed. Because, however,
the acceptance criterion serves as a concrete gauge of what is an acceptable level of risk, the
formulation of the definition of "risk-significant" from this quantity would be logical. Ultimately,
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consistency in the definition of "risk-significance" would provide for a better characterization of
uncertainty, as the modeling would be tailored to those quantities most significantly affecting the
final result.
5.2.3 Expert Judgment
5.2.3.1 Illustration
Expert judgment is used as a means to reduce the number of deterministic conservative
assumptions used in the risk-informed PTS analysis by providing for an expanded domain of the
state of knowledge, allowing for the increased use of best-estimate models. Because experts are
able to characterize the uncertainties of their knowledge, expert judgment also contributes to the
increased use of explicit uncertainty treatments.
Expert judgment was heavily utilized in the development of the vessel flaw distribution. The
use of destructive examinations of nuclear vessels had resulted in an improved state of knowledge
as compared to that existing at the time of the derivation of the deterministic PTS rule; however,
because of the limited nuclear vessel data available, there remained large gaps in the understanding
of vessel flaws. Expert judgment was solicited in a highly structured manner in order to address
the aspects of the flaw distribution that lacked concrete data. The results of the expert judgment
were compared to a weld flaw distribution model that had been previously developed. The results
of this comparison were deemed to give satisfactory confidence that the expert judgment was of
good quality. Figure 5.2.3 illustrates the weld flaw distributions derived from both expert judgment
and destructive examination that were proposed for the PVRUF vessel, as compared to the results
of the weld flaw distribution model (PRODIGAL) (Chapman and Simonen, 1998). All of these
distributions were considered in the formation of the recommended distributions, which are shown
in bold in Figure 5.2.3 from (Simonen, 2004). The distributions are given in terms of the number
of flaws per meter of weld bead with a depth greater than A (shown on the y-axis), where A is the
depth of the flaw as a fraction of the weld bead thickness (shown on the x-axis). The recommended
distributions are those that were used in the development of the final flaw distributions that were
used as input for the probabilistic fracture mechanics analysis.
The definition of the thermal-hydraulic scenario bins in support of the PRA development
provides another example of heavy reliance on the use of expert judgment. In this case the experts
were the NRC thermal-hydraulic analysts instead of outside experts, as in the development of the
flaw distribution. The solicitation of their opinions was not done in the same systematic way as
was done in the development of the flaw distribution, but specific decision-making criteria were
used to guide the elicitation. In determining bin partitioning, a new bin would be defined if a
5.2. RISK-INFORMED ANALYSIS STRATEGIES 77
AA- 1.E01-----+-----.. .-.-- -------- --+--+----+--+------------
" 1.E-02 - ' - - + - - - - - - - - + + - -
1.E-02
o .E.03 --------- -
1 .1.06
I.14A i I
0.0 .2 OA 0.6 0.3 1.0 1.2 14 1 1.3 2.0
Through-Wall Extent, Fraction of Bead Size
Figure 5.2.3. Comparison of curves for estimating numbers and sizes of flaws in vessel cladding,
Extracted from (Simonen, 2004)
thermal-hydraulic transient were considered to be sufficiently different from all others and the
frequency of occurrence of the given condition was such that it could not be included in another
group without using a large degree of conservatism. Although the transient selection and binning
processes were peer reviewed, the opinions of the thermal-hydraulic analysts were not explicitly
compared to another model, as in the development of the flaw distribution model.
5.2.3.2 Critique
Making use of expert judgment in a risk-informed analysis is necessary, as it provides a way
to incorporate existing, but uncertain, knowledge into the analysis relating to subjects for which
there exists insufficient empirical data. While the motivation for its use is clear, its implementation
requires consistency in both how it is executed and how the results of the judgment process are
interpreted in order for it to contribute to the risk-informed analysis constructively.
In the case of the risk-informed PTS analysis, solicitation of expert judgment in the devel-
opment of the flaw distribution was performed in a highly structured manner with the results being
subsequently compared to empirical models. Given that the flaw distribution has important bear-
ing on the result of the analysis, the carefully controlled process exercised in collecting the expert
judgment was presumably the right approach. On the contrary, the approach taken in using expert
judgment in forming the PRA bins was less sophisticated. The importance of defining the PRA
78 CHAPTER 5. CRITIQUE OF U.S. RISK-INFORMED RPV INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT
bins is shown through the large bearing that it has on the overall uncertainty associated with the
analysis. Therefore, the decisions concerning the PRA bin formation would benefit from a consis-
tent approach to use of expert judgment. Additionally, a more concrete method of comparing the
decisions of the analysts would provide for increased confidence in the result, as it could provide
evidence that the experts were not overusing conservative engineering judgment.
Ultimately, a degree of unquantifiable uncertainty will always be present when using expert
judgment due to its inherently qualitative, and irreducible, characteristics. This does not mean,
however, that it should be ignored as a tool in risk-informed analyses. A more structured approach
to the implementation of expert judgment in the risk-significant portions of the analysis would
allow for greater confidence in the results of the analysis and thereby working to reduce the overall
uncertainty in the analysis.
5.2.4 Sensitivity Studies
5.2.4.1 Illustration
Sensitivity studies are used in the analysis as a means to gain insight concerning quantities
that are considered to be risk significant, but which are described by inadequate information. The
implementation of sensitivity studies allows for a reduction in the dependency upon deterministic
conservatisms. They produce a more detailed understanding of the range of behavior relating to
particular phenomena. This increased knowledge allows for the inclusion of more best-estimate
modeling in the analysis.
Sensitivity studies were used to support transient definition and characterization in the PRA
portion of the risk-informed PTS analysis. They were used as a means to provide an estimation of
how plant conditions that were not explicitly modeled in the PRA, such as seasonal changes in out-
side temperature, influenced transients. Sensitivity studies were performed upon parameters that
were believed to be contributors to variation between different event sequences modeled within
the same PRA transient sequence category. This provided for a greater understanding of the plant
behavior without having to drastically increase the number of plant states being examined. The
results of sensitivity studies were also used as evidence for the adjustment of the PRA bin frequen-
cies, as a better understanding of the role that various model parameters play in the occurrence of
transients was developed.
Sensitivity studies were also particularly useful in identifying whether the risk-informed
PTS analysis on the three selected plants would be applicable to the rest of the PWR fleet. Partic-
ularly, sensitivity studies were used to address whether the risk-informed PTS analysis would be
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applicable to forged vessels, as the three studies were performed on plate vessels. The sensitivity
studies were useful in this case, as they demonstrated the existence of large margins due to the
differences in the construction of the vessel types, and they provided sufficient means to justify
performing no further analysis of this issue.
5.2.4.2 Critique
The implementation of sensitivity studies in a risk-informed analysis is a powerful tool,
as it provides a method for gaining new insight that can be used both to assist the creation of
more realistic models and to better characterize the uncertainty of model parameters. Even more
importantly, sensitivity studies provide for a level of confidence in the analytical result that pre-
cludes the need for more detailed modeling and analysis. Because increasingly detailed models
have associated costs, using sensitivity studies in this way can provide for an increasingly efficient
analysis.
It is important to identify clearly where the use of sensitivity studies is appropriate in a
risk-informed analysis. As in the other topics discussed, sensitivity studies should be used in a
consistent manner so that decision-making in the modeling process does not place too much em-
phasis on their results in the wrong places. In the risk-informed PTS analysis, there is no consistent
logical basis for the use of sensitivity studies, except for the obvious avoidance of what was con-
sidered to be more complicated, unnecessary modeling. A definition of risk-significance could be
useful in identifying when and where the implementation of sensitivity studies is appropriate. It is
likely that in many cases sensitivity studies may be a good first-order approach useful in identify-
ing where further modeling is appropriate, perhaps addressing the issues concerning the required
detail of current models and data.
5.3 Conclusions
The U.S risk-informed PTS analysis serves as a useful means for identifying the techniques
employed to increase the use of best-estimate modeling, accommodating the increased use of ex-
plicit uncertainty treatment. There remains, however, an inconsistent use of deterministic conser-
vatisms in order to account for aspects of the model that lack sufficient data. The existence of these
conservatisms illustrates the potential for the development of superior future methods of treating
this type of uncertainty in a risk-informed analysis. Clearly, there is great difficultly in remedying
the treatment of unquantified conservatisms, as these conservatisms are in place due to a lack of
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inherent knowledge, or resources. For those cases where the acquisition of more detailed informa-
tion is not available, there must be a systematic treatment of these kinds of conservatisms. These
conservatisms could be addressed particularly through an improvement in risk-informed methods
by addressing the lack of consistency in the implementation of risk-informed strategies. The four
elements that have been described should be structured in such a way so that they are exercised
consistently and are complementary to each other in working towards achieving the goals of a
risk-informed analysis.
Chapter 6
A New Risk-Informed Analysis
Methodology
The U.S. risk-informed pressurized thermal shock (PTS) rule provides an example of an
attempt to risk-inform a traditional deterministic engineering analysis. Examining the development
of this rule is particularly instructive, as it concerns an age-related degradation phenomenon of a
safety significant reactor component. Understanding how the risk-informed analyses of this class
of components can be improved in the future will be important, as those in the nuclear enterprises
of the U.S. and other countries want to understand how to make better use of risk-information in
assessing the safety of the long-life operation of nuclear power plant components.
A major conclusion drawn from analyzing the technical basis of the U.S. risk-informed
PTS rule is that the technical analysis used to demonstrate reactor vessel integrity is a hybrid of
the use of risk-information and conservative engineering modeling (see Chapter 5). This result
is to be expected given that U.S. nuclear regulatory policy does not allow for the singular use of
risk arguments in support of regulatory decision-making. The technical basis of the U.S. risk-
informed PTS rule reveals, however, that the method by which this combination of risk-based and
engineering judgment is made could be improved.
In this chapter, we propose a methodology that can be used as a tool to construct a more
logically consistent risk-informed analysis. The methodology is general, as it can be applied to the
improvement of any risk-informed analysis. The future implementation of the methodology allows
for increased justification of the decisions during the development of the analytical approach, as it
provides for stricter adherence to the implications of the definition of the risk-acceptance criteria.
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the methodology, an illustrative example of its application
to the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis is presented.
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6.1 Recommended Improvements
6.1.1 Definition of Risk-Acceptance Criteria
The risk-informed process could be greatly improved through the implementation of a more
consistent application of the risk-acceptance criteria throughout the entirety of the technical anal-
ysis. This would be realized by first, defining the level of risk tolerated for the given event which
is being analyzed and then, when making strategic analytical decisions, applying a consistent con-
sideration of the fractional contribution to the risk due to the event in question. Certainly, this logic
was applied in parts of the risk-informed PTS analysis, but if it were applied more consistently, it
is likely that an improved result could be achieved.
Implementing a more consistent approach to the consideration of risk would not neces-
sarily mean that there would be a greater decision-making dependency upon the risk measures
themselves, as inherent in the risk-informed approach is a coupling of best-estimate evaluations
with conservative engineering models where resources or data are lacking. An improved approach
would utilize a more concrete justification for each modeling decision where both the risk impli-
cations and conservative models are considered jointly in making decisions about the analytical
approach. Making the modeling decisions increasingly based on the risk contribution of the rel-
evant phenomena would allow for a more transparent communication of the logic of the analysts
performing the work. For example, this would allow for stronger justification of the level of engi-
neering conservatism used when its use is considered to be necessary.
Applying this logical approach could take on many forms, and these are discussed as applied
to various components of the risk-informed analytical approach in the following sections. It is
important to reiterate that the risk-informed PTS analysis does in places apply this principle, but a
more thorough application would allow for greater logical and communicative transparency to be
achieved in future risk-informed analyses.
6.1.1.1 Selection to Pursue the Use of Current Models and Data, Expert Judgment or Sen-
sitivity Studies
One of the main objectives of a risk-informed analysis is to use best-estimate modeling to
the largest extent that is realistically achievable. In the case where there is a desire to risk-inform a
previously deterministic analysis, such as in the case of the U.S. PTS rule, it is beneficial to be able
to identify easily at the beginning where in the. analysis it would be most beneficial to implement
best-estimate modeling. Making this decision early in the process is helpful because some parts of
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the modeling may be very time intensive, requiring multiple-year efforts. Use of risk-information
can support such decision-making.
In making these strategic analytical decisions, the risk contribution of the model in question
can be used to prioritize the places in the analysis where increased accuracy in the modeling could
be more helpful in reducing uncertainty, thereby increasing the overall realism and accuracy of the
results of the analysis. Of course, at this stage of the process, these decisions would not necessarily
be based upon a sophisticated understanding of the risk contribution of each part of the analysis,
as the purpose of the work is to guide the transition from a deterministic analysis to one that is
risk-informed. However, even a rough estimation of the risk significance of the various models
could benefit the end product of the risk-informed analysis. The important point is that the efforts
spent on creating best-estimate models should be justified in a concrete way, and not just based
upon a select few opinions of analysts or based upon which models would be easiest to improve.
Using this risk justification is helpful because it directly targets those models that most strongly
influence the final result. Furthermore, the use of such justification provides for a more concrete
foundation upon which to consider the economic implications of creating best-estimate models.
Ultimately, this consideration provides a quantitative measure to use in making these decisions.
There are three techniques that can be used to create these best-estimate models: use of
updated models and data, structured use of expert judgment and sensitivity studies. All three
techniques allow for the creation of a more refined understanding of a phenomenon, or model. In
the majority of cases, the implementations of these three strategies would require different levels of
effort, with the pursuit of more refined empirical models and data likely being the most laborious,
followed by either the implementation of sensitivity studies, or solicitation of expert judgment,
depending on the model in question. The decision between these methods is strategic, in that it
likely will significantly affect the usefulness of the analytical results. Therefore, it is important
that it be made carefully. Knowledge of the risk significance of the phenomena in question can
be helpful in determining which technique to use. It can provide a means to justify the economic
consequences of pursuing a set of different approaches. For example, it may be better to spend
money on obtaining new data on a phenomenon that governs a risk significant component of the
analysis, while a sensitivity study may provide enough new understanding for a less risk significant
phenomena for which the economically intensive pursuit of new fundamental data would not be
economically feasible.
6.1.1.2 Selection of Plant-Specific Data
The decision of whether to incorporate plant-specific data into the analysis can also be
based upon risk justification. The practical implications of using plant specific data are serious, as
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they greatly increase the cost of the analysis. For example, in the U.S. risk-informed PTS rule, the
regulatory requirement of the use of plant-specific vessel flaw distributions is costly to the plant
operators. Therefore, having concrete risk-based justification for such requirements would provide
for additional logic to use in making the selection of plant-specific data. The risk implications
of the implementation of the data would be able to be compared to those of the other analytical
decisions concerning the choice of techniques discussed previously, so that it would be apparent
why the use of plant-specific data is necessary.
6.1.2 Using Risk-Information to Achieve Logical Transparency
In making the transition from the use of a deterministic analysis to a risk-informed analysis,
many decisions are required to be made concerning how best-estimate models and explicit uncer-
tainty treatments can be incorporated into the analysis. In order to perform this task with high
efficiency, risk-information can be used as means to encourage more reasoned decision-making
about the analytical structure.
The risk-informed PTS rule demonstrates some use of this concept, but a stricter adherence
to this practice would be beneficial in two ways. First, it would demonstrate to the creators of
the regulation that the decisions about the structure of the analysis are made in a systematic way
in using the risk criteria, thereby demonstrating logical consistency in the analysis. Secondly, it
would provide a framework that would allow for easier analytical changes to be made in the future,
as it would reveal where improvements would be most valuably incorporated.
Ultimately, this strategy can provide a means to achieve analytical transparency, which is
desirable given how the main purpose of the risk-informed analysis is to improve upon the lack
of transparency that characterizes many deterministic engineering analyses. It is important to note
that the recommendations presented here are not meant to suggest that these decisions should be
solely made based upon risk considerations. What they do suggest is that an explicit consideration
of risks should be made at each analytical crossroads. If these decisions are explicitly recorded
by the analysts responsible for making them, implementing improvements to the analysis in the
future can be much easier. This consideration of risk significance provides a quantitative means
of comparison that can be used in combination with other considerations in the decision-making
process, even if they are not necessarily quantitative.
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6.1.3 Outline of Methodology
The implementation of this methodology consists of two major tasks: risk characterization
and analytical decision-making. The way that it could be implemented is dependent upon the
nature of the deterministic analysis that is desired to be risk-informed. In the case of PTS, risk
considerations were a part of the deterministic analysis, which suggests an easier starting point
for the development of a risk-informed analysis. In the deterministic rule, the fleet-wide screening
limit for the nil ductility temperature (RTNDT) was derived by correlating it to the annual through-
wall cracking frequency (TWCF), which is by definition a measure of risk. Therefore, the focus
of the development of the risk-informed PTS rule was on the development of best-estimate models
and explicit uncertainty treatment. This, however, may not always be the case, so it is important
to show how this could be achieved from a more purely deterministic starting point, in which the
optional analysis does not implement a risk acceptance criterion.
Risk Characterization The first step of this methodology is to determine the failure state that
is of concern, and subsequently characterize the risks of as many of the currently used models as
possible that govern this failure state in order to be able to arrive at an estimate of its frequency
of occurrence. Although the frequencies calculated are naturally derived from event frequencies,
the power of this quantity is that model uncertainties and parameter uncertainties can be correlated
to these frequencies, so that an appreciation can be developed for how the uncertainties in models
and parameters affect the overall understanding of the risk of failure. Essentially, the use of event
frequencies provides a mechanism for these uncertainties to be quantitatively compared among
models pertaining to very different phenomena.
Identification of Risk Significance Once the risk characterization has been performed, events
can be classified by their level of risk significance, as a comparison can be made of their individ-
ual risk contribution to the total risk of failure. A metric that can be used in order to make this
comparison is the Fussell-Vesely (van der Borst and Schoonakker, 2001), which is defined as,
R(base) - R(x; = 0)FV = Rbs)(6.1.1)
R(base)
where the numerator states the level of risk reduction that could be achieved by component i op-
erating with perfect reliability and the denominator states the present risk level. In other words,
the Fussell-Vesely states the relative risk contribution of a given event to the total base risk of the
failure state. The events that are realized to be major contributors to the overall risk of failure can
then be separated into groups of similar risk significance for further analysis.
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In the case of the PTS analysis, the identification of risk significance by using the Fussell-
Vesely importance measure would have been an appropriate technique to use primarily as a means
of identifying the PTS phenomena as a significant contributor to the overall risk of core damage
frequency, as this is ultimately the risk that needs to be understood. In general applications, the
metric could also be helpful in providing insight into which models and parameters strongly influ-
ence the risk, as it identifies the phenomena that are the risk contributors. In the case of the PTS
revision, because the same thermal-hydraulics and fracture mechanics analysis is performed for
each identified scenario, the Fussell-Vesely would not have been useful in this way in the revision
of the PTS rule. Its use, nonetheless, constitutes an important step in a generalized risk-informed
methodology, as the identification of risk significant events may play an important role in the tran-
sition of other analyses from a deterministic basis to one that is risk-informed.
Comparison of Models and Parameters Once the risk significant event of interest has been
identified, the next step in this methodology pertains to the selection of the models and parameters
to be revised in transitioning from a deterministic to a risk-informed analysis. In order to achieve
a good result, a systematic way of comparing the effects of model improvements should be im-
plemented. This would allow for there to exist a logical transparency that can provide for both
an improved current justification of the chosen practice and a framework that could be helpful in
providing organization to any future revisions of the analysis that may be required.
Examining the definition of risk is helpful in illustrating the theory behind the decision-
making that is required in this step in the development of a risk-informed analysis. As shown
below, risk is defined as the sum of the product of the associated consequence and frequency of
each scenario that can result in the failure end state of interest,
Risk = E < C >scenario (6.1.2)
scenarios
where,
< C >scenario= (consequence x frequency)scenario. (6.1.3)
The decision concerning which models and parameters receive priority in creating best-estimate
models will directly affect the consequence portion of the risk definition, in that best-estimate
modeling allows for an improved understanding of the consequences.
In order to achieve more realistic modeling of the consequences, expert judgment must be
solicited in determining how improvements to the models could result in a better characterization
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of the consequences. This is true, as there is no way to predetermine the effect that the model
change will have on the total risk characterization until after the model improvement has been
made. Therefore, this solicitation of expert judgment is a very important step in the development of
a risk-informed analysis. Not only does this decision affect the quality of the models implemented
in the analysis, but it also concerns how effectively resources are utilized in the development of the
risk-informed analysis.
In order to be able to make decisions about which models to improve, expert judgment needs
to be solicited about two quantities. For each model under consideration, experts must decide:
1. The improvement in the understanding of the consequences that is feasible by better model-
ing:
S< c >i (6.1.4)
and,
2. The cost associated with the development of the better consequence model:
8< c >i
3$ (6.1.5)3$
Once the quantities in Eqs. 6.1.4 and 6.1.5 have been defined for each model in question through
the elicitation of expert judgment, decisions can be made regarding the strategy of the risk-informed
analysis. Logically, those that show the highest value of both quantities should receive priority in
the distribution of resources, as these models will result in the most benefit per cost. It is important
to note that these may not be the only two measures that are important in determining the approach
to the risk-informed analysis. Although in most cases the cost-benefit consideration will be the
strongest consideration in the decision-making process, sometimes other considerations, such as
social considerations could be important. For example, if the model in question concerns a phe-
nomenon that was critical in a recent nuclear power plant accident, it may be important to spend
more resources on examining it in order to maintain public confidence in the safety assessment. In
most cases, however, the cost-benefit considerations will prove a sufficient means to use in making
this decision.
There may be instances where the consideration of frequencies is implicit to defining the
consequence, separate from the frequency by which the consequence is multiplied in order to
calculate < c >scenario. This will occur when probabilistic models, which are separate from the
traditional probabilistic risk assessment that defines the event frequencies, are used in the anal-
ysis. An example of such a model is the flaw distribution that is used in the risk-informed PTS
rule. It does not relate to the definition of plant event frequencies, but it does directly affect the
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consequence of the event, and ultimately the total risk. Therefore, in this case, the frequency of
flaw types will be directly considered in making an assessment of how the understanding of the
consequences can be improved by better modeling.
Selection of Modeling Strategy Once the comparison of the models and parameters has been
made by ranking them according to Eqs. 6.1.4 and 6.1.5, the techniques available for the creation of
best-estimate models can be chosen. The three techniques: development of current models & data,
structured elicitation of expert judgment and sensitivity studies, have different associated costs
with their implementation. The identification of the cost of implementation for the models and
parameters in question can then be used in order to determine the most effective use of resources
by identifying how the greatest increase in the modeling of the consequences can be achieved per
dollar expended in making the improvements.
6.1.4 Example Implementation of the Methodology
The following is an example of the implementation of the above outlined methodology us-
ing the development of the risk-informed PTS analysis as an example. Actual model improvements
that were implemented in the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis are used as examples, however, the
values associated with the implementation of the process are hypothetical and they are defined for
illustrative purposes only.
Risk Characterization In the analysis of PTS, the risk characterization step consists of the ex-
amination of all possible nuclear reactor core damage events, as ultimately the purpose of the PTS
analysis is to prevent a core damage event from occurring. In order to determine PTS as a risk
significant phenomenon, the most updated information concerning initiating and mitigating action
events that govern the behavior of a nuclear power plant would need to be used in order to make an
assessment of the core damage frequency. In the case of the PTS analysis, the risk characterization
would result in an estimation of the risk associated with PTS and all other core damage initiating
events.
Identification of Risk Significance Once this risk characterization has been made, the risk sig-
nificance of the various contributing events to the overall risk of core damage can be evaluated
using the Fussell-Vesely metric. This is the point where PTS is identified as an important phe-
nomenon, as it contributes significantly to the core damage frequency. It therefore can be selected
for further analysis.
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In identifying the risk significance of PTS, clearly a frequency of this event has to be calcu-
lated. Thus, one may pose the question: "What is to be gained by more deeply studying this event
if we already have an estimation of its contribution to the core damage frequency?" The reason
for pursuing this deeper understanding is that there exists dissatisfaction with the current state of
knowledge surrounding the phenomenon. It is important to remember that the entire purpose of
a risk-informed analysis is to attempt to achieve a more realistic, best-estimate analysis, instead
of relying on conservative engineering modeling in order to treat knowledge uncertainties. In the
case of the first U.S. PTS analysis, there was simply a belief held that PTS could be a significant
contributor to the overall risk of core damage, but there did not exist any formalized understanding
of this risk, thereby a deeper scrutiny of this phenomena was justified. The existing knowledge
base providing the starting point for risk-informed analyses can range significantly in its level of
sophistication. Each application of the methodology will be different, but the goal of improving
the state of the modeling to best-estimate remains constant.
Comparison of Models and Parameters In the development of the risk-informed PTS analysis,
many model improvements were considered. Here, three will be used in order to exemplify the
comparison that would be conducted in the implementation of this methodology. It is important
that in implementing this methodology, the elicitation of expert judgment be performed in accor-
dance with a standardized practice. This practice must allow for the elicitation of expert judgment
such that the opinions of the experts are elicited in an unbiased fashion, and that the values be
accompanied by a statement of uncertainty. A record of how the elicitation of expert judgment was
performed should be kept so that in future revisions to the risk-informed analysis, the formulations
of these opinions can be reviewed.
An example of the quantitative estimations of the expected consequence reductions and
associated costs are shown in Table 6.1.1. The values in the improvement in consequence factor
that are real (not illustrative) are cited below. Here, average values are used in this illustration. In
an actual elicitation, uncertainty bounds would be considered, too.
In considering improvements to the thermal-hydraulic analysis, there was a desire to pro-
vide a more accurate representation of the spectrum of challenging events that could initiate a PTS
event. The original deterministic analysis consisted of only 10 thermal-hydraulic sequences. Rep-
resenting this spectrum more accurately would result in a reduction of the expected consequences,
as these sequences had been chosen conservatively. There would, however, be a cost associated
with a more refined representation, as an increased human effort would be required in order to
create this more detailed understanding.
As the number of thermal-hydraulic sequences modeled increased by a factor of ten in the
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risk-informed analysis, for our example we will assume that the experts believe that this more
refined representation of the events had a slightly greater than an order of magnitude effect (factor
of 15) on the improvement in the understanding of the consequences. The cost of implementing a
more thorough modeling of the thermal hydraulic sequences depends upon a more effort intensive
sequence selection process, but it does not require the collection of any additional data. Therefore,
for this example, we will assume that the improvement in consequence per dollar is high, at 15
[TWCF/$]. Therefore, the cost required in order to implement this best-estimate model is low, at
$1.
In the fracture mechanics analysis, two major areas of improvement were identified: the de-
velopment of a more sophisticated flaw distribution and the inclusion of warm pre-stress effects in
the crack initiation model. The flaw distribution used in the original PTS analysis was recognized
as severely conservative, so that the reduction in expected consequences that could be achieved
from the development of a more realistic model was realized to be potentially significant, between
a factor of 20 to 50 [The range of actual values cited in EricksonKirk (2007)]. The range of con-
sequence improvements per dollar is based upon which analytical strategy is required in order to
achieve the improvement in consequence. For our illustrative example, we assume that the im-
provement in consequence per dollar is higher for using expert judgment (20 TWCF/$) and lower
for using empirical data (10 TWCF/$). Therefore, by considering the total economic resources
available, the ideal blend of using expert judgment, and empirical data can be realized in order
to most efficiently bring the flaw distribution model to best-estimate. It is important to note that
just because the expert judgment is a cheaper alternative to the collection of empirical data, it may
have limitations in the total amount of improvement to the consequence that can be achieved. This
consideration must be taken into account when determining the ideal blend of the two strategies.
The inclusion of the warm pre-stress effects in the fracture mechanics presented itself as a
simpler improvement. The warm pre-stress accounts for the tendency of a material in the fracture
mode transition regime (ductile to brittle) to behave as having a higher fracture toughness when
it is previously stressed at an elevated temperature. Using this model in the fracture mechanics
analysis reduces the expected consequences, as it decreases the likelihood that a crack will initiate
growth. This has the effect of improving the consequence by a factor of 3 EricksonKirk (2007).
The effect simply needs to be added into the fracture mechanics code, and it does not require the
solicitation of new data. Therefore, the improvement in the consequence per dollar is illustrated to
be high, at 12 TWCF/$, bringing the cost to $0.25.
Selection of Modeling Strategy In the implementation of this methodology, the selection of the
modeling strategies to be employed in order to develop best-estimate models would be based upon
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Improvement in Improvement in Cost of
Consequence Factor Consequence per Implementation
3 < C >i = Dollar $= <c> i
3cTC
5 <c>i 3 $i(-TWCF) =
( [TWCF/$]
Thermal- 15 15 1
Hydraulic
Sequences
Flaw 20-50 20 (expert judgment) 1-5
Distribution 10 (empirical data)
Warm 3 12 0.25
Pre-Stress
Effect
Table 6.1.1. Example comparison values of model improvements
the data contained in 6.1.1. The model improvements that would be selected would be those that
collectively give the largest total improvement in consequence factor for the cost. In this example,
the main decision that has to be made is what combination of the use of expert judgment and
empirical data would allow for the largest improvement in the understanding of the consequence
for the cost. Once the most efficient combination has been realized, if there are additional resources
available, more expensive improvements to the understanding of the consequence can be made.
In this particular illustration, depending upon the costs associated with the use of the blend
of expert judgment and empirical data in the development of the flaw distribution, it may be pos-
sible that the improvements realized from improving the flaw distribution alone are most effective
at improving the total consequence factor than implementing the warm pre-stress effect into the
model, as the inclusion of the warm pre-stress effect has little effect on the consequence factor. This
would be an example of how the use of this strategy could provide deeper insight into the selection
of modeling choices, as it would provide an alternative result to just selecting those improvements
that are simply recognized as feasible.
6.1.5 Implications of the Strategy
As nuclear power plants continue to age, and as the positive economic and safety benefits
of the use of risk-informed analyses continue to be realized, it is likely that there will be increased
interest in applying the risk-informed process to many deterministic analyses. Making this tran-
sition from deterministic to risk-informed analysis is not a process that is well defined, because
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it is inherently based upon making thousands of decisions about how to develop most effectively
the best-estimate models given the constraints of the efforts that must be expended in the process.
Therefore, if this decision-making process can be more clearly delineated at each analytical cross-
roads, it is likely that not only will a more logically consistent result be achieved in the present,
but also in the future. Furthermore, when the time is reached when further technical advancements
should be applied in order to update a risk-informed analysis, the implementation of this method-
ology provides for the access to the decision-making framework that was previously used in the
last revision of the analysis. Therefore, the benefit of including the new knowledge of a model or
parameter can be understood in the context of the last time a decision was made concerning the
quantity. This record of model improvement can thereby help the contemporary modelers imple-
ment well-formulated modeling decisions, as the historical modeling justification can be used to
gain insight on the structure of the analysis.
Ultimately, the use of this methodology for improving consequence analyses can allow for
the risk-informed analysis to be more easily altered in the future, making it more of a "living
document," rather than just a snapshot of the technical capabilities of a particular time. This is
practically useful, as the operating life of NPPs span many more years than most individual careers.
So when the time comes to revise the analysis, the experts needed may not be available. Therefore,
having an explicit statement of how the risk, economic and other technical considerations were
made would be informative for future analysts to consider when making their own decisions.
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The Use of Reliability Knowledge in the
Management of Aging Nuclear Power Plant
Components
7.1 Introduction
The technical analysis that provides the basis of the U.S. risk-informed regulation of pres-
surized thermal shock (PTS) provides an example of how an aging reactor vessel, characterized by
its increased embrittlement, is analyzed in order to determine its likelihood of failure during future
operation. The analysis performed is an assessment of how reliably the vessel will perform up until
its projected shutdown time. Naturally, this analysis is important because it provides confidence to
both the licensee and regulator that the nuclear power plant (NPP) will operate with an expected
reliability in the future.
The evaluation of the reliability of NPP components is important not only for maintaining
confidence about the safety of the NPP operation, as in the case of the reactor pressure vessel in
response to PTS, but the knowledge of reliability is important also for business performance-related
decisions. For example, if it is expected that an expensive component will need to be replaced at
some point during its lifetime, the knowledge surrounding the timing of this placement is very
beneficial to the operator. This knowledge will allow the operator to plan this activity in order to
minimize the economic burden.
The basic economic tradeoffs that the operator must consider are both the potential income
and expenditures that may be incurred over the lifetime of the NPP. The one source of income
for the operator is the revenue earned from the electricity that the NPP generates. The sources of
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potential expenditures for the operator over the NPP lifetime are many. If the NPP is to shutdown
prematurely due to economically impractical repairs, there will be a cost incurred due to the fu-
ture lost revenue of the NPP. In this situation, there would also be a higher cost associated with
decommissioning than would have been previously expected, due to it being incurred at an earlier
date. There also will be the routine costs associated with the operation of the NPP until either the
planned shutdown time, or an earlier time due to NPP failure. Also, there are costs associated with
any repairs that may be required. Finally, there are costs incurred from the preventative refurbish-
ment or replacement of those components for which it would be more practical, with regard to both
safety and economics, to address prior to their projected failure. These economic considerations
are summarized in Table 7.1.1.
7.2 Reliability of Extended Life Operation
Reliability is defined as, "the probability that a specified fault event has not occurred in
a system for a given period of time t and under specified operating conditions." (McCormick,
1981) The reliability, R(t), of an operating NPP is a function of the total failure frequency of its
component parts, X, assumed to be constant, and the time, t:
R(t) = e-'. (7.2.1)
The NPP operates until either its planned time of shutdown, tp, or until it fails terminally at some
time, t2 , yielding a terminal failure scenario. This is illustrated in Figure 7.2.1. The extension
of the operating life of a NPP presents a different analytical framework due to the fact that the
NPPs are operated past their original designed lifetimes. Therefore, it is increasingly likely that
a terminal failure scenario will occur before the full term of the life extension. This is because
the new time domain of operation may yield circumstances that were previously unknown, and
therefore, unpredictable.
The types of potential failures that may be encountered during extended life include two
different categories of failures: fatal failures and repairable failures. Fatal failures pertain to those
components whose failure yields a repair that is too expensive, thereby triggering a shutdown of
the plant. This can be described, following Figure 7.2.1, by the following general probability
distribution,
Prob{fail(t)} = R(t) x A dt = e-(ed), (7.2.2)
which describes the probability of success to time t (reliability R(t)) multiplied by the probability
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Expenditures
- Revenues from electricity gen-
eration
- Costs of premature shutdown
and decommissioning
- Costs of operation to time to
failure or to planned shutdown
- Costs of repairs due to failure
- Costs of preventative compo-
nent replacement or refurbish-
ment
Table 7.1.1. Factors of economic tradeoffs of plant operation
R(t)=e-At
R(t)=e-Xt2
t 2
Operation Until -
Terminal Failure
Time of Terminal Failure
ts
Time of Planned
Shutdown
Terminal Failure: Succesful operation until time t2followed by terminal failure at time t2
Figure 7.2.1. Framework for evaluation of reliability of extended life operation, reflecting success
until time, t2 , when failure occurs.
Income
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of failure during the subsequent time interval dt (2Ldt). Repairable failures can be tolerated during
the operation of the plant until the expected future losses either become too monetarily expensive
or intolerable due to other factors, such as the potential for an event which would result in a
stakeholder loss-of-confidence. The probability of such repairable failures occurring is commonly
described by the Poisson distribution,
Prob(n failuresIt, n e-X, (7.2.3)
which yields the number of expected failures, n, to occur at time t for a given average failure
frequency X, as the product of Xt.
From Figure 7.2.1, we can assign specific time periods during which the various costs and
benefits from the operation of the plant are incurred. It is assume that before t=O, which is the
period before the life extension, investments were made in order to provide assurance that a longer
operational life would be achievable. These costs are presumed to be amortized during the course
of future operation. In the time interval [0,t2 ], failures that are repairable may occur and the
costs associated with these are comprised of both the cost of the repairs themselves and the cost
associated with the plant not operating and earning revenue while the repairs are being made. At the
time during which the fatal failure occurs, t2 , the cost of decommissioning will be incurred, and so
will to any short-term costs of abrupt shutdown, for example the purchasing of replacement power.
The benefits realized during the operation of the NPP are the revenues generated via electrical
production up until t2 , the time of fatal failure. The time of failure, t2 , can occur anywhere within
the domain [0, tp].
7.3 Using Reliability to Inform Plant Management
The knowledge of component reliability can be very valuable for NPP operators, as main-
tenance activity can be planned so as to limit the associated economic burden. In order to illustrate
the basic relationship between component failure frequency and reliability, the effects of various
failure frequency formulations on the stream generator reliability are shown below. These effects
ultimately affect the operator's decision-making.
7.3.1 Steam Generator Replacement
The steam generator in a pressurized water NPP serves as the interface between the primary
and secondary side cooling systems. The integrity of the steam generator is therefore of high
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importance, as it is a barrier to the release of the radioactive primary system reactor water to the
secondary side. When nuclear power plants were constructed in the United States, it was not
anticipated that steam generators would have to be replaced during the plants licensed 40 year
lifetimes; however, the granting of 20 year life extensions have necessitated their replacement in
order for continued safe operation to be ensured. (Note, many steam generators are replaced before
20 years.)
In replacing the steam generators, operators must make a decision as to when is the optimal
time for replacement. This decision is made by considering the timing of the costs and benefits of
the replacement. As summarized in Table 7.3.1, the following illustrative example assumes that
the only difference between the classes of costs and benefits when deciding to replace or not to
replace the steam generator is the capital costs associated with the replacement of the steam gen-
erator itself. The amount of expected benefits to be realized, however, is affected by the reliability
of the steam generator. Replacing the steam generator should increase the reliability of its fu-
ture operation, thereby increasing the likelihood that the future expected benefits will be realized.
Therefore, having accurate knowledge of the reliability of the steam generator should allow for
better economic decisions to be made concerning steam generation replacement.
7.3.1.1 Constant Failure Frequency Example
In order to illustrate how steam generator reliability affects NPP economics, and ultimately
operator decision-making, a simplified example of steam generator replacement is presented. First,
a case which assumes a constant failure frequency, X, for both the case of replacement and non-
replacement is illustrated. It is assumed that the decision either to replace or not to replace the
steam generator is made at the beginning of the life extension period, so for the case of steam
generator replacement, the capital expenditure for the replacement occurs in the first year. Addi-
tionally, this simplified model assumes that the cost of the steam generator replacement is $200
No Steam Generator Replacement Steam Generator Replacement
Costs Decommissioning upon shutdown Steam generator replacement at
beginning of life extension &
Decommissioning upon shutdown
Benefits Plant revenues accrued while Plant revenues accrued while
operating operating
Table 7.3.1. Comparison of costs & benefits of steam generator replacement at beginning of life
extension
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million and the revenue accrued per operating year is $400 million.
The economic effects of the two different cases is shown by examining the expected an-
nual rate of revenue for both situations. This comparison is illustrated in Figure 7.3.1. The re-
placement case, shown in red, clearly shows a projected higher annual rate of revenue than the
non-replacement case, shown in blue. This difference is directly explained by the lower failure
frequency characterizing the replacement case, as compared to the non-replacement case.
Similarly, a comparison between the two cases can be made by examining the difference
between the cumulative expected benefits of operation. This comparison is shown in Figure 7.3.2.
Here, with the exception of the initial payback period for the installation of the new steam gen-
erator, the dramatic difference between the expected benefits is shown. This difference can be
accounted for by the fact that the higher reliability of the new steam generator increases the like-
lihood that the plant will successfully operate in the future. If the steam generator is not replaced,
the reliability will eventually become so low that the expected benefits will be minimal, which is
shown by the asymptotic behavior of the no-replacement case in Figure 7.3.2.
7.3.1.2 Time-Dependent Failure Frequency Example
The assumption of a constant failure frequency largely simplifies the analysis of steam
generator replacement. A more realistic evaluation of the problem would include the effects of
time-dependent properties. In this example of the steam generator, possible contributors to the
time-dependent nature of the failure frequency that are considered are the following: primary and
secondary water chemistry, maintenance quality and residual stress from manufacturing. Variation
among these parameters can affect how quickly the steam generator will degrade, and ultimately
fail.
The consideration of these multiple contributing effects of the failure frequency can be
considered to be additive, such that their addition yields the total failure frequency as shown in the
following equation,
Ar = X (t),+ A(t)s + A (t)Q + (t)RS. (7.3.1)
Here, AT represents the total failure frequency, which is comprised of the sum of the different
time-dependent contributing factors. Primary and secondary water chemistry are represented by
p and s, respectively. The water chemistry of both the primary and secondary side are important
considerations to the time evolution of the failure frequency, as it is likely that water chemistry will
change over time due to both generalized corrosion and on the primary side particularly, the release
of any fission products due to the loss of integrity of fuel. The maintenance quality, designated by
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-No Replacement -Replacement
$450,000,000.00
$400,000,000.00
$350,000,000.00
$300,000,000.00
$250,000,000.00
$200,000,000.00
$150,000,000.00
$100,000,000.00
$50,000,000.00
$0.00
6 11 16 21 26 31 36
Year of Operation
Figure 7.3.1. Expected annual rate of revenue: constant failure frequencies
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Q, is another important consideration, as any lapses in this could allow for accelerated degradation
to occur. Finally, the level of residual stress, designated by RS present in the U-tubes of the steam
generator effect the progression of stress corrosion cracking, and therefore importantly contribute
to the time-dependent failure frequency.
In order to illustrate these time-dependent effects, an example was developed. This exam-
ple assumes a gradual degradation of water quality chemistry over time in both the primary and
secondary systems. A maintenance lapse was assumed to occur between years 11 and 27, and the
contribution due to the level of residual stresses was assumed to be constant, as it is a function of
the manufacturing quality for each steam generator and will vary among them. The time-dependent
nature of this failure frequency is illustrated in Figure 7.3.3.
7.3.1.3 Risk-Informed Failure Treatment
A further extension of the time-dependent treatment of failure frequency is the consideration
of the effect that event-driven degradation may have on NPP components. The failure frequency
of the component in question is thereby dependent upon the failures of other NPP components.
In this case, the failure frequency of the component is either increased during the duration of the
transient, or can be additionally increased for the remainder of the operational duration. Therefore,
the transient will either induce failure immediately, or increase the likelihood of failure during the
remainder of operation. Having knowledge of how the expected reliability of NPP components
changes due to the occurrence of transients will provide for an understanding of plant behavior
that is increasingly realistic, and thus can be used for more efficient asset management.
In the case of the steam generator, an example of one such type of transient is a primary
pressure pulse. This transient could induce stresses into the steam generator which could either
result in the immediate failure of a steam generator tube, or a decrease of the reliability of the
steam generator in the future. The step-change of the failure frequency that could occur due to
the transient, as compared to transient-independent time-dependent failure frequency is shown in
Figure 7.3.4 as occurring in year 20. The effect that this consideration has on the reliability is
shown in Figure 7.3.5. The value of the step change was selected for illustrative purposes only,
and therefore does not reflect any physical phenomenon.
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7.4 Evaluation of Net Benefits of Extended Operation, Consid-
ering Random and Transient-Related Failures
7.4.1 Introduction
This section outlines the calculation of net present benefits occurring from replacement of
a nuclear power plant component at time, t = 0; followed by operation of the component either to
failure, at t = tevent, or to the time of planned plant shutdown, at t = ts.
Here we consider a failure event occurring at time, tevent. This failure can either be due
to a random event (having frequency AR), a transient event occurring at time tevent causing failure
(having frequency 47 -Prob(failure| T)), or due to random failure at time, teven,, where an earlier
transient, occurring at time, tT, (tT < tevent), causes an increase in AR by an amount AAR.
This framework can be used for evaluating the financial implications of individual invest-
ment scenarios and for comparing them.
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7.4.2 Nuclear Power Plant Component Reliability Estimation Considering
Factors of Random and Transient Related Failures
Random failures are depicted by AR(t). A transient occurring at time, tT, (i.e. event T)
can induce both: failures, depicted by XT and Prob(failure|T), and degradation, depicted by )AT
and Prob(AXR I T), where the component survives, but is degraded by, the transient. Therefore the
probability of failure is defined as,
Prob(failure) = Prob(failurerandom) + Prob(failurerandom following degradation)
+ Prob(failuredue to transient)-
The failure frequency prior to transient, T, is defined as,
X = XR + AT -Prob(failure|T).
The failure frequency following the transient, T, is defined as,
X' = XR + AXR
where AXR is an increase in XR due to transient. Thus, the probability of failure is defined as
follows,
Prob(failure) = Prob(Failure due to random failure or transient event)
+ Prob (failure due to transient at time tT inducing degradation,
followed by random failure at time tevent , tT < tevent),
Prob(failure) = 'dt+ X'dt Ar )TProb(AXRT Te- re-A(t-t)dtT.
In summary, for a failure and/or permanent impairment as result of an event occurring at
t=tevent, failure is governed by random failures (XR) and terminally stressful transients (XT), where,
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) = AR + AT -Prob(failure IT)
or, by a stressful transient occurring and being survived at time tT, where tT < tevent and )' =
AR + AAR.
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Figure 7.4.1. Reliability diagram indicating the relationship of time of transient, tT, and time of
failure event, tevent.
7.4.3 Net Present Benefits Calculation
We evaluate below the expected net present benefits considering all failure and shutdown
possibilities, discounting all costs and revenues to the present at rate, a, and using continuous
compounding assumptions.
Net benefits of operation during interval [0,teven,]:
Net Benefits = - [CostReplacemeni + Costshutdown] + Revenues
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Net present value at t=0 due to operating during interval [O,tevent]:
Revenues (tevent) = fntAe-atdt
0
where,
a = discount rate, and
A = annual revenue rate resulting from production during a year.
Costs of component replacement:
COstreplacement = constant, incurred at t = 0
Discounted net present value (NPV) of incurring shutdown cost at t=tem:
COstshutdown = Cse-atetem
where,
Cs = constant.
Net Present Expected Benefits (NPB) = Revenueoperationto failure + Revenueoperation until shutdown
-COstreplacement - COstshutdown
where,
Expected Revenueoperation to failure = Probability of failure during each year until shutdown
x NPV of revenues accrueduntil failure at t = tevent
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Expected Revenueoperat ionto failure =] e 'devemdtevent J Ae-atdt
(t f ts+ 'dtevent TProb(AXR|T)e-tTe-1'(tem-tT)dtT
J00
f tevenAe-atdt
0
and,
Expected Revenueoperation until shutdown = Probability of survival until shutdown
x NPV of revenues accrued until shutdown
Expected Revenueoperationuntil shutdown = e-)'s - Ae-atdt
J0
and,
Expected COStshutdown = Cost of shutdown at tent + Cost of shutdown at end of life (t)
Expected Costshutdown f Xe-Ateventdtevent ' Cse-atevem
f ts 
t s
+ X'dtevent 10 XTProb(AXR|T)e-T (' event -tT)dt7 -Cse-atevent
+Cse-ats .e-;ts
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Therefore, the total Net Present Benefits are:
NPB = dteyenXe teve t Ae-aidt
+ f Xdtevent f 7 T e(Prob(AvT -) e- '(' ~'T)dt -f Ae-atdt
+ e "s -] Ae -a dt - COStReplacementJ0
- { Xe-'"endtevent -Cse-even2
J00
+ 'dtevent f 7~Prob( AXRI Te-A''e-'(''ve~'T)dtrTCe-te
+Cse-ats 
.e-1s I
7.5 Framework for the Evaluation of Transient-Induced Degra-
dation Reliability Effects
7.5.1 Introduction
As presented in Section 7.4, understanding the effects that transient-induced degradation
has on the reliability of a nuclear power plant can be used to make statements of belief about
the economic benefits received from future operation. Therefore, the development of a practical
probabilistic framework that can be used to evaluate these transient-induced effects will aid in the
optimization of a nuclear power plant's future economic performance.
One framework that has been developed for the deterministic evaluation of remaining useful
life is the "usage factor", which is implemented in the fatigue analysis of various components in
nuclear power plants. Fatigue is a failure mechanism by which failure occurs due to the accumula-
tion of stresses due to cyclic loading. A specific cycle number exists at which failure by fatigue is
expected to occur. As a result, component life can be predicted based upon the number of induced
cycles. The fatigue failure mechanism, therefore, inherently lends itself to the creation of a usage
factor that characterizes the degree to which a component has been degraded. The development
of fatigue usage factors is of particular interest to our work, as it represents an example of a de-
terministic evaluation of event-induced degradation that is currently being implemented in nuclear
power plants. Therefore, it will serve as a means to allow for the exploration of how a probabilistic
approach could be practically implemented in order to the characterize component degradation and
predict future component reliability.
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In the following sections, the state-of-the-art approach to the analysis of nuclear power plant
components that are significantly affected by the fatigue degradation mechanism will be presented
in order to provide an example of how future component performance is currently predicted on
a deterministic basis. The following summary of this analysis is based upon the discussion in
(Carney, 1997). The necessary considerations for the development of a probabilistic approach to
this type of analysis will be presented, where the probabilistic approach yields a failure frequency
for the component versus a deterministic statement of life usage. This exploration of the different
approaches will give insight into how probabilistic treatments of event-induced degradation in the
future may be applied to other components characterized by different modes of degradation.
7.5.2 Nuclear Power Plant Fatigue Monitoring
Currently in nuclear power plants, degradation resulting from fatigue is monitored during
operation by collecting measurements of pressure, temperature, flow and other parameters that
are important to understanding fatigue occurring at determined critical locations in the plant. The
measurements collected allow for the on-line determination of the occurrence of fatigue cycle
conditions (i.e. changes in temperature) and the calculation of the stresses at the critical locations.
This ultimately allows for the determination of realistic fatigue usage.
On-line calculation of component fatigue was prompted by the realization that the margin
to failure required a more refined understanding if nuclear power plants were to operate with li-
cense extensions to 60 years. Because fatigue failures typically manifest themselves as cracks or
leaks long before component failure, fatigue degradation is not a primary safety concern; however,
component performance could have significant economic implications in the life-extension period
from 40 to 60 years. There had been a realization of the inconsistencies between the design basis of
the components and the actual conditions that the components subject to fatigue were experiencing
in service. The original method of calculating fatigue was very conservative, so it was recognized
that even an improved deterministic characterization of the specific degradation effects of various
transients would augment the understanding of future component performance.
The current state-of-the-art practice of fatigue assessment is performed in three different
ways depending upon which application is best suited for the specific component in question.
Here, these three methods are presented. As stated in (Carney, 1997), the approaches used to
monitor fatigue involve:
- "Counting, categorizing, and tracking plant transient events and comparing the result to the
allowable cycle counts assumed in the design basis.
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- Computing cumulative usage factors, either through real-time stress analysis or a cycle-
based approach, and demonstrating that values less than the allowable are maintained for all
monitored locations.
- Using a flaw tolerance approach to demonstrate that actual or postulated flaws remain within
acceptable limits."
The combination of these approaches allows for realization of the structural integrity of compo-
nents subject to fatigue.
7.5.2.1 Stress-Based Fatigue Analysis
Stress-based fatigue (SBF) analysis provides the most precise estimation of fatigue usage.
Therefore, it is used for those components which pose the greatest threat of damage. SBF is
performed in three steps. First, plant data are collected from the identified regions of interest.
Location-specific transfer functions are then implemented in order to derive the stress history for
the component based upon the instrument readings at the location. Next, the derived stress history
is transformed into a stress-loading spectrum that characterizes the frequencies of the induced
stress levels. Finally, the cumulative usage factor is computed for the stress-loading spectrum.
This process is illustrated in Figure 7.5.1.
Local Stress Calculations In order to calculate the stress vs. time profile show in Figure 7.5.1, a
plant-specific transfer function needs to be developed in order to accurately characterize the stress
history based upon the measured plant data at the location of interest. Because there are a variety
of stress mechanisms involved in such an assessment, all must be considered in the way that is
appropriate for the mechanism. Some are dependent upon instantaneous instrument readings, while
others depend upon the prior transient history. The types of stress considered in the analysis include
those due to pressure, thermal expansion, cladding, thermal stratification and thermal transients.
The types of stress that depend upon instantaneous data are derived by multiplying the
appropriate instrument readings by a stress influence factor that has been derived in the design
stress report for the plant. These influence factors are typically a function of material properties, a
component's geometrical configuration and the plant status, such as valve positions.
The types of stresses that depend upon the transient history are calculated by implementing
the use of Green's functions. The product of the relevant Green's function and the transient data
are integrated over time in order to calculate the stress history profile. These Green's functions are
derived by using finite-element methods in order to determine how stresses are influenced by step
changes in loading, such as a thermal shock.
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Ordered Overall Range Cycle Counting The Ordered Overall Range Cycle Counting (OOR)
step show in Figure 7.5.1 allows for the extraction of the number of cycles of each load magnitude
from the stress history that has been calculated by either using a stress influence factor or a Green's
function. The method employed is not of significance for the purposes of this discussion; the im-
portant result of this process, however, is that the stress history is decomposed so that a comparison
can then be made to the ASME fatigue cycle standards.
Fatigue Usage Calculation The fatigue usage calculation is performed in accordance with ASME
Section III Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requirements. From the results of the OOR, the fatigue
usage is calculated by linearly adding the fatigue damage incurred by each cycle. Therefore, as
stated in (Carney, 1997), the fatigue usage calculation is performed as follows,
U = [(ni/Ni)
where,
U = cumulative usage factor
ni = applied number of cycles by stress level
Ni = allowable number of cycles at each stress level, per the design fatigue curve.
Some examples of actual calculated incremental fatigue usage factors for the transients listed in
the left-hand column are shown in Table 7.5.1. Incremental usage factors represent the increased
fatigue usage due to the single occurrence of a transient.
7.5.2.2 Fatigue Crack Growth Analysis
The Fatigue Crack Growth (FCG) Analysis is performed in order to be able to monitor
detected or postulated flaws. The analysis is performed in a very similar manner as the stress
based fatigue analysis, the main difference being that the stress history is used to determine the
localized stress intensity factors (K1) that can be used to compute crack growth. The crack growth
calculation methodology is illustrated in Figure 7.5.2.
111
CHAPTER 7. NPP COMPONENT RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Components & Incremental Usage Factors
Transient Charging Nozzle Hot Leg Surge Nozzle Pressurizer Surge
Nozzle
Shutdown and Start - 2.332 x 10-4 4.14 x 10-10
Up
Charging and 1.1 x 10-4
Letdown Trip Delayed
Return
Charging Trip 6.266 x 10--
Delayed Return
Table 7.5.1. Incremental usage factors for various transients of several components, Adapted
from(Associates, 2004)
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Figure 7.5.2. Crack growth calculation methodology, Extracted from Carney (1997)
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Local Stress Calculations The local stress calculations performed in the FCG are very similar
to those performed in the SBF analysis. The main difference between the two approaches is that
crack growth analysis requires the consideration of a greater number of stress directions. Therefore,
additional stresses that were not considered in the SBF analysis are considered in the FCG analysis,
such as deadweight or residual stresses.
Calculation of Crack Growth The real-time stress intensity factor (K1) values are calculated
based upon the previously calculated stresses, the current crack size and the specific crack shape
model. These K1 values are then sorted by R-ratio, which is defined as,
R Kj,min
KI max
where Kmin is the lowest stress intensity for a stress cycle and Kjrax is the highest. This sorting by
the R-ratio allows for the application of the exponential fatigue crack growth law, which determines
the total crack growth history for the entire K1 history, as shown in the Crack Growth Analysis step
in Figure 7.5.2.
7.5.2.3 Automated Cycle Counting Analysis
Automated cycle counting (ACC) is the third method that is used to calculate the effects of
fatigue degradation on nuclear power plant components. Although it is not based upon fundamen-
tally different principles than the SBF analysis, it is important to highlight because it is a method
that can be used in order to make generalizations about the degradation induced by the occurrence
of specific transients.
Essentially, the ACC analysis provides a rule-based definition of plant events. Important
events that are responsible for inducing fatigue degradation are defined by parameters that can
be measured by plant instrumentation. This allows for automatic determination of fatigue cycle
occurrence so that cumulative usage factors can be computed automatically.
The ACC analysis simplifies the calculation of fatigue by characterizing each transient by
a stress profile. This stress profile can be scaled by the on-line measured parameters in order to
provide for a more precise characterization of usage. Essentially, the implementation of the ACC
analysis allows the transformation of plant parameters into stress profiles by the use of influence
factors, or transfer functions to be avoided, thereby lessening the analytical burden. Essentially the
ACC analysis allows for the continuous recognition of the occurrence of cycles, as defined in the
design basis of the component, thereby providing an alternative means for estimating fatigue usage
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that is dependent upon a comparison to the design basis cycles versus the calculation of a fatigue
usage factor.
7.5.3 Considerations for the Development of a Probabilistic Analysis of
Transient-Induced Degradation
The methods that are employed in order to calculate the effects of fatigue degradation pro-
vide an example of how an estimation of the remaining useful life of a component is determined.
The example of fatigue is of particular interest because the resulting degradation is transient-
induced. The calculation of the fatigue usage factors, however, is performed deterministically.
Therefore, it is instructive to examine how this analysis of useful life may be achieved on a proba-
bilistic, risk-informed, basis.
In order to develop a risk-informed treatment of fatigue usage, three areas of analysis need
to be addressed collectively: transient characterization, parameter uncertainty and the definition of
the failure state. The pertinence of these areas to the development of a risk-informed treatment is
elaborated in the following sections.
7.5.3.1 Transient Characterization
In the deterministic calculation of fatigue usage, the postulated transients that are consid-
ered to be important to the determination of fatigue usage are defined. There exists a design basis
of transients characterized by an allowable number of occurrences. If these parameters are ex-
ceeded, then the component will no longer be serviceable. The on-line monitoring of fatigue is
used to establish the occurrence of these various transients. From this historical plant behavior,
claims are then made concerning the ability of the design basis to be maintained during the future
operation of the component.
A probabilistic characterization of transients would involve first, as in the deterministic
treatment, the identification of all transient states that would result in fatigue degradation. Most
importantly, however, the transients would be characterized by an established frequency of occur-
rence that could be later used in order to derive the probability of achieving a failure state. The
characterization of the transient frequencies is an important departure from the deterministic ap-
proach because it allows for probabilistic statements to be made concerning the future performance
of the component.
1 14
7.5. FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSIENT-INDUCED DEGRADATION
7.5.3.2 System Parameter Uncertainty
In the models used to evaluate fatigue usage, there are many parameters that are used to
derive the stresses and stress-intensity factors necessary for the calculation of fatigue. In the deter-
ministic evaluation, these parameters are not characterized by any explicit uncertainty treatment.
They are instead characterized by the use of conservative margin. The development of a risk-
informed treatment would necessitate the creation of uncertainty distributions for these parame-
ters, as these distributions would enable a more realistic characterization of system performance,
allowing for the analytical result of the fatigue usage calculation to be presented with confidence
bounds.
7.5.3.3 Definition of Failure
A risk-informed treatment requires a corresponding failure criterion that is risk-based. In
the calculation of the fatigue usage factor, the definition of failure is achievement of a usage factor
of unity. A probabilistic treatment would require both a statement of what is considered to be an
unacceptable reliability and a corresponding acceptable applicable confidence level. The combi-
nation of these two components provide for a definition of failure that accommodates both the use
of event frequencies and explicit statements of parameter uncertainty.
7.5.4 Risk-Informed Analysis Method for Component Fatigue Analysis
The current deterministic treatment of fatigue degradation will require the replacement of
NPP components that may still be able to safely operate. The use of a risk-informed method could
allow for a better understanding of the real operable-life of the components. The creation of a
roadmap for the implementation of a risk-informed method for fatigue analysis is an important
contribution of this thesis work. The formulation of this method allows for the identification of
the data required in order to successfully implement a risk-informed method. This identification
is important because it provides justification for the work required in order to collect the needed
data.
In order to develop a risk-informed treatment of component fatigue analysis, a method that
directly relates the occurrence of a transient to a change in the reliability of the component's perfor-
mance is needed. Here, a new method is presented that could be used in order to make predictions
about the remaining life of components that are affected by fatigue degradation. This method com-
bines portions of the usage factor and crack growth analysis that are both used in the deterministic
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fatigue analysis in order to create a probabilistic treatment of fatigue degradation. This probabilis-
tic treatment is possible because the fatigue degradation mechanism can be treated probabilistically
as an uncertain phenomenon. In the sections that follow, this risk-informed method of component
fatigue degradation and its application for making future component reliability predictions are pre-
sented.
7.5.4.1 Transient Frequency Characterization
The first step of the risk-informed method is to characterize the frequencies of all of the
transients that could possibly cause fatigue degradation to occur in the component. The capabilities
of the currently implemented on-line fatigue monitoring system allow for the easy identification
of these fatigue-inducing transients. Next, both industry available and plant-specific data of the
transient frequencies are used in order to determine the expected frequencies of the transients.
These transient frequencies are expressed using distributions in order to account for uncertainties
in the frequencies. These uncertainties can be propagated throughout the analysis in order to
accommodate an explicit treatment of uncertainty. This process is illustrated in Figure 7.5.3.
7.5.4.2 Transient Consequence Distributions
The second step requires the development of probability density distributions in order to
characterize the expected consequences that the transient has on the component. The consequences
of a fatigue-inducing transient can be characterized as the number of cycles per induced stress
level. In the deterministic treatment, each time that a fatigue-inducing transient occurs, a conse-
quence profile specific to that transient is constructed. In the probabilistic treatment, however, a
distribution of consequences is required. Therefore, for each transient, a distribution of the ex-
pected number of cycles per stress level (a,, q 2 , a3 ) is required. These distributions describe the
probability that a specific number of cycles will occur for all possible induced stress levels. The
All Plant Fatigue-Inducing T 2 Prob.
Transients Transients -.- +ranr ot3
Define Set of
Fatigue-Inducing
Transients
Transient Frequency
Figure 7.5.3. Transient frequency characterization
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characterization of the consequences with distributions allows for an explicit uncertainty treatment
of the transient consequences. This process, as applied to each transient considered in the analysis,
is illustrated in Figure 7.5.4.
7.5.4.3 Crack Nucleation
The fatigue degradation mechanism causes component failure due to the nucleation and
propagation of a crack. Therefore, it is important that the time of crack nucleation be identified so
that a crack propagation analysis may be applied effectively.
In the construction of the stress/cycle number curves (also known as S-N curves or ASME
fatigue curves), which are applied when performing the calculation of the usage factor in the de-
terministic fatigue analysis, the curve defines failure as the propagation of the crack through the
specimen wall. For the application of this best-estimate, probabilistic model, a method of in-
terpreting the number of cycles to crack nucleation from the ASME fatigue curves needs to be
applied. This method of interpreting the ASME fatigue curves in order to describe the behavior
of crack nucleation is the major advancement required for the successful implementation of this
risk-informed method. The data that are needed in order to perform this analysis successfully is
a distribution that characterizes the probability that a specific number of cycles at a given stress
level will induce crack nucleation. In Figure 7.5.5, an illustrative average behavior of the crack
nucleation phenomenon is shown in the top right graph. Each particular stress level from the top
right graph is treated probabilistically as shown in the graph below, where a probability exists that
a specific number of cycles at a given stress level will induce crack nucleation.
The recognition of the time to crack nucleation represents the most significant departure
from the deterministic analysis, as use of this factor this provides a mechanism for the connection
of the characterization of the transient consequences to the fatigue crack growth analysis. As in
the deterministic fatigue analysis, this allows for a comparison of the consequences (cycles per
For Each Fatigue-
Inducing Transient:
02 Prob.
E(N ) (, ( 03
N
Figure 7.5.4. Transient consequence distributions
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stress level) to these established fatigue curves (ASME fatigue curves), as the number of cycles
to induce crack nucleation are interpreted from these curves. The risk-informed method, however,
specifically characterizes the probability of crack nucleation in order to tie the occurrence of a
fatigue-inducing transient to an analysis of crack growth (see next section).
7.5.4.4 Crack Growth Analysis
Once it has been established that a crack has nucleated, a crack growth analysis may then
be applied. The same crack growth analysis method that was used in the deterministic fatigue
analysis may be applied; however, the driving force is now treated probabilistically. In the crack
growth analysis, once a crack has nucleated in the material, its growth is analyzed until either the
predictive period ends, or the component fails.
The driving force of crack growth is the stress intensity that is located at the crack-tip.
Changes in the stress intensity happen as a result of the occurrence of the fatigue-inducing tran-
sients. In the risk-informed method, once a crack has nucleated, for every transient that occurs
from that time onwards, the crack growth analysis is performed using the transient consequence
distributions. The steps of the crack growth analysis remain the same as in the deterministic treat-
ment illustrated in Figure 7.5.2; however, the transient consequences are instead implemented in
order to derive the required stress coefficients for the calculation of crack growth. Ultimately, the
crack growth analysis will provide a prediction of the expected degradation induced in the compo-
nent that can be made at a stated confidence level, given the explicit propagation of uncertainties
throughout the analysis. This distribution of crack growth can be then used in order to interpret the
reliability of the component by comparing it to the physical definition of failure: the crack length
at which the component fails.
7.5.4.5 Determine Failure Criteria
In order to apply this probabilistic fatigue analysis method usefully in the safety and asset
management of nuclear power plants, specific risk-based failure criteria must be established for
each component. Therefore, a minimum acceptable reliability at a defined confidence level must
be stated explicitly. The results of the probabilistic fatigue method can then be used in comparison
to the failure criteria in order to determine if the plant will perform acceptably at a given time in
the future.
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Figure 7.5.5. Probabilistic treatment of crack nucleation
7.5.4.6 Application of Risk-Informed Fatigue Analysis
The risk-informed method of analyzing fatigue degradation that is presented here is an
improvement upon the deterministic fatigue analysis. It applies a single method that can be used to
understand the degradation that results from fatigue, whereas the deterministic treatment applies
situation-specific treatments in order to make this assessment. The result of this holistic treatment
of fatigue degradation is that the prediction of the reliability of the component can be made at a
stated confidence level. This is a direct result of the ability of this method to quantify the effect
that the occurrence that a fatigue-inducing transient has on a component in terms of its induced
degradation.
This risk-informed method can be applied in order to predict when a component will be
operating with an undesirably low reliability. This prediction is made by using the established
method in order to determine the value of the reliability as a function time. This knowledge can
then be used in order to determine when the component should be replaced, thus aiding the asset
management of the plant. For example, as shown in Figure 7.5.6, the time corresponding to the
achievement of an unacceptable reliability can be established, and component replacement can be
planned to be performed before that time is reached.
a
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Figure 7.5.6. Prediction of probability of failure
The most significant difference between this probabilistic treatment and others that have
been developed, for example in order to study the risk of pressurized thermal shock (see Chapter
2), is that both the transient frequency and transient history are important to the characterization of
the failure of the component. In the U.S. risk-informed pressurized thermal shock analysis, only
the transient frequencies are needed in order to derive the expected reactor vessel failure frequency.
In this probabilistic analysis of transient-induced degradation, the nature of the phenomenon is in-
herently time-dependent. Therefore, the reliability is not only a function of the fatigue-inducing
transient frequency, but it is also a function of the order that the transients occur. This reinforces
the importance of both identifying and characterizing the transient frequencies well, as their im-
portance is amplified by the time-dependent nature of this degradation process.
The steps that are required in order to calculate the expected component reliability by im-
plementing the risk-informed method are illustrated in the Appendix. The practical application of
this method will require the development of new models and the collection of additional data. First,
the distributions pertaining to the characterization of the transient frequencies and consequences
will need to be developed. The large availability of transient frequency data would enable the char-
acterization of the transient frequency distributions. Regarding the consequence distributions, the
currently implemented on-line fatigue monitoring program could be provide a data set from which
to derive the consequence distributions that are applied in the risk-informed method.
The most significant advancement that needs to be made is the development of the crack
nucleation probability distributions. Ideally a method would be developed that would allow for
the characterization of this probability from the extensive database of ASME fatigue cycle curves,
which characterize the number of cycles required to induce component failure. The curves, how-
ever, could also be developed for component-specific applications as well, allowing for the con-
sideration of the influence of component geometry on crack nucleation. This component-specific
characterization would allow for a more precise result, however the economic cost of implement-
ing such a method would need to be weighed against the enhanced predictive ability that it may
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provide.
In order to usefully apply the calculation of the future component reliability, specific reli-
ability criteria must be established for each component analyzed, reflecting the lowest acceptable
reliability that would be tolerated in the operating plant. These reliability criteria could be devel-
oped by assessing the effects that the failure of these components has on both the economic and
safety performance of the nuclear power plant. Ideally, an optimization of these two factors would
result in the establishment of the reliability criteria that is applied to this risk-informed method.
Finally, by holistically characterizing the degradation process in the risk-informed method,
the user of the method has the ability to update the distributions based upon observations (inspec-
tions) made in the nuclear power plant. Therefore, the future reliability predictions that are made
by implementing this method can be consistently improved upon as new information about the
status of the plant is learned.
7.5.5 Extension of Probabilistic Treatment to Other Component Applica-
tions
In the future, the reliability theory pertaining to transient-induced degradation can be ex-
tended to treat other components that degrade in this way. The example of the calculation of fatigue
degradation provides a means for considering how a probabilistic assessment of reliability could
be constructed. Importantly, it also provides an example of what considerations could be crucial to
the actual implementation of a system for monitoring degradation in a nuclear power plant. These
considerations should not be understated, as the connection of the theory to the practice is what
will allow for the achievement of goals of the reliability model.
7.5.5.1 Transient Characterization
Perhaps the most important consideration in the extension of this reliability theory to other
nuclear power plant components is the determination of which transients are important to the anal-
ysis. In the case of the fatigue analysis, the underlying degradation mechanism is well understood
and therefore it is not difficult to determine which types of transients could induce this type of
degradation. Many reactor components, however, have their degradation characterized only by
time-dependent degradation mechanisms; therefore transient-induced step changes in component
condition, reflecting degradation are not being considered. Thus, demonstrating the robustness
of this reliability theory will require a companion detailed understanding of the root-cause of the
transient-induced degradation. Ideally, a mechanistic understanding of the degradation would be
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developed, as this would allow for the determination of the various transients that could induce the
system to degrade in the identified way. This, however, may not always be achievable. Alterna-
tively, comparisons of component performance could be made before and after transients that are
suspected to induce degradation. If performance changes can be shown to occur in response to the
same transient for many different components of the same type, the degradation inflicted by the
transient can be deduced.
7.5.5.2 Importance of On-line Data Collection
The fatigue monitoring system that is currently employed is a powerful tool for nuclear
power plant operators because it provides a real-time, comprehensive characterization of the vari-
ables and factors inducing fatigue, as the analysis is based upon location-specific plant data rather
than upon making conservative estimations of induced fatigue through knowledge of system-wide
variables. In a probabilistic treatment, the collection of this kind of specific knowledge can aid
in the improvement of the characterization of the consequence by allowing for the application
of Bayesian updating to both the characterization of event frequencies and system parameter un-
certainties. The use of this plant-specific performance knowledge would improve the predictive
capability of the reliability model.
7.5.6 Conclusion
The ultimate goal of incorporating transient-induced degradation into a nuclear power plant
reliability model is to enable the more accurate prediction of the remaining useful life of a com-
ponent. This has already been accomplished through the calculation of fatigue usage factors, but
it has only been done so deterministically and conservatively. A probabilistic application of this
analysis to a broader range of nuclear power plant components could be realistically accomplished
by developing an accurate characterization of the important transient contributors to degradation
and their associated frequencies of occurrence. As demonstrated in the example of the fatigue
usage factor, the inclusion of on-line monitoring of degradation enhances the predictive ability of
future component performance, and should therefore be considered for implementation in future
applications.
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Chapter 8
Future U.S. Implementation of
Risk-Informed Analysis
In order to be able to make an assessment of the future applicability to U.S. nuclear power
plant regulation of both the methodology presented in Chapter 6 and the reliability model present in
Chapter 7, a history of the use of probabilistic risk assessment in nuclear power safety assessment
in the U.S. is presented. This historical perspective is a summary of the discussion of the same
topic in the thesis of E. Verdier (Verdier, 2010) and is supplemented by the material presented
in (Keller, 2005). In light of the historical use of risk-information in U.S. nuclear regulation, the
future implementation of the methodology and reliability model will be discussed.
8.1 U.S. Regulatory Structure
In the U.S., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the independent government
agency that is responsible for regulating the use of civilian radioactive materials. The NRC regu-
lates both civilian nuclear power plants and the use of radioactive medicine by issuing licenses and
conducting inspections to enforce its requirements. The leaders of the NRC consist of five Com-
missioners who are appointed by the U.S. President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate for five-year
terms.
The regulations that are enforced by the NRC are contained in the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations: Chapter 1 of Title 10: Energy. The staff of the NRC publish many types of supporting
regulatory documents, such as Regulatory Guides (RG), which aid the licensees in the implemen-
tation of the regulation, and NUREG reports, which provide the licensees with additional informa-
tion about regulatory decisions and research results. The NRC has its own research division and
123
124 CHAPTER 8. FUTURE U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK-1NFORMED ANALYSIS
works in a fashion complementary to the efforts of the Electric Power Research Institute in order
to conduct research relevant to nuclear power safety. Several U.S. national laboratories serve as
NRC contractors in support of this research. The NRC also works with standards organizations,
such as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers and the American Nuclear Society, on the
development of codes and standards relevant to nuclear technology.
Although not a part of the formal U.S. regulatory structure, there are two important or-
ganizations that are heavily involved in the U.S. nuclear industry. The Nuclear Energy Institute
conducts lobbying to both Congress and the NRC on behalf of the nuclear industry and commu-
nicates information to the public about nuclear power. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
(INPO) is a utility-funded organization that was founded in response to the Three Mile Island
nuclear accident in order to ensure that industry-standard best practices will be used widely.
8.2 History of the Use of Risk-Information in U.S. Nuclear
Regulation
The application of risk-informed analysis to nuclear power plant safety analysis has been
the result of a gradual evolution of beliefs concerning the merits of risk-informed analysis versus
the traditional use of conservative deterministic engineering margins. Because the use of risk-
informed analysis in the U.S. has allowed for improvements in both safety and economics, the
merits of its use have been increasingly recognized by those in the nuclear power industry since its
initial introduction in the Reactor Safety Study of 1975 (Rasmussen, 1975).
8.2.1 Deterministic Regulation
The use of the deterministic approach to nuclear safety engineering, characterized by the
use of the 'defense-in-depth' principle and large safety margins, was a consequence of the lack of
understanding of the uncertainties associated with the operation of nuclear reactors at the time of
the technology's initial development. The use of this methodology also precluded the need for the
development of best-estimate calculations, which would have been very costly, given the limited
computational capabilities of the time of the technology's origins. A set of design basis accidents
was used as a measure of the plant's ability to operate safely. This set of accidents was chosen
based on the opinions of experts, and was comprised of what was considered to be an envelope
of the most important failures that a nuclear power plant could experience, such as the double-
ended guillotine break of the largest reactor coolant water pipe. The use of this safety philosophy
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was fundamentally based on the belief that if the nuclear power plant could safely survive the
worst hypothesized accidents, it consequently would be able to safely handle other, less severe,
challenges to its integrity. This approach has resulted in a high level of nuclear safety, but one less
high than had been hoped and comprehended.
8.2.2 Reasons for Interest in the Use of Risk-Information for Nuclear Power
Applications
The use of risk and reliability analysis in nuclear engineering began in the 1950's, but did
not gain much attention until the 1970's. Although the Atomic Energy Commission (the prede-
cessor organization to the NRC) was not interested in considering the use of risk in its formal
regulatory oversight, there had been an acknowledgement of the fact that the prescriptive design-
basis accident might provide an incomplete assessment of safety. This incomplete assessment
arose from the fact that the use of engineering conservatisms does not provide an integrated un-
derstanding of expected system performance. In addition, the deterministic assessments focused
on the prevention of serious accidents, while not considering the ability of the plant to tolerate less
serious, but more frequent events. The notion of this incomplete understanding of safety prompted
the initial use of risk-analysis in a nuclear power plant application.
8.2.3 First Applications of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to Nuclear
Power Plants
The desire to understand the risks associated with nuclear power arose in response to the
need to provide justification for insurance requirements, particularly the supplemental government
insurance provided under the Price-Anderson Act (Keller, 2005). This prompted completion of the
Atomic Energy Commission's study WASH-740 (Downes, 1957), which provided an estimate for
the risk of a serious reactor accident as 10-6 per reactor year of operation. This study, however,
focused exclusively on loss-of-cooling accident scenarios, and thus likely was not portraying the
reality of the risks associated with nuclear power plant operation.
In order to improve upon these risk methodologies and to address the increasing public
concern about the risks associated with nuclear power, a new study, WASH-1400 (Rasmussen,
1975) or the Reactor Safety Study, was published in 1975. This study structured the risk analysis
of nuclear power plants in a new way, combining the use of both event trees and fault trees in order
to calculate the overall frequency of core damage. The combination of these techniques allowed
for a much more encompassing examination of the events that could trigger core damage. The
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study ultimately showed that the risks associated with nuclear power were orders of magnitude
less than other threats. The risk of core damage was concluded to be 1/20,000 per reactor year.
This was a surprising conclusion to many, as it was previously believed that it would be on the
order of 10-8 per reactor year.
The results of the WASH-1400 were met with much controversy, since many thought that
the data used to derive the results were insufficient. In addition, it was believed that the con-
clusions concerning the risk contribution of external events lacked sufficient justification. The
improvements to the risk methodologies, however, were welcomed, but criticisms of the portions
of the analysis which were believed to be unrealistic or misleading led the NRC to terminate its
support for the conclusions of the assessment.
The attitudes towards the Reactor Safety Study quickly changed in response to the events
of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. Because the initiating event that resulted in the core
damage was the same class of event that the Reactor Safety Study indicated as having an associated
relatively high risk (small-break loss-of-cooling accident), credibility was granted to the results of
the Reactor Safety Study. During the aftermath of the accident, many utility companies were
concerned about the number of new safety requirements that would be called for in their plants. It
was recognized that the risk-analysis techniques could help the NRC identify on which components
and systems to focus during this evaluation. This was the first time when the connection was made
between risk-analysis and economics.
8.2.4 The Development of Plant-Specific PRA
Realizing the benefits that could be derived from the use of risk-analysis, the NRC sup-
ported the development of plant-specific PRAs by issuing the Generic Letter 88-20 (Commission,
1988) in 1988. The publishing of this letter gave recognition to that fact that the creation of plant-
specific PRAs would provide for better insight into the safety of each plant because each plant
had a different design. All plants were required to perform their own PRAs under this Individ-
ual Plant Examination program, and they have continued to update the analyses according to both
plant modifications and new information learned from operations. These plant-specific PRAs have
been important in helping licensees determine how to improve both hardware and procedures so
accidents can be mitigated better or avoided, thereby reducing the overall risk of core damage.
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8.2.5 Definition of Safety Goals
This new appreciation for PRA prompted the need for a useable definition of safety, or
'safety goals.' At the direction of the Congress, an NRC policy statement entitled "Safety Goals
for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants" (Commission, 1986) was published in 1986. The
policy statement declared that the risks from nuclear power should be much less than the risks re-
ceived from all other societal hazards. This policy statement was made in order to support a "more
coherent and consistent regulation of nuclear power plants, a more predictable regulatory process,
a public understanding of the regulatory criteria that the NRC applies, and public confidence in
the safety of operating plants"(Commission, 1986). The policy statement declared a qualitative
goal pertaining to the risk of nuclear power plants to both individuals and society. It stated that
the risk to individuals should not be a significant additional increase to life and health, and that the
societal risk should be comparable to the risks induced by other modes of electricity generation.
The quantitative goals state that the the risk to the individual near a nuclear power plant should not
be more than 0.1% of the sum total of prompt fatality risks to which the individuals in the U.S. are
exposed and that the latent risk of cancer development should not be greater than 0.1% of the total
cancer risk from all other causes.
In 1990, additional safety goals were developed by the NRC in order to provide a metric
that is more easily applicable to the output of PRA analysis. These were published in 1990 in
the document SECY 89-201: "Implementation of the safety goals" (Commission, 1990b). The
goals state that the core damage frequency should be less than 10-4 per reactor year, and that
the large early release of nuclear material frequency should be less than 10- 5 per reactor year.
Although these goals are meant to be reflective of the goals promulgated in the safety goals policy
statement, there is no strict statement of equivalence between them. Therefore, strictly speaking
they are not a Commission approved safety goal. They have, however, come to be used as de
facto safety goals, given how easily they may be applied to the output of PRA. The NUREG- 1150
(Commission, 1990a) report, published in 1990, served as an update to the Reactor Safety Study.
It consisted of five plant-specific PRAs of both the boiling and pressurized water reactor designs.
It also considered more phenomena and was more explicit in its use of expert judgment and in the
quantification of uncertainties in its results. The results of this study showed that all five plants
demonstrated risk levels consistent with the established safety goals.
8.2.6 PRA Policy Statement
With each nuclear power plant having conducted its own risk assessment under the Indi-
vidual Plant Examination program, utilities became increasingly interested in using the results of
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the analyses as justification for regulatory decision-making. In 1995 the NRC published the Policy
Statement: "Use of Probabilistic Assessment Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities" (Com-
mission, 1995) This policy statement endorses the use of PRA to both "enhance and extend" the
traditional deterministic approach to regulation. It allows for the prioritization of challenges to the
reactor based upon the risk-significance in combination with operating experience and engineering
judgment. The policy was established in order to promote the development of PRA methodologies
that would encourage consistent implementation, allowing for a predictable regulatory response to
the use of PRA.
The PRA Policy Statement was a major step forward in the evolution of the use of PRA in
nuclear power plant safety applications as it provided a clear endorsement of the benefits of the use
of PRA by the NRC. It acknowledged that the use of PRA can allow for the identification of the
spectrum of initiating events and consequent mitigating actions that can constitute core damage
sequences. This approach to the assessment is a stark difference compared to the single failure
approach implemented in the deterministic method, which relies upon analyzing the consequences
of one specific type of failure at a time. The PRA policy statement also recognized that PRA can
be used to eliminate unnecessary regulatory burdens, so improved regulatory justifications can be
developed based upon the implementation of risk principles.
8.2.7 Introduction of Risk-Informed Regulation
The issuance of the PRA Policy Statement paved the way for the introduction of the use
of PRA as a means to support changes to the licensing basis. The NRC followed-up this Policy
Statement with the 1998 publishing of Regulatory Guide 1.174: "An approach for using Proba-
bilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the Licensing"
(Commission, 1998) This Regulatory Guide presents an acceptable method for the consideration
of the use of risk arguments in the alteration of the licensing basis. This Regulatory Guide does not
limit licensees from developing other methods of justification for changes to the licensing basis. In
essence, the Regulatory Guide shows how licensees may implement changes which result in small
changes in risk, including small increases in risk, but do not significantly affect the overall levels of
safety margin, or degrade the level of defense-in-depth. When changes are shown to be allowable,
the effects of the change must be monitored during the course of operation. The main elements of
the risk-informed process for making changes to the licensing basis is outlined in Figure 8.2.1.
Although the issuance of Regulatory Guide 1.174 provided a way for licensees to use risk-
information to change their licensing basis, this new regulatory development did not require risk
information to be used to support these future changes when they are in accordance with NRC reg-
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Figure 8.2.1. Diagram of risk-informed request for licensing basis change, Extracted from
(Commission, 1998)
ulations. If the changes requested extend past what is required by the NRC, then risk information
may be required in order to justify the change. The method provided in Regulatory Guide 1.174
used to justify these changes is dependent upon the quantitative objects outlined by the subsidiary
objectives concerning the acceptable core damage frequency and large early release frequencies.
These quantitative acceptance guidelines are illustrated Figures 8.2.2 and 8.2.3. These figures out-
line what changes in both the core damage frequency and large early frequency are allowed. The
figures show that for a given baseline CDF or LERF (on the x-axis), the changes that are allowed
to the CDF and LERF (shown on the y-axis), are illustrated by the areas of the three regions on
the chart. Any change falling into region I is not permitted. In regions II and III small changes are
allowed as long as the cumulative effects of the changes are tracked. Because of the small changes
in risk associated with region III, there is more flexibility with respect to the value of the baseline
CDF/LERF to which these changes may be applied.
Although risk-informed changes to the licensing basis were made allowable, an important
purpose of the engineering analysis is to show that both the principle of defense-in-depth and
the safety margins were maintained. These methods used in order to treat uncertainty were still
recognized as being important. Therefore, specific criteria that demonstrate the licensing change
is in accordance with these principles were outlined in RG 1.174.
Ultimately there is no general principle for how risk-information should influence the decision-
making process, as each application of risk-information will be different depending upon the tech-
nical question being addressed. RG 1.174, however, does legitimize the ability of PRA to quanti-
tatively characterize the risk and consequently provide evidence for changes to the licensing basis,
provided that the conclusions can be supported by the results of traditional engineering analyses.
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8.3 Implementation Strategy for Risk-Informed Framework
Initially the introduction of the risk-informed regulatory practices was received with reluc-
tance by some staff at the NRC, as it was believed that the introduction of these new methods would
result in the ignorance of the traditional deterministic practices based on defense-in-depth and the
use of safety margins. Beginning with the Individual Plant Examination program, it became evi-
dent over time that the knowledge gained by examining the risks was very useful in helping identify
vulnerabilities. The success of the implementation of the Maintenance Rule also provided evidence
of the positive impact that the risk-informed approach could have on plant performance. This suc-
cess, combined with risk training programs for the NRC staff allowed for the gradual acceptance
of risk-informed practices by the NRC Staff.
The industry's adoption of risk-informed practices was also a gradual process. Initially the
NRC was the driver of the efforts, requiring licensees to perform their own plant-specific PRAs un-
der the Individual Plant Examination program. Some licensees resisted the use of risk practices, as
they believed it to be an unnecessary burden. Attitudes changed, however, when it became appar-
ent that PRA could be an effective tool for risk management through the adoption of risk-informed
regulatory practices. The application of the Maintenance Rule was the first major implementation
of risk-informed regulation. Licensees continued to expand their use of risk information in their
plant operations by using risk monitors in order to operate their plants more safely and efficiently.
The implementation of these risk-informed operational applications has also had the added benefit
of developing an improved safety culture at many plants, with some licensees tying compensation
to realized risk performance metrics.
Recently, the NRC has published NUREG 2150: "A Proposed Risk Management Regula-
tory Framework" (Commission, 2012). This document describes a framework that would allow for
the more consistent use of risk information in the regulation of nuclear power reactors and other
nuclear entities that the NRC regulates. Regarding power reactors specifically, it states that risk in-
formation should be used more extensively in order to determine the definition of the deterministic
design-basis accidents, to determine how to best guard reactors against beyond-design basis acci-
dents and to improve the consistency between how risk is used to inform both nuclear security and
nuclear safety. The successful implementation of this framework will be largely dependent upon
the prerogatives of the NRC Commissioners to promote it in their agency. The framework does,
however, place a technical burden on licensees. Many of the licensees do not have plant-specific
PRAs that are advanced enough in order to be able to successfully implement the features of the
framework. Therefore, its success will be dependent upon a combination of the political-will of
the Commissioners and the technical advancement of the plant-specific PRAs.
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The implementation of risk-informed practices in the future appears to be promising in the
U.S.. Improvements in nuclear power plant performance in terms of both safety and operation
have been demonstrated through industry metrics such as the INPO performance indicator and the
NRC accident precursor index (Kadak and Matsuo, 2007). These metrics show that the use of
risk-informed regulatory practices has either allowed for the maintenance or even an increase in
the performance of the plants. If these trends continue into the future, it is likely that the increases
in efficiency realized from the implementation of risk-informed practices will allow for continued
adoption of new risk-informed practices.
Chapter 9
Future Implementation of Risk-Informed
Analysis In France
In order to be able to make an assessment of the future applicability to French nuclear power
plant regulation of the methodology presented in Chapter 6 and the reliability model presented in
Chapter 7, a history of the use of risk-information in French nuclear regulation is presented. This
history is a summary of the material presented in (Verdier, 2010). Based upon the past success of
the use of risk-information in French nuclear regulation, conclusions are made regarding the future
success of their implementation.
9.1 French Regulatory Structure
The safety of French nuclear power plants is regulated by the independent Authority of
Nuclear Security (ASN). This body was formed in 2007 following a reorganization of nuclear
safety oversight functions. The ASN regulates the design, construction and operation of nuclear
facilities, including both commercial nuclear power plants and nuclear research facilities. The ASN
is run by five commissioners, who are each appointed for six years. The ASN receives technical
advice from the Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety Institute (IRSN) and Permanent Groups of
Experts (GP). The French Parliament is responsible for voting on laws pertaining to nuclear safety
and the Government promulgates decrees concerning nuclear power plant safety. It also makes
important decisions concerning the nuclear utility, Electricit6 de France (EDF). The Government
receives recommendations from the ASN on these matters.
The ASN issues legally binding "technical regulatory decisions" to supplement various laws
and decrees. The ASN also issues Basic Safety Rules (RFS), which are recommendations concern-
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ing safety objectives and accepted practices that are allowed to be implemented in order to achieve
the objectives. Licensees do not have to follow the particular recommended practices if it can be
shown that they can achieve their goals via another acceptable means. RFSs also concern accept-
able industrial standards that pertain to design, construction and operation. More recently, Guides
have been issued by the ASN. Similarly to the RFSs they are not legally binding, but they may
override some of the RFSs. Finally, because the French nuclear industry consists of one utility,
EDF and one regulator, ASN, many of the technical requirements have been communicated infor-
mally and are not published. One of the goals of the reorganization of the French nuclear safety
in 2007 was to make the regulatory relationships more scrutable, and to more greatly formalize
regulatory practices.
9.2 Historical Use of PRA in France
The French approach to nuclear reactor safety relies heavily on the use of conservative
deterministic analyses. The French began to perform PRA in the 1990s in order to gain new in-
sights on the safety performance of their plants. The use of PRA allowed them to identify the
risk-dominant structures, systems and components (SSCs) and to understand which plant config-
urations presented the greater safety concerns. As the results of these initial analyses were able
to be used to improve the safety level, the use of PRA has substantially increased since their ini-
tial introduction. PRA has been implemented to inform the various changes required during the
French decennial reactor safety reviews, providing justification for safety upgrades to be made
during these reviews.
9.2.1 The Basic Safety Rule
As the benefits of PRA had been witnessed since the 1990s when they were first performed,
the ASN issued the Basic Safety Rules (RFSs) in 2002 in order to explicitly define acceptable
methodologies for the implementation of PRA and to define how PRA may be applied to make an
assessment of safety. The rules state that PRA may be used to complement the use of deterministic
engineering analyses, which are still valued as the main determinant of plant safety. Importantly,
the rules state that PRA may not be used equivalently to the deterministic basis for evaluation of
safety, but only as a complementary means of assessment. The ability of PRA to identify the risks
in plant configuration is recognized as a valuable, alternative way that safety can be analyzed.
The rule also requires that a PRA be performed for each plant, and that it be continually
updated. This allows for PRA to be used in the French decennial safety review process. The
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rule also states that the future design of nuclear power plants should utilize PRA in their design
decision-making.
Unlike in the US, the rule does not endorse the use of specific quantitative criteria pertaining
to the results of PRA. Core damage frequency objectives exist, but they are meant to be used only
as guidelines and are not considered to be strict. It is possible that the ASN does not want to strictly
define an acceptable level of safety through the use of a risk acceptance criterion, as it believes that
this may negatively affect the safety attitudes of the plant operators.
9.2.2 Regulatory Framework
As there is only a single utility company in France responsible for the operation of all of
the nuclear power plants, there has historically been a greater reliance on direct, informal commu-
nication between the EDF and ASN staffs for the establishment of regulatory requirements instead
of the promulgation of many formal regulatory documents. This situation is now changing due
to ASN's membership to Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA), an asso-
ciation of European nuclear safety authorities, that aims to bring about increased standardization
in nuclear regulation among European countries. WENRA has issued statements outlining what
actions should be implemented in order to increase the level of nuclear regulation standardization.
A comparison of French nuclear regulation to these requests by WENRA shows that France has
insufficiently implemented regulations pertaining to the use of PRA. These requirements extend
beyond what is contained in the Basic Safety Rule, and currently the ASN is working on a new set
of documents to address these deficiencies.
9.3 Future Implementation of Risk-Informed Regulation
Although France has benefited from the insights that PRA can provide, there is no major
effort underway either within EDF or the ASN to encourage the increased use of risk-information
in nuclear regulation. This lack of interest stems from both technical and non-technical barriers.
Although the regulator in general is not opposed to the use of risk-information, it tends to
be very demanding about the PRA scope required, and this is met with licensee resistance as the
appropriate acceptance criteria which would be needed for the justification of such a scope do not
exist. Also, there is disagreement between the IRSN and EDF about the models and hypotheses
used in the construction of PRAs, as each entity uses their own methods.
It has also been suggested that there are also more non-technical reasons that the implemen-
tation of risk-informed regulation has not been successful in France. First, the resources required
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in order to develop the needed PRA models may not be available, as other engineering needs are
considered to be of higher priority. Second, there is also a strong sentiment of regulatory uncer-
tainty surrounding the implementation of risk-informed regulations, as established methodologies
are not in place that can be used to implement this type of regulation. This uncertainty can there-
fore drain motivation that may otherwise be present for the introduction of new risk applications.
Third, doubts are present concerning the usefulness of risk-informed applications, as many be-
lieve that they will not result in operational improvements. Although some benefits of PRA are
recognized, there still exists a strong belief that the use of risk-informed applications will be eco-
nomically constraining, and ultimately not worth the investment. Finally, there is also an element
of mistrust surrounding the use of PRA, as some believe that it may encourage behaviors that are
not in agreement with deterministic standards.
Chapter 10
The Best-Estimate Plus Uncertainty Method
10.1 Introduction
Due to the realization of the low likelihood of near-term French application of risk-informed
regulatory practices, we searched for an alternative approach that could be used in order to improve
upon conservative deterministic analyses. The best-estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) method was
identified as a candidate method. The implementation of the BEPU method allows for gains to
be achieved due to the implementation of increasingly realistic modeling, without requiring the
use of a risk-based acceptance criterion. Here, current U.S. applications of the BEPU method are
evaluated in order to determine how its application could be improved upon in the future in the
context of both French and U.S. nuclear regulation. The French application of the BEPU method
is specifically addressed.
10.2 Historical Perspective
The following discussion of the historical perspective of best-estimate plus uncertainty anal-
yses is a summary of a related discussion presented in (Bucalossi, 2010; Wilson, 2013). The initial
requirements for the licensing of U.S. nuclear power plants were developed in the 1950's and they
were promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (CFR, 1996). The prescribed analy-
ses and the established criteria were reflective of nuclear power plant performance and beliefs that
existed at that time. Safe operation of the plants was ensured by performing analyses demonstrat-
ing the ability of the plant to withstand the occurrence of a set of serious accident scenarios. These
accidents are referred to as Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) (See Chapter 8). Criteria were estab-
lished that are to be used in order to demonstrate the emergency core cooling system's (ECCS)
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ability to mitigate these DBAs. The criteria are outlined in 10 CFR 50.46 (Bucalossi, 2010) and
are as follows,
1. Peak cladding temperature (PCT) shall be <2200OF (1478K).
2. Local maximum cladding oxidation (LMO) shall be <17%.
3. Core-wide cladding oxidation (CWO) shall be <1%.
4. The core shall maintain a coolable geometry.
5. Long-term core cooling shall be demonstrated.
The analyses that are performed in order to demonstrate the ability of the plant to tolerate the
DBAs implemented conservative modeling techniques and assumptions. The techniques used to
accomplish this included: the use of "defense-in-depth", specification of hierarchical safety re-
quirements (for example, 1) protect public health and safety 2) limit fission product release etc.),
use of DBAs, strictly specified conservative models and methods, and using requirements focused
on what was thought to be the most penalizing accident: Large Break Loss-of-Cooling Accident
(LBLOCA). Specific conservative treatments that are to be used in performing the analysis for
the LBLOCA are outlined in 10 CFR 50.46 Appendix K. The use of these conservative modeling
assumptions reflects both the limited knowledge and limited computational abilities that prevented
the development of more realistic safety assessments.
During the 1980's, attitudes changed towards the use of traditional conservative modeling
for the purposes of safety justification. New experimental and analytical research and greater plant
operating experience provided evidence indicating that the use of such modeling actually gave
non-conservative results in some cases. Also at this time, the benefits of using risk-information
in assessing safety were beginning to be realized. Particularly, risk-information had shown that
there existed an overemphasis on the LBLOCA, as other less severe, but more frequent, events
contributed more to the overall core damage frequency.
In order for there to be a progression towards the use of best-estimate modeling, a technical
basis for such an approach needed to be developed. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
worked on developing guidelines for what it would consider to be an acceptable methodology
for a standardized best-estimate methodology. In 1990, this methodology was accepted and was
available for licensees to implement. The traditional conservative approach, however, was still
acceptable for licensees to use.
In order for best-estimate analysis to be considered as an acceptable approach by the reg-
ulator, the uncertainty associated with the estimates has to be quantified, so that it is able to be
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compared with the regulatory acceptance criteria. The NRC developed an approach that would
be used in order to achieve this objective which is known as the Code Scaling, Applicability and
Uncertainty methodology (CSAU). This approach has been applied to the LBLOCA. Regulatory
guidance on this approach has been promulgated through the publishing of Regulatory Guides
1.157 (Commission, 1989) and 1.203 (Commission, 2005b). RG 1.157 describes the specific re-
quirements that need to be met in order to perform a best-estimate calculation of the ECCS per-
formance during a LOCA. RG 1.203 and Sec 15.0.2 of "Standard Review Plan for the Review of
Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR 23 Edition" (Commission, 2005a) give
guidance on the acceptance criteria that should be used for analytical models and computer codes
that are used to analyze transient behavior.
10.3 Best-Estimate Plus Uncertainty
10.3.1 Comparison to Deterministic Approach
The best-estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) approach to safety analysis is fundamentally
different than the deterministic approach. The differences between the two approaches are pre-
sented in (Bucalossi, 2010) and a summary of the discussion follows. The difference between the
approaches arises from the way in which it demonstrates that satisfactory margin exists between
the real values of system variables and the value at which damage would result in the release of
radioactivity. There are two ways to define safety margins: either they can be defined in relation to
the actual value of the variable at which damage would begin to occur, or in terms of the regulatory
acceptance criteria, as shown in Figure 10.3.1. Of course since regulatory acceptance criteria are
applicable in this discussion, this definition is used for comparison of the deterministic (conserva-
tive) and BEPU approaches. As shown in Figure 10.3.1, the deterministic approach yields a single
value that is a result of the implementation of conservative models and parameters. The BEPU
approach yields a different result, as it provides a value with an associated calculated uncertainty
range.
The difference between these two approaches is revealed through the margin that each pro-
vides to the acceptance criterion. As shown in Figure 10.3.1, the margin for the deterministic
approach is defined as the difference between the conservative value and the acceptance criterion,
while the margin for the BEPU approach is defined as the difference between the upper value of
the uncertainty range defined at a stated confidence level and the acceptance criterion. The benefit
that can be realized through the use of the BEPU approach is derived from the difference between
these two margin values, as the BEPU approach typically demonstrates the existence of a greater
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Figure 10.3.1. Illustration of the two approaches to evaluation of safety margins, Extracted from
(Bucalossi, 2010)
margin to the regulatory acceptance criterion than the conservative calculated value as compared
to the regulatory acceptance criterion. The implementation of the BEPU method allows for the
calculation of a more realistic safety margin that could be used as a means to support changes to
regulatory rule-making.
10.3.2 Sources of Uncertainty in Thermal-Hydraulic System Codes
As the BEPU method was applied to the analysis of LBLOCA events in the U.S., the method
is structured in order to focus on the sources of uncertainty in the thermal-hydraulic system codes
used for this analysis. Therefore, the identification of these sources of uncertainty is important in
understanding how BEPU can be applied to the LBLOCA analysis. Bucalossi et al. (Bucalossi,
2010) describes these sources of uncertainty. The following is a summary of their discussion.
Code or Model Uncertainty The thermal-hydraulic codes used in LOCA analysis consist of
balance equations, constitutive relationships, material and state properties, process and component
models and a numerical solution method. The equations are used to model the thermal-hydraulic
behavior of the system and its interaction with solid structures in the system. The relevant reactor
physics is coupled to these systems in order to determine the average moderator density and av-
erage fuel temperature. Some relationships that are used in order to describe the interconnection
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between the thermal-hydraulic and reactor physics are not based upon first principles and, as a re-
sult, they suffer from limitations in their ability to accurately describe system behavior. Therefore,
they are a source of uncertainty. For example, parameters and relationships may be used outside
their ranges of validation. Or, the conditions under which the relationships were derived are not
the same as those under which they are applied in the code, and are thereby approximate. Material
properties also may present limitations in their ability to characterize the system behavior.
Representation Uncertainties The representation uncertainty is derived from the nodalization
of the plant into the system code. This nodalization is performed by using expert judgement in
order to determine a sufficient idealization of the plant configuration in the code. Of course, a
perfect representation of the plant is impossible to achieve, so the uncertainties are derived from
the limits in the computational capabilities, a lack of data or a lack of available man power to
perform the nodalization.
Scaling Uncertainty In order to describe the physical phenomena that pertain to the behavior
of a full scale nuclear power plant, data are extracted from smaller scale facilities, or from nu-
merical tools which use small-scale experiments, as a means for qualification. The discrepancy
between the relative size of the experiments and their application results in scaling uncertainty.
Scaling uncertainty is addressed by using the Uncertainty Methodology based on Accuracy Ex-
trapolation (UMAE). This methodology accounts for the fact that accuracy of a thermal-hydraulic
phenomenon paramater is not scale-dependent. The use of this methodology allows for the eval-
uation of the uncertainty by examining the accuracy of the integral test facility calculations for
specific transients at different scaled facilities.
Plant Data Uncertainty The uncertainty associated with plant data is derived from the uncer-
tainties in initial or boundary conditions important to the analyzed phenomena. For example, quan-
tities such as the size of the gap of the fuel rods, or the pressurizer level at the start of a transient.
These uncertainties will affect the calculation of safety metrics, such as peak clad temperature.
User Effects Because the system code has to be implemented by human beings, there is the po-
tential for errors to be made by the implementers themselves. The specific sources of this type of
uncertainty are many, as the user must perform the nodalization and interpret both the available
information concerning the phenomena and the code outputs. The degree of uncertainty result-
ing from user behavior can be mitigated by implementing several strategies, such as following
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code user guidelines, implementing quality assurance procedures and solving rigorously specified
problems in order to reduce the level of data interpretation required by the user.
10.4 Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty Methodology
10.4.1 Background
The Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty Methodology (CSAU) was developed by
the research branch of the NRC in conjunction with members of academia, national laboratories
and the nuclear industry. The objectives of CSAU as presented in (Boyack, 1990) are:
- To provide a technical basis for quantifying uncertainties within the context of the revised
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) rule;
- To provide an auditable, traceable, and practical method for combining quantitative analyses
and expert opinion to arrive at computed values of uncertainty; and
- To provide a systematic and comprehensive approach for defining scenario phenomena, eval-
uating code applicability, assessing code scale-up capabilities and quantifying code uncer-
tainties concerned with code and experiment accuracies, code scale-up capabilities and plant
state and operating conditions.
Its development was based upon 25 years of experimental and analytical data on phenomena per-
taining to nuclear reactor safety, and it reflected the recommendations from members of both the
U.S. and international nuclear research communities.
The CSAU methodology is composed of three major elements. Element one concerns the
selection of the appropriate computer code in order to address the particular phenomena under
examination. Element two concerns the quantification of the effects that the different types of pa-
rameter uncertainty have on the total uncertainty. Element three uses the results of the sensitivity
and uncertainty analyses in order to combine the various types of uncertainty so that the calcu-
lation of the total uncertainty may be performed. The methodology addresses both uncertainties
which are able to be quantified by a distribution, and those which are only able to be quantified
by a bounding value. All three elements are composed of 14 total steps. The description of the
methodology presented in the section is based upon the discussion of it in (Boyack, 1990; Wilson,
2013).
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10.4.1.1 Element One: Requirements and Code Capabilities
The purpose of element one (shown in Figure 10.4.1) is to determine the appropriate code
that should be used in order to characterize the scenario selected for study. Therefore, it follows
that the first step is to identify the scenario of interest, for example the large-break loss-of-cooling
accident (LBLOCA). Coupled with the specification of this scenario is the identification of the
phenomena that are important for this scenario. The second step is to determine the nuclear power
plant to which the analysis will be applied. This is important because the U.S. pressurized water
reactor designs are unique to each nuclear power plant, necessitating a plant-specific calculation of
uncertainty.
The third step involves performing an identification and ranking of the phenomena impor-
tant to the scenario. The prescribed methodology that is employed for this purpose is the Phe-
nomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) analysis. The structure of the PIRT methodology
is shown in Figure 10.4.2. The PIRT identifies all of the plausibly important phenomena that are
important for this scenario. The phenomena may relate to a safety goal (such as PCT), a material
property (such as thermal conductivity) or a process (such as heat transfer). These phenomena are
selected in order to be able to characterize them well reflecting their relative importance to safety.
This ranking is performed because it would be too costly to quantify the uncertainties associated
with all of the phenomena involved in a particular scenario. Therefore, attention is only paid to the
significant phenomena.
Step four is the selection of the code used for the analysis. The code must be a "frozen"
code, which means that it remains unchanged throughout the entire CSAU analysis in order for
all code results to be traceable. Step five consists of the procurement of the code data base that is
needed in order to exercise the code. Step six determines how applicable the selected code is for the
given scenario of interest. During step six both deficiencies and limitations of the code's ability to
characterize the scenario are identified in order to be able to constitute a quantified contribution to
the uncertainty. If the code is determined to be satisfactorily applicable, then the analysis proceeds
to element two.
10.4.1.2 Element Two: Assessment and Ranging of Parameters
The purpose of element two (shown in Figure 10.4.3) is to determine the uncertainties asso-
ciated with code applicability and the scaling effect. In order to begin this assessment, step seven
requires the procurement of an experimental test database that can be assessed by the code. These
data are used in order to determine the accuracy of the code and to see whether the code is able to
reveal the dominant phenomena. In step eight the nodalization is performed through the use of an
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To Step 7
Figure 10.4.1. Steps of element 1 in CSAU, Extracted from (Wilson, 2013)
Define the issue driving the need for a PIRT
Define the specific objectives of the PIRT
Compile and review background information that captures relevant knowledge
4 Specify NPP, systems & components; select scenario
Scenario & define time phases
Step 5 Select key figure of merit used to judge phenomena
Figure of Merit relative importance
Step 6 Identify all plausible phenomena plus
Identifv Phenomena definitions
Assign importance relative to figure of merit;
document ranking rationale
Assess current level of knowledge regarding
each phenomenon
Document effort with sufficient detail that knowledgeable
reader can understand process and results
Figure 10.4.2. Steps of the PIRT methodology, Extracted from (Wilson, 2013)
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iterative process. The same final nodalization is used throughout the analysis. Step nine determines
the bias and uncertainties inherent to the code itself. This is achieved by using the code to simu-
late the experiments for which the data were collected so that a comparison can be made. Then,
the phenomena and processes which are large contributors to the uncertainty can be identified for
later sensitivity study application. Step ten determines the bias and uncertainty associated with the
scaling effects from the application of the experimental data to the geometry of a full scale nu-
clear power plant. The uncertainties and biases of these effects need to be calculated, as the entire
purpose of the methodology is to quantify the uncertainties associated with the implementation of
thermal-hydraulic system codes as applied to scenario analysis.
10.4.13 Element Three: Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analyses
The purpose of element three (shown in Figure 10.4.4) is to determine the total uncertainty
associated with the analysis of the chosen scenario. In step eleven, the bias and uncertainty re-
sulting from the chosen initial conditions of the reactor are determined. These uncertainties are
determined by examining a particular reactor state and its associated distributions of states though
the use of both experimental data and analytical studies. Sensitivity calculations are performed in
step twelve, which utilize the results of the PIRT in order to determine the appropriate boundaries
of the calculations. Step thirteen consists of the statistical analysis which is required in order to
combine all forms of uncertainty. In the final step, the results of step thirteen are transformed into
probability density functions of the various safety limits defined in the code of federal regulations.
If it is recognized by the analysis that there are deficiencies in the input to the analysts, extra un-
certainty may be added when calculating the total final uncertainty, however, this is normally not
required. The output of step thirteen are both mean and 95% probability values of the parameters
of interest.
10.5 CSAU Application to Large-Break LOCA: Best-Estimate
LOCA (BELOCA)
10.5.1 Background
When the CSAU methodology was initially developed, a demonstration of its application
to the LBLOCA was performed. The details of this demonstration are discussed in (Boyack,
1990). This demonstration solicited significant critique, and questions were raised concerning
the following list, which is directly borrowed from (Young, 1998),
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Figure 10.4.3. Steps in element 2 in CSAU, Extracted from (Wilson, 2013)
- The general applicability had not been demonstrated;
- The practicality had not been demonstrated. In particular, it was noted that a methodology
must be amenable to use by design engineers, not just experts;
- There was excessive use of engineering judgment;
- There was excessive use of biases to account for code deficiencies;
- A "frozen" code with major model deficiencies was used;
- The analysis ignored the effect of nodalization uncertainty;
- The ability of the code to correctly predict phenomena at full scale was not sufficiently
demonstrated; and,
- The response surface approach and statistics used were not properly applied.
In order to achieve regulatory acceptance of the CSAU LBLOCA application, these deficiencies
needed to be addressed. Westinghouse in partnership with the Electric Power Research Insti-
tute and Consolidated Edison developed a more sophisticated application of the CSAU for the
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Bias and Uncertainty
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Total Uncertainty to
Calculate Specific Scenario
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Figure 10.4.4. Steps of element 3 in CSAU, Extracted from (Wilson, 2013)
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LBLOCA and it received regulatory acceptance in 1996. The important considerations regarding
this application are discussed in (Young, 1998) and are summarized, by CSAU element, in the
following sections.
10.5.2 Element One: Requirements and Code Capabilities
The types of power plants selected for the LBLOCA CSAU application were three- and
four-loop Westinghouse plants, which have emergency core cooling injected into the cold leg. The
significant focus of element one concerns the performance of the PIRT. Compared to the initial
demonstration of CSAU, the PIRT identified several additional phenomena that were believed to
be important. These 30 phenomena that are considered to be important contributors to the overall
uncertainty are listed in Table 10.5.1, with the newly identified phenomena labeled with an asterisk.
Also, additional considerations regarding plant operating conditions were made in order to realize,
for example, their effect on the core power distribution.
In terms of the dominating phenomenological contributors that negatively affect the peak
clad temperature (PCT), it was found that the axial core power distribution had the dominating
effect. The models having the greatest effect on the PCT were the flow resistance from the core to
each side of the break and the effects of cladding burst and fuel relocation. Of minimal significance
were the initial fluid conditions.
Because the purpose of performing the PIRT is to identify the significant phenomena in or-
der to limit the computational burden of the problem, the question arises of whether some phenom-
ena are ignored due to cost implications when they should be included in order to comprehensively
assess safety. This concern was quelled by the redundant review of the process by the NRC and
their prescriptive regulatory guidance, in addition to the heavy reliance on experimental data that
is coupled to the use of the frozen code. Therefore, the ignorance, or neglect, of safety important
phenomena was believed to be highly unlikely.
10.5.3 Element Two: Assessment and Ranging of Parameters
The code that was used to develop the probability distributions and biases was COBRA/TRAC
(Thurgood, 1983). This code was chosen due to its ability to model entrainment with two liquid
fields, behavior in small regions and a high power core assembly without being too computation-
ally intensive. In order to demonstrate that this code was applicable to this analysis, a series of
single effects tests and integral effects tests were used to provide experimental data. The assess-
ment of the code's applicability using the experimental data considered the full range of conditions
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Analytical Element Category Elemental Uncertainty Contributor
Plant Initial Core Power Distribution Nominal hot assembly peaking factor
Nominal hot assembly average relative power
Average relative power, lower third of core*
Average relative power, middle third of core*
Average relative power, outer edge of core*
Thermal-Hydraulic Physical Models Critical flow modeling
Broken loop resistance (accounts for pump as well as other
loop resistances)*
Blowdown and reflood heat transfer coefficient
Minimum film boiling temperature
Condensation modeling*
Break type (cold leg split or guillotine)*
Emergency Core Cooling bypass
Entrainment and steam binding
Effect of nitrogen injection
Hot Rod Physical Models Local hot spot peaking factor
Fuel conductivity
Gap heat transfer coefficient
Fuel conductivity after burst*
Fuel density after burst (fuel relocation)*
Cladding reaction rate*
Rod internal pressure*
Burst temperature*
Burst strain*
Plant Initial Fluid Conditions Reactor coolant system (RCS) average fluid temperature*
RCS pressure*
Accumulator fluid temperature*
Accumulator pressure*
Accumulator volume*
Safety injection temperature*
Accumulator line resistance*
Table 10.5.1. List of PWR uncertainty contributors, Extracted from (Wilson, 2013)
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(pressure, flow, power etc.) throughout the transient, an assessment of all the phenomena indicated
as important in the PIRT and a simulation of every experiment with the frozen code.
In order to determine the range of expected values for each of the parameters in Table 10.5.1,
plant operating data were used if available. Variations in parameter values due to measurement
and software uncertainties were also taken into account. The uncertainty range of the thermal-
hydraulic models was assessed by comparing the code outputs with experimental data for each
analyzed parameter in order to determine a ratio between the two methods of arriving at the value
of the parameter. In the demonstration of thermal-hydraulic parameter uncertainty, care had to be
taken to ensure that the model selected for use accurately characterized the parameter, so as to not
introduce additional bias or uncertainty. This was an important consideration as the goal was to
limit the uncertainty derived from the use of thermal-hydraulic models. If misleading results were
identified, the distribution associated with the parameter had to be shown to scale correctly from
the available data.
Biases were identified when it was determined that the code under- or over-predicted the
PCT resulting from a specific phenomenon. Positive biasing refers to under-predictions, and nega-
tive biasing refers to over-predictions. When a negative bias was identified, it was used as justifica-
tion for the presence of conservatism in the code and could be used as justification for not including
additional uncertainty late in the CSAU analysis. Only small positive biases were allowed to exist.
All of the probability distributions developed for this application are explicitly based upon
data and no final biases were added in addition to those identified while developing parameter
distributions. No distributions were formulated using expert judgment. Therefore, limiting as-
sumptions had to be used in cases where the available information was deemed incomplete. For
example, in the analysis of the cold leg split break where the cold leg pipe breaks but does not
completely sever, there is no data available concerning the probability of break size. Therefore, in
keeping with the practice of not soliciting expert judgment, the conservative approach was taken
in which the break size that would result in the highest PCT was used.
10.5.4 Element Three: Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis
The objective of element three is to determine how to combine the uncertainties governing
all of the parameters into one joint uncertainty distribution in order to be able to make a comparison
to the regulatory acceptance criteria. The third element was shown to be the most straightforward to
implement, as the steps taken in element two, in order to characterize the uncertainty distributions,
were sufficiently rigorous in order to allow a straightforward combination of the uncertainties in el-
ement three. The most precise way to derive this total uncertainty distribution would be to quantify
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how all of the variations of each parameter affect each other. This, however, is too computationally
intensive, so approaches have been developed for use in developing a solution. The two approaches
available to use as a means to combine the uncertainties are stated in (Young, 1998) as follows,
1. Develop response surfaces which fit calculational data points generated by running the code
with specific input variables, then use these response surfaces in a Monte Carlo simulation
to generate the output distribution.
2. Sample the input distributions n times, then use the computer code directly to generate n
outputs which are used to estimate the actual distribution.
A combination of these two methods was implemented. A succinct summary of the implementation
is provided in (Frepoli, 2008) and is repeated here:
"Data points are generated by running the code with specific input variables to per-
form parametric studies on selected uncertainty contributors. Then response surfaces
are a fit calculation to these data points. The response surfaces are treated as a "sur-
rogate" of the code which reflects the functionality between PCT and the uncertainty
attributes. Finally, these response surfaces are used in a Monte Carlo simulation to
generate the output distribution (PCT, PDF, e.g.).
An advantage of this approach is that the generation of response surfaces requires
a well organized matrix of calculations in which single and multiple effects are evalu-
ated. These calculations allow the analyst to understand how each important contribu-
tor affects the PCT.
On the other hand, the actual implementation is not as straightforward. The uncer-
tainty contributors have to be grouped together to limit the size of the run matrix which
is a strong function of the number of parameters ranged in the uncertainty analysis. At
the same time, it is important to ensure that the run matrix or matrices can adequately
highlight key interactions."
This method was selected, due to its ability to identify how each parameter ultimately affects the
PCT. The use of this method allowed for the prediction of the overall reactor response in the fuel
assembly having the highest power. Therefore, the way in which the local variables influence prob-
ability distributions in the hottest rod of the high power assembly was determined. This division
of the analysis into "global" and "local" responses is shown in Figure 10.5.1. Judgment had to be
exercised in deciding which interactions between parameters would more significantly affect the
final result. This was done in order to collapse statistically the uncertainty distributions into fewer
distributions for purposes of simpler uncertainty propagation. From this analysis a histogram for
PCT was developed and from that the 95% confidence-level PCT was able to be determined.
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"local distribution"
"Global transient "
Time (s)
Figure 10.5.1. Illustration of global prediction versus local parameter distribution, Extracted
from (Frepoli, 2008)
10.5.5 Regulatory Acceptance
In terms of regulatory acceptance, the most important question concerns how the results
of the implementation of BELOCA are interpreted in order to determine compliance with the
regulations. As discussed in (Frepoli, 2008), 10 CFR 50.46 states that
"uncertainty must be accounted for, so that, when the calculated ECCS cooling
performance is compared to the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of this section, there
is a high level of probability that the criteria would not be exceeded."
In 10 CFR 50.46, paragraph (b) provides a list of the acceptance criteria; however, the regulation
does not state what probabilities or evaluation methods are considered to be acceptable. Regulatory
Guide 1.157 provides some additional clarification: "a 95% probability is considered acceptable
by the NRC staff." (Commission, 1989) It does not describe, however, what statistical approaches
to the uncertainty treatment are considered to be acceptable, thereby not providing guidance on an
acceptable confidence level. When statistical methods were applied for LOCA analysis, the NRC
was satisfied with the implementation of 95% confidence level.
The justification for the use of a 95/95 acceptance standard is based upon the defense-in-
depth philosophy. Because it is recognized that even the execution of the BELOCA involves the
use of many conservative models and that the criterion prescribed for a single failure design basis
accident, a higher than 95% level of confidence is not deemed necessary.
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The above described application of the CSAU methodology was accepted in 1996 by the
NRC after a three-year review process. This was the first time that CSAU was accepted for use in
a licensing application. In 1999, this application was expanded to include two-loop plants having
upper plenum injection. This methodology has been since applied to more than 30 other nuclear
power plants.
10.6 Large-Break BELOCA - Automated Statistical Treatment
of Uncertainty Method (ASTRUM)
10.6.1 Background
Although the implementation of the CSAU BELOCA method was successful, improve-
ments in uncertainty propagation techniques led to development of an improved version of BE-
LOCA called ASTRUM. The basic CSAU methodology employed is the same, except that in
element three of the methodology the uncertainty propagation technique used is based on order
statistics. The following sections describe ASTRUM based upon the discussion presented in (Fre-
poli, 2010).
10.6.2 CSAU Elements One & Two
As the basic implementation of the CSAU methodology in elements one and two is the
same in the ASTRUM method as compared to the original BELOCA, only the differences are
presented here. ASTRUM employs the use of WCOBRA/TRAC, which is an updated version of
the system code employed in BELOCA. This code has the ability to model three-dimensional flows
and exhibits the state-of-the-art modeling techniques used for modeling two-phase flow.
The important result of the first two CSAU elements is the identification of the uncertainty
parameters and the development of their associated uncertainty distributions. The uncertainty pa-
rameters identified are listed in Table 10.6.1. The slight differences between the ASTRUM un-
certainty parameters and those established in the BELCOA method are identified by an asterisk in
Table 10.6.1.
Similar to BELOCA, the modeling assumptions made in the application of ASTRUM are
conservative. For example, the hottest rod and the hottest assembly are assumed to be functioning
at the beginning of their first irradiation cycle. Also, it is assumed that the most penalizing axial
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Analytical Element Category Elemental Uncertainty Contributor
Plant Initial Core Power Distribution Nominal hot assembly peaking factor
Nominal hot assembly average relative power
Average relative power, lower third of core
Average relative power, middle third of core
Average relative power, outer edge of core
Core power calorimetric uncertainty*
Decay heat uncertainty*
Gamma redistribution*
ime in cycle*
Thermal-Hydraulic Physical Models Critical flow modeling
Broken loop resistance (accounts for pump as well as
other loop resistances)
Minimum film boiling temperature
Condensation modeling
Break type (cold leg split or guillotine)
Break area (for split breaks)
Emergency Core Cooling bypass
Entrainment and steam binding
Effect of nitrogen injection
Hot Rod Physical Models Linear Heat Rate
Fuel conductivity
Gap heat transfer coefficient
Fuel conductivity after burst
Fuel density after burst (fuel relocation)
Cladding reaction rate
Rod internal pressure
Burst temperature
Burst strain
Blowdown and reflood heat transfer coefficient
Minimum film boiling temperature*
Plant Initial Fluid Conditions Reactor coolant system (RCS) average fluid
temperature
RCS pressure
Accumulator fluid temperature
Accumulator pressure
Accumulator volume
Safety injection temperature
Accumulator line resistance
Table 10.6.1. ASTRUM list of important uncertainty contributors, Adapted from (Frepoli, 2010)
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power shapes and peaking factor are able to occur at any time during the burnup cycle, which is
also unrealistically conservative.
10.6.3 CSAU Element Three
The statistical technique used to propagate the uncertainties in order to make a singu-
lar probabilistic statement about the ability of the plant to meet the regulatory requirements for
LBLOCA is the main difference between ASTRUM and BELOCA. ASTRUM employs a non-
parametric technique. The non-parametric technique differs in that it does not attempt to determine
the underlying probability distribution of the output, but instead it determines a bounding value of
the output at a specific confidence level.
The non-parametric treatment implemented allows for the determination of the tolerance
limits without understanding the underlying distributions by randomly sampling the parameters in
question. This technique was originally proposed by Wilks. As presented in (Frepoli, 2008),
"Wilks study showed that the proportion of the population between two order statistics
from a random sample is independent of the population sampled, it is only a function
of the particular order statistics chosen. Using the well-known Wilks formula, one can
determine the sample size for a desired population proportion at a tolerance interval.
Let us say that we are interested in determining a bounding value of the peak clad tem-
perature (95th percentile (y=0.95)) with 95% confidence level (#3=0.95). The sample
size (i.e., the number of computer runs required) is determined solving the following
equation:
( = (1 (10.6.1)
By substituting y=0.95 and 0=0.95, the number of computer runs, N, is found to be
59."
The results from these computer runs are then ordered in terms of PCT. The highest PCT value
indicates a bounding estimate of the 95th percentile PCT, having a confidence level of 95%.
Because the PCT is not the only result of the analysis of interest, as the regulatory criteria
pertaining to LMO and CWO must be met as well, a more general theory than that of Wilks must be
applied in order to achieve adequate confidence of the result. The ASTRUM methodology makes
use of the approach developed by Guba et al. as discussed in (Frepoli, 2008). It is
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"[...] applicable to one-sided populations with multiple outcomes (P>1). The number
of runs can be found solving the following equation for N:
N-p N! (10.6.2)
j=0 (N - j)!j!
By substituting y=0.95 and #3=0.95, and p=3, the number of computer runs, N is found
to equal 124." (Frepoli, 2008)
10.6.4 Regulatory Acceptance
In the Regulatory Guide 1.203, which was published in 2005, updated guidance on the
CSAU methodology was provided in the form of the "structured evaluation model development
and assessment process" (EMDAP). It improves upon the CSAU methodology by providing more
focus on the process of developing the appropriate evaluation model.
The NRC accepted the ASTRUM methodology in 2004. More than ten nuclear power plants
have been analyzed using this newer methodology. The main advantage of the use of the ASTRUM
methodology is that the number of runs required in order to achieve the desired tolerance and con-
fidence levels is independent of the number of uncertainty parameters considered in the analysis.
This allowed for an the consideration of a greater number of uncertainty parameters in the AS-
TRUM methodology, as shown in Table 10.6.1. The increased number of uncertainty parameters
under consideration resulted in a demonstration of increased margin in the output variables. These
results, as reported in (Frepoli, 2008), are shown in Table 10.6.2.
10.7 Discussion of U.S. BEPU Implementation
10.7.1 Implications of Modeling Evolution
As is previously discussed, the implementation of BEPU techniques in the U.S. reflected
an evolution of thought concerning the demonstration of nuclear power plant safety. The impetus
for this change of thought lay in the increasing acceptance of the validity of risk and probability
concepts as applied to the evaluation of nuclear safety. Although the Regulatory Guide 1.157
promulgating the guidelines for the use of risk-informed regulation was not issued until 1998, the
nuclear industry, since the publication of the 1975 WASH-1400 Reactor Safety Study, had slowly
grown to appreciate the insights that risk information could provide in performing nuclear power
plant safety analysis.
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Representative plant analysis BELOCA 2004 EM ASTRUM
Legend: PCT = Peak Clad Temperature, LMO = Local Maximum Oxidation,
CWO = Core Wide Oxidation, BELOCA = Best-Estimate LOCA Analysis,
ASTRUM = Automated Statistical Treatment of Uncertainty Method
PCT = 2087OF PCT=1870
0 F
PCT 07 0 F LMO=3.4%LMO<17% CWO<<0.3%
2-loop with UPI CWO<1% (18% Power Uprate)
PCT=2050 0F PCT=l 8360F
LMO=12% LMO=2.9%
3-loop CWO=0.8% CWO=0.03%
PCT=2125"F PCT=19670 F
LMO=12% LMO=2.4%
4-loop CWO=0.9% CWO<<0.4%
Table 10.6.2. Sample results from BELOCA analyses (Frepoli, 2008)
157
CHAPTER 10. THE BEST-ESTIMATE PLUS UNCERTAINTY METHOD
The BEPU methodologies developed for the LBLOBA application demonstrate this transi-
tional acceptance of the use of risk insights, as the implementation does not rely upon a risk-based
acceptance criteria, but does make use of probability distributions in order to characterize the un-
certainty of the phenomena of interest. Therefore the acceptance criteria remain the same as were
used in the deterministic analysis (outlined in 10 CFR 50.46), but the demonstration of how the
acceptance criteria are met is different, as now the models used in the safety demonstration explic-
itly consider uncertainty distribution. The BEPU method is therefore a blend of best-estimate and
conservative engineering treatments, but it is more grounded in the use of conservative engineering
judgment as compared to U.S. risk-informed analyses.
10.7.1.1 Determination of Uncertainty Distributions
Two of the most important steps in the implementation of the BEPU are the identification
of the parameters for which uncertainties will be propagated and the development of the uncer-
tainty distributions themselves. Although the identification of the uncertainty parameters involves
using expert judgment in implementing the PIRT methodology, because there are several mecha-
nisms by which PIRT is independently checked, high confidence is indicated in the accuracy of the
identification of the significant parameters.
The approach to the development of the uncertainty distributions governing the uncertainty
parameters reflects the conservative nature of the BEPU method. In developing the distributions,
statements of belief were only made when there was empirical data available to support the de-
scription of the distributions. When such information was lacking, very conservative assumptions
were made. Although implementing conservative modeling is one approach that can be used when
information is lacking, the U.S. BEPU methodology strictly avoided soliciting expert judgment as
a means to increase the best-estimate character of the analysis. This is a significant departure from
the U.S. approach to risk-informed analysis, thereby demonstrating the middle-ground position
that the U.S. BEPU methodology takes in terms of its modeling approach.
The decision not to solicit expert judgment in formulating these distributions reflects a so-
cial decision regarding what is considered to be a tolerable level of conservatism. Although, it
is believed to be more conservative to rely only on empirically derived data in developing these
distributions, by not exercising the use of expert judgment, in fact, the methodology ignores a body
of existing knowledge, which therefore brings into question the level of realism that is captured
by the modeling. Of course, it improves upon the original deterministically based formulation,
but by ignoring the use of expert judgment it is not capturing the full existing state of knowledge.
Furthermore, although in most cases the use of conservative models in order to avoid the solici-
tation of expert judgment indeed returns a conservative result, there have been instances in which
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what is thought to be considered conservative, is in fact not. For example, in the development of
the regulatory criteria for reactivity-initiated accidents, a cladding failure mechanism (pellet-to-
cladding mechanical interaction) had not been taken into account in the analysis (Clifford, 2012).
Therefore, a potential existed for fuel rod cladding failure to occur below the criteria which was
initially prescribed. Recognitions of these kind of non-conservatisms are a strong driving force for
the development of BEPU methods. Their ignorance of the body of knowledge held by experts,
however, could result in the creation of similar such non-conservatisms in the future, and thus
should be avoided.
10.8 Recommendations for the Application of BEPU Method
to French Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) Analysis
10.8.1 Basic Concept
The French interest in pursuing a BEPU method in order to address the PTS analysis is
in accordance with the French nuclear safety regulator's level of tolerance of the use of risk-
information in nuclear regulation. The use of a BEPU method allows for gains to be achieved
due to the implementation of increasingly realistic modeling, without requiring the use of a risk-
based acceptance criterion. In the case of the French PTS assessment, this acceptance criterion is
the comparison of the stress at the crack-tip to the fracture toughness of the material, taking into
account the application of the regulatory safety coefficients.
The main difference between the French PTS application and the U.S. LBLOCA application
is the number of criteria that must be met. Only one criterion, the margin to failure ratio, must be
met in the PTS application, while the LBLOCA has several. This difference affects which kind
of order statistics method should be selected for implementation in the uncertainty propagation
portion of the BEPU analysis. The Wilks method, presented in Section 10.6.3, has been suggested
by EDF as the preferred method to implement. This choice is in agreement with the U.S. decision
to pursue an order statistics method of uncertainty propagation, as it offers the ability to model an
increased number of uncertain parameters without imposing intolerable computational demands.
10.8.2 Recommendations for Uncertainty Parameter Selection
Similar to the implementation of the U.S. BEPU methodology, the identification of the
uncertainty parameters and the development of their associated distributions are tasks of primary
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importance. The uncertainty parameters, or hazards considered by EDF, are shown in Table 10.8.1.
Most of these parameters are relevant to the thermal-hydraulic aspects of the PTS phenomena, with
only four parameters characterizing the fracture mechanics analysis.
The method used to select these parameters is critical to successful implementation of
BEPU, as providing a logical justification for these decisions is intrinsic to the implementation
of the method. In the U.S. CSAU methodology, the PIRT methodology is implemented. As the
PIRT process is being currently used to provide increased safety justification for the current French
PTS analysis, it is sensible that it should also be implemented in the development of a BEPU PTS
analysis.
The ranking of phenomena that the PIRT methodology provides is particularly useful be-
cause this ranking can be used as a means for the justification of which parameters are modeled
with uncertainty distributions in the BEPU method and which are not. The most complete imple-
mentation of the BEPU method would incorporate uncertainty distributions for all relevant param-
eters; however, realistically choices must be made regarding which parameters to model due to
resource limitations.
Because the French PTS BEPU analysis may retain a deterministic conservative treatment
of some parameters, the logic used in making the decision of which parameters to model deter-
ministically should be logically consistent with the choices regarding which parameters to model
with an uncertainty distribution. From the results of the PIRT analysis, a clear decision should
be made regarding what level of phenomenological importance serves as the boundary between
deterministic and best-estimate treatment. Where this boundary lies, will ultimately a reflect of
the social acceptance of the BEPU method. The existence of this boundary, however, is important
because it provides justification for the selection of the type of uncertainty treatment. For example,
it would not be logical to treat deterministically a parameter that is determined to be less important
than one that is treated with an uncertainty distribution.
Uncertainty Parameters
Break Diameter Emergency Feedwater Flow Rate RTNDT Shift
Safety Injection Flow Rate Dome Flow Rate Clad Thickness
Operator Actions Accumulator Temperature Flaw Geometry
Residual Power Emergency Feedwater Temperature Flaw Location
Table 10.8.1. Uncertainty parameters for French BEPU PTS analysis
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10.8.3 Recommendations for Uncertainty Parameter Distribution Develop-
ment
Maintaining a logical consistency in the selection of the uncertainty parameters is important
because not only does it provide concrete justification to the regulator for the selection of the
uncertainty treatment of the parameters, it also can provide for a more efficient modeling process.
Depending on the parameter in question, the development of uncertainty distributions may be
resource intensive. Therefore, the effort should be focused on the characterization of uncertainties
for those parameters which most significantly affect the final result of the analysis.
The PIRT analysis provides for the identification of which parameters will significantly
effect the final state of interest, thereby indicating which parameters it would be most beneficial to
model with uncertainty distributions. The PIRT analysis does not, however, provide guidance in
determining how the distributions should be developed. Because the major deficiency of the U.S.
implementation of BEPU to LBLOCA has been identified as the lack of the use of expert judgment
in the development of the uncertainty distributions. It is important to consider how this could be
improved upon in the French implementation of BEPU.
In order to implement efficiently the use of expert judgment in the distribution development
process, an estimation should be made of the effect that the inclusion of expert judgment on the de-
velopment of each uncertainty distribution has on the final analytical result. Making this judgment
can allow for attention to be focused on the solicitation of expert judgment for those parameter
distributions which more significantly affect the final result.
The areas that are most likely candidates for the application of expert judgment are the
break diameter, operator actions and the flaw geometry and location. In the U.S. application of
BEPU to LBLOCA, break diameter was conservatively modeled, as there was strict adherence
to only the use of empirical data in developing the uncertainty distribution. Therefore, soliciting
expert judgment for this parameter could be particularly helpful, as there exists a limited empirical
basis.
Given the extensive effort to solicit expert judgment for the development of the reactor ves-
sel flaw distributions in the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis, it is probable that the French PTS
BEPU analysis could benefit from the development of similar distributions governing flaw geome-
try and flaw location. As was done in the development of the U.S. risk-informed flaw distributions,
flaw simulation software could be used as a means to provide an empirical comparison to the
conclusions of theexperts.
Finally, realistic modeling of operator actions will require some degree of expert judgment.
Operating histories can be used to some extent to model operator actions, but because most of the
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scenarios that are modeled in a PTS analysis have never actually occurred, in order to model the
effects realistically, expert judgment will have to be exercised in order to determine both the type
and timing of operator actions to model.
10.8.4 Recommendations for Acceptance Criterion
Regarding the selection of an acceptance criterion, a 95/95 would likely be appropriate
for the French PTS assessment. The justification provided in the U.S. for the use of the same
criterion in the U.S. BEPU LBLOCA implementation was that it was sufficient due to the presence
of conservatisms in the analysis. Therefore, if the deterministic treatment of some parameters
remains in the French analysis, this same criterion would likely be considered to be applicable.
Chapter 11
Conclusion
11.1 Introduction
The thesis work reported here was motivated by the desire to understand how to improve
upon the approach to the development of risk-informed analyses for the benefit of nuclear power
regulatory practices in both the United States and France. These improvements are intended to
allow for both a reduction in traditional conservative engineering practices and the increasingly
economic performance of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Specifically, the two objectives of this
work are:
1. What new methodology could be implemented in order to improve upon the development of
risk-informed analysis?
2. How applicable is this methodology to U.S. and French regulatory practices?
In order to address these two questions, a case study of the analysis pertaining to the pressurized
thermal shock (PTS) phenomenon in the U.S. and France was performed. Examining the treat-
ment of PTS in these two countries is instructive because there exists a risk-informed treatment
of PTS in the U.S. and a deterministic treatment of PTS in France. The development of the U.S.
risk-informed PTS analysis from the prior deterministic analysis provided a means to assess the
strategies used to develop risk-informed analyses and, consequently, to make judgments about how
these could be improved in future applications. We developed a new methodology that could be
applied to the construction of risk-informed analyses in the future in order to make them more
logically consistent.
In looking to further improve upon the development of risk-informed reliability models, we
developed a new reliability model that addresses the effects of transient-induced degradation. The
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development of this model was inspired by a desire to understand how to perform an assessment
of the performance of a reactor vessel if it were to survive a PTS event. In order to understand how
this model could be applied usefully in the future to NPP components, the assessment of the fatigue
of NPP components was explored, as fatigue analysis is a current application of the modeling of
transient-induced degradation effects. From this review, recommendations are made regarding how
this reliability model may be applied successfully in a risk-informed manner to other components.
The assessment of the applicability of our developed methodologies led to the study of an
alternative approach to best-estimate safety analysis, which is not risk-based, known as the best-
estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) method. The application of this method to U.S. safety analysis
was studied in order to determine how the method could be improved upon in other safety analysis
applications in the future.
11.2 Summary of Findings and Recommendations
11.2.1 Comparison of French and U.S. Pressurized Thermal Shock Analyses
In order to understand the differences between a risk-informed and deterministic treatment
of the reactor vessel integrity in response to PTS, a comparison was made between the U.S. and
French approaches to the analysis. This comparison allowed for insights to be gained into the struc-
ture of risk-informed analyses that were later helpful in the development of a new risk-informed
methodology. The critique of the risk-informed development to-date also indicates areas where
further best-estimate analyses could be valuable.
The most significant difference identified between the two methods is demonstrated con-
cerning how the successful performance of the reactor vessel is defined. The U.S. treatment de-
rives its criterion for successful performance based upon the direct statement of an acceptable
level of risk, through the definition of an acceptable frequency of annual through-wall cracking.
The French treatment defines acceptable performance through the evaluation of margin to crack
initiation in the vessel, which is not based upon the use of any stated acceptable level of risk. This
discrepancy highlights the fundamental difference between the risk-informed and deterministic
approaches of these integrity assessments.
The focus of the comparison was upon the transient selection and fracture mechanics meth-
ods employed in both analyses, as these were the areas that are most dissimilar. The overall ap-
proach to the transient selection process by both countries was found to be fundamentally different,
in that the U.S methodology is structured to account for the range of thermal-hydraulic conditions
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that could result in PTS, while the French methodology considers only those cases that are under-
stood to result in the most severe PTS conditions. The most significant difference found to exist
in the fracture mechanics analysis was that between the definitions of vessel failure. In France,
vessel failure is defined as the initiation of crack growth in the vessel wall, while in the U.S., ves-
sel failure is defined by the propagation of a crack through the entire vessel wall. Although the
U.S. and French PTS analyses exhibit important fundamental differences, the two methodologies
both agree in that they both identify loss-of-cooling accidents and main steam line breaks as the
transients that contribute most significantly to the threat of reactor vessel failure.
11.2.2 Critique of the U.S. Risk-Informed PTS Analysis
The development of a methodology that would enable improved construction of risk in-
formed analyses necessitated the critique of a current application of risk-informed analysis. The
U.S risk-informed PTS analysis served as a useful means for identifying the techniques employed
in order to increase the use of best-estimate modeling and the use of explicit uncertainty treatment,
which both characterize a risk-informed analysis. We found that there was inconsistent application
of deterministic conservatisms in order to account for aspects of the model that lack sufficient data.
The existence of these conservatisms illustrated the potential for the development of superior future
methods of treating this type of uncertainty in a risk-informed analysis. Specifically, it was shown
that these conservatisms could be addressed through an improvement in risk-informed methods
by eliminating the inconsistency in the implementation of risk-informed strategies. The four tech-
niques that were identified as tools used to develop a risk-informed analysis (use of current models
and data, frequency arguments, sensitivity studies and expert judgment) were recommended to be
structured in such a way so that they are exercised consistently and are complementary to each
other in working towards achieving the goals of a risk-informed analysis.
11.2.3 Development of a New Risk-Informed Analysis Methodology
One major conclusion drawn from the critique of the U.S. risk-informed PTS analysis is that
the technical analysis used is a hybrid of the use of risk-information and conservative engineering
modeling. While this is to be expected, given that U.S. nuclear regulatory policy does not allow
for the singular use of risk arguments to support regulatory decision-making, the technical analysis
supporting the U.S. PTS rule reveals that the method by which this combination of risk-based
and engineering judgments is made could be improved. A better strategy for the implementation
of risk-information would allow for a greater level of consistency to be achieved in the future
development of risk-informed analyses.
165
CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSION
A new methodology was developed in order to address the current deficiencies in the ap-
proach to the creation of risk-informed analyses. The implementation of this methodology consists
of two major tasks: risk characterization and analytical decision-making. First, the Fussell-Vesely
importance measure is employed in order to interpret relative risk contributions of events that can
lead to undesirable end-states. Then, in order to determine how to proceed with the risk-informed
modeling process, both the improvement in the understanding of the consequences that is feasible
by better modeling and the cost associated with the development of the better consequence model
are considered. Making these judgments is inherently dependent upon the solicitation of expert
judgment for successful implementation of the methodology, but it can be done in a logically con-
sistent fashion.
The implementation of this new methodology addresses the fact that the transition from
deterministic to risk-informed analysis is not a process that is yet well defined, as it is inher-
ently based upon making thousands of decisions about how to develop most effectively the needed
best-estimate models given the constraints upon the efforts that must be expended in the process.
Therefore, if this decision-making process is more clearly delineated at each analytical crossroads,
it is likely that a more logically consistent result can be achieved than in the present. Further-
more, when the time is reached when further technical advancements should be applied in order to
update a risk-informed analysis, the implementation of this methodology provides for the access
to the decision-making framework that was previously used in the last revision of the analysis.
Therefore, the benefit of including the new knowledge of a model or parameter can be understood
in the context of the last time a decision was made concerning the quantity. This record of model
improvement can thereby help the contemporary modelers implement well-formulated modeling
decisions, as the historical modeling justification can be used to gain insight on the structure of the
analysis.
Ultimately, the use of this methodology for improving consequence analyses can allow for
the risk-informed analysis to be more easily altered in the future, making it more of a "living
document," rather than just a snapshot of the technical capabilities of a particular time. This is
practically useful, as the operating life of NPPs span many more years than most individual careers.
So when the time comes to revise the analysis, the experts needed may not be available. Therefore,
having an explicit statement of how the risk, economic and other technical considerations were
made would be informative for future analysts to consider when making their own decisions.
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11.2.4 Transient-Induced Degradation Reliability Model of Nuclear Power
Plant Components
A probabilistic reliability model was developed in order to model the effects that transient-
induced degradation has on NPP components. This reliability model can be applied in order to
make statements of belief about the economic benefits received from future NPP operation. Essen-
tially, the reliability model developed accounts for the effects that transient-induced degradation
has on the expected future failure frequency of the component. These changes in failure frequency
are then used as a means to project the future expected benefits of the operation of a NPP.
In order to gain insight into how this reliability model could be usefully applied in the future
to various NPP components, the analysis pertaining to the calculation of fatigue usage factors was
examined. Understanding the basis of this calculation is instructive because it is an example of the
consideration of the effects of transient-induced degradation. Because the analysis of the fatigue
usage factors is performed deterministically, it provided an example that could be used in order
to consider what would be required in order to implement practically a probabilistic treatment of
this type of degradation. A risk-informed method for evaluating the effect that fatigue-inducing
transients have on component failure frequency was presented.
In considering the probabilistic application of this reliability model to a broader range of
NPP components, the requirements for success were identified as the development of an accurate
characterization of the important transient contributors to degradation and their associated frequen-
cies of occurrence. As was demonstrated in the example of the fatigue usage factor, the inclusion
of on-line monitoring of actual transient occurrences enhances the predictive ability concerning
component performance, and should therefore be considered for implementation in future applica-
tions.
11.2.5 Future Implementation of the Risk-Informed Methodology in the U.S.
and France
A review of the history of the use of risk-information in U.S. and French nuclear power plant
regulation was conducted in order to be able to estimate the likelihood that the newly developed
methodologies could be applied in the development of each country's nuclear power plant regula-
tion. In the U.S., the NPP industry has gradually accepted the benefits of risk-informed regulation
in its operational practice. This has largely been influenced by the recognition of the benefits of
these practices by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as they continue to seek new oppor-
tunities for assuring safety more efficiently and confidently for risk-informed applications. Thus,
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it was found that the implementation of risk-informed practices in the future is promising.
At this time, the environment in France was found to be not as receptive to risk-informed
practices. Although France has benefited from the insights that probabilistic risk assessment can
provide, there is currently no major effort underway either within the major electric utility or the
nuclear safety regulator to encourage the increased use of risk-information in nuclear regulation.
In general, there is currently a great hesitation to make a statement about an acceptable level of
risk. Because this is inherent to the application of risk-informed practices, it was found to be
unlikely that risk-informed analyses, similar to those implemented in the U.S., will be used in the
development of French nuclear safety regulation in the near-term. However, because this hesitation
to the use of risk-informed practices is a reflection of the social tolerance of risk practices, it must
be recognized that at any time this social tolerance could change. Therefore, the risk-informed
methodologies developed in this thesis work could also be applicable in the future to the French
nuclear regulatory system, should the social attitude to the use of risk-informed practices change.
11.2.6 Evaluation of the Best-Estimate Plus Uncertainty Method
Due to the realization of the low likelihood of near-term French application of risk-informed
regulatory practices, we searched for an alternative approach that could be used in order to improve
upon conservative deterministic analyses. The best-estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) method was
identified as a candidate method. The implementation of the BEPU method allows for gains to be
achieved due to the implementation of increasingly realistic modeling, without requiring the use
of a risk-based acceptance criterion. Therefore, current applications of the BEPU method were
evaluated in order to determine how its application could be improved upon in the future in the
context of both French and U.S. nuclear regulation.
The methodology developed for U.S. application of BEPU to LBLOCA analysis was exam-
ined in order to determine whether its methods for making improvements could be made in French
treatments of PTS. The main conclusion from this examination was that the development of the
uncertainty parameter distributions could be improved upon by the elicitation of expert judgments,
instead of formulating the distributions solely by using empirical data. Although, it is believed to
be more conservative to rely only on empirically derived data in developing these distributions,
by not exercising the use of expert judgment, in fact, the methodology ignores a body of exist-
ing knowledge, which therefore brings into question the level of realism that is captured by the
modeling. Of course, it improves upon the original deterministically based formulation, but by
ignoring the use of expert judgment it is not capturing the full existing state of knowledge. In order
to implement efficiently the use of expert judgment in the distribution development process, it was
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recommended that an estimation should be made of the effect that the inclusion of expert judgment
on the development of each uncertainty distribution has on the final analytical result. Making this
judgment can allow for attention to be focused on the solicitation of expert judgment for those
parameter distributions that more significantly affect the final results.
11.3 Future Work
The future developments enabled by this work involve the practical demonstration of both
the new risk-informed analysis methodology and the transient-induced degradation reliability model.
Because the risk-informed analysis methodology is directly applicable to the real development of
risk-analyses in support of regulatory rule-making, it would ideally be applied to an actual risk-
informed revision of a deterministic analysis. The practical application of this methodology would
demonstrate whether the application of this methodology would provide for an improved imple-
mentation of risk-informed analyses. Once practically applied, the methodology would be logically
refined further, if necessary.
The validation and application of the transient-induced degradation reliability model pro-
vides significant opportunity for future research. In order to usefully show the benefits of the
application of this reliability model, two key areas of work must be performed. First, a component
needs to be identified that currently does not have transient-induced degradation considered in its
performance analysis, which could be any of virtually all NPP components. The purpose of choos-
ing a component of this type is that the application of the reliability model can demonstrate that the
consideration of only time-dependent degradation mechanisms provides for an incomplete charac-
terization of the future expected performance of the component. Once this component has been
selected, the transient-induced degradation effects will have to be shown to exist either through
the development of an understanding of the transient-induced physics of degradation, or through
examining a population of components from whose common transient experiences, the quantifi-
cation of the transient-induced degradation can be observed. Finally, once this effect has been
demonstrated, the practical requirements of monitoring these components while in operation will
have to be addressed in order to allow for NPPs to be able to predict the future reliability of their
components.
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Appendix A
Demonstration of the Risk-Informed
Fatigue Method
Introduction
As a supplement to Section 7.5.4, here we illustrate the basic steps that are required in order
to perform a risk-informed calculation of transient-induced fatigue degradation. This example
shows how the occurrence of a fatigue-inducing transient can be related directly to the level of
degradation induced by the transient in order to enable the calculation of the future reliability of
the component. This example presented here is entirely illustrative, highly simplified, and employs
fictitious parameter values. Nonetheless, this illustration explicitly presents the steps of the risk-
informed calculation, showing where probability distributions need to be applied.
In the following example, the expected (mean) values of the distributions will be calculated
in order to determine the degradation resulting from the occurrence of a fatigue-inducing transient.
This treatment is sufficient in order to demonstrate the required steps of the risk-informed process.
In a real application of this method, instead of the mean values, a distribution of the degradation
of the transient would be calculated. Therefore, the method required for interpreting the degrada-
tion distribution in order to make reliability predictions is explicitly presented here, providing a
roadmap for the future practical implementation of this method.
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Example Calculation
Transient Frequency Characterization
In this demonstration, we calculate the annual expected fatigue degradation induced by two
different hypothetical transients, A and B. Each transient is characterized by a frequency distri-
bution as shown in Figure A.0.1. The frequency distribution represents the likelihood that the
transient will occur per reactor year [ry- 1 .
These transient frequency distributions are used to calculate the annual expected transient
frequency for each transient, A and B as follows:
E(fA) = 0.4(0.3) + 0.45(0.4) + 0.15(0.5)
E(fA) = 0.375[ry-1]
E(fB) = 0.75(1) + 0.25(2)
E(fB) = 1.25 [ry-1]
Transient Consequence Characterization
Next, the consequences of the transient must be quantified. In the case of fatigue degrada-
tion, consequence characterization is performed by determining the number of cycles, at specific
stress levels, that the component experiences as a result of the transient. In a risk-informed treat-
ment, this characterization is performed probabilistically in order to fully account for the range of
possible consequences. Therefore, distributions of the number of cycles at each stress level are
used as shown in Figures A.0.2 and A.0.3. In this example, transient A and B are characterized
by both stresses a and 72. The numbers on the bars represent the number of induced cycles as a
result of the transient at the designated stress level, either ai, or 02.
From these consequence distributions, the expected risk of transient-induced consequences
can be calculated as follows,
For Transient A:
E(Nal) = {0.5(1) + 0.5(2)} x E(fA)
E(Ne1 ) = 0.56 [cycles/ry]
0.30
0.40
0.75 -+-
P
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f [ry-]
Jr2
f [ry~1]
Figure A.0. 1. Transient A and B frequency characterization
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Figure A.0.2. Transient A consequence distributions
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Figure A.0.3. Transient B consequence distributions
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E(Na,2) = {O.25 (3) +0.75(4)} x E(fA)
E(Na2) = 1.3 [cycles/ry]
For Transient B:
E(Na1 ) = {O.2(3) + (0.3)4 +0.5(5)} x E(fB)
E(Nai) = 5.4 [cycles/ry]
E(Na2) = {0.3(1)+0.6(2)+0.1(3)} x E(fB)
E(No) = 2.3 [cycles/ry]
The expected risk distributions for Transients A and B are shown in Figure A.0.4.
Crack Nucleation
The next step of the analysis concerns the calculation of the probability that a crack will
nucleate in the material given the occurrence of a transient. Probability distributions representing
the likelihood of crack nucleation given the occurrence of a specific number of cycles at a desig-
nated stress level are used in order to make this assessment. Illustrative probability distributions
are shown for stress levels ai and o-2 in Figure A.0.5.
The calculation of the probability of crack nucleation must be performed by considering
the total cycles that the component has experienced, as fatigue degradation is a cumulative phe-
nomenon. Therefore, the calculation of the probability of crack nucleation must take into consid-
@nB
E{N(o)/ry} 13-
0.56-
E{N(o)/ry}
a1 Cy2
Figure A.0.4. Expected transient A and B consequences
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Figure A.0.5. Crack nucleation probability distributions
eration the cycle number at the beginning and the end of the transient. For example, if previously
the component had experienced two cycles, and the transient induced three cycles, calculating the
probability of crack nucleation requires the use of the probability distribution to calculate the prob-
ability of crack nucleation between two and five cycles. Because the calculation of this probability
is considered cumulatively, once the component has experienced a specific number of cycles, there
will no longer be a probability of crack nucleation, as it will have certainly occurred at some point
in the history of the component's life.
In this example there is no history of induced cycles, as we assume the component is at
the beginning of life. Therefore, using these illustrative distributions, the expected probabilities
of crack nucleation for this first reactor year can be calculated for Transients A and B as follows,
using the values from the risk distributions for the bounds of integration:
For Transient A,
where,
PcracknucleationA = PcracknucleationA (( 1 ) + PcracknucleationA (U2)
0.56
PcracknucleationA(61) = J0.125Nai dN, = 0.020,
0
1.3
PcracknucleationA (G2) = f0.03125Nq2dNa2 = 0.026,
0
PcracknucleationA = 0.046
For Transient B,
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PcracknucleationB = Pcrack nucleation (u1 ) + Pcrack nucleation ((2)
where,
5.4 4 5.4
PcracknucleationB(C1 ) = f0.125NoyidNj = f0.125NidNri + f0.125NdNai = 1 +0 = 1
0 0 4
2.3
Pcrack nucleation B(C2) = f0.03125NqzdNcr = 0.083
0
PcracknucleationB > 1, SO7 PcracknucleationB = 1
As stated above, the expected probability for crack nucleation due to transient A is 0.046.
The calculation of the probability of crack nucleation for transient B shows that the nucleation of
a crack is certain.
Crack Growth Analysis
The crack growth analysis is performed for each transient once a non-zero probability of
crack nucleation is achieved as the result of the occurrence of a fatigue-inducing transient. The
crack growth analysis quantifies the degradation induced as a result the transient in terms of the
amount of crack growth. The crack growth analysis is performed until the component has failed.
The crack growth analysis performed in the risk-informed treatment is the same as in the
deterministic fatigue analysis. Therefore, this analysis is not performed probabilistically. ASME
fatigue crack growth curves are used in order to make this assessment. The use of these curves al-
lows for the determination of the crack growth that is expected to occur as a result of the component
experiencing specific induced levels of stress.
As this is an illustrative calculation, here we will assume that this deterministic calculation
results in transient A and transient B induce 2mm and 1mm of crack growth respectively.
In order to determined the expected crack growth for this first reactor year, these values are
then multiplied by the probability of crack nucleation:
For transient A:
EcrackgrowthA= 0.046 X 2mm = 0.092mm
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For transient B:
EcrackgrowthB= 1 X 1mm = 1mm.
Calculation of Component Reliability
The final step of the analysis concerns the calculation of the component's reliability. This calcula-
tion requires the definition of the failure state. Here, the failure state is crack propagation through
the entire component, which is defined by a length. In our simplified example we calculate the
expected annual crack growth in this first reactor year by summing the expected crack growths of
transients A and B as follows,
Eannual crack growth = Ecrack growth A + Ecrack growth B
Eannual crack growth = 1-1 mm per ry
In order to determine if failure occurs, the value of the expected annual crack growth is
compared to the failure definition (for example, 5mm) in order to determine if failure occurs. In
this example, failure would not occur, as 1.1 mm < 5 mm.
Clearly the calculation of the expected (mean) annual crack growth does not allow for
probabilistic statements to be made about the occurrence of component failure. Therefore, in a
real demonstration of this risk-informed method, the analytical result of the crack growth analysis
would be a probabilistic distribution of the crack growth for a given reactor-year. The reliability
of the component is calculated by calculating the probability that the crack length will be less than
that required to fail the component, or,
Reliability = Prob(x < xfail)
where, x is the crack growth and xfail is the crack length that defines component failure. Graphi-
cally this is shown in Figure A.0.6.
In our example, the degradation resulting from transients occurring in one year was eval-
uated. The usefulness of this risk-informed method, however, is its ability to characterize the
future reliability of a component over many years. Because the fatigue damage is cumulative, the
crack length resulting from sequential years of degradation is determined by adding crack growth
distributions from the current year to the crack length distribution from the prior year as follows,
Crack Lengthyear 2 = Crack Lengthyear 1 + Crack Growthyear 2
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Figure A.0.6. Determining reliability from crack length distribution
Then, the Crack Lengthyear2 distribution would be evaluated in order to determine the reliability of
the component in the second year, as shown in Figure A.0.7.
Conclusions
The above illustration of the risk-informed calculation of fatigue degradation shows how
the reliability of a component experiencing fatigue degradation can be derived by considering both
the expected consequences and the frequencies of the transients. The requirements for the real
application of this method are discussed in Section 7.5.4.6.
Crack Length Distribution for Year 1 Crack Growth Distribution for Year 2 Crack Length Distribution for Year 2
*1.
Figure A.0.7. Determination of crack length distribution for years beyond year 1
